Elliott v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 October 1912 |
| Citation | 75 S.E. 886,94 S.C. 129 |
| Parties | ELLIOTT v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marion County; Geo. E Prince, Judge.
Action by E. T. Elliott against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
J. B Gibson, of Dillon, and Jas. W. Johnson, of Marion, for appellant. Henry Buck, of Marion, and Henry E. Davis, of Florence, for respondent.
This was an action for damages by plaintiff against defendant. The complaint alleges that on May 2, 1907, at Norfolk, Va., the plaintiff delivered and defendant received for shipment a car load of mules and horses in consideration of the usual freight charges paid thereon, and the defendant agreed to safely carry and deliver same to plaintiff at Dillon, S. C that the defendant did not fulfill and perform its agreement, but, on the contrary, so carelessly and negligently acted and conducted itself in the business of common carrier that one of the horses died, and three others were injured and became diseased to such an extent that he was injured and damaged in the sum of $577.33, and he filed claim for that amount on July 10, 1907. Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint, and as a further defense set up "that, in consideration of a reduced freight rate granted to plaintiff by this defendant at the time of the shipment alleged in the complaint, plaintiff agreed and contracted with the defendant that, should damages occur to any of the horses or mules contained in the shipment described in the complaint, for which this defendant might be liable, the value at shipping point on the day of shipment should govern the settlement, in which the amount claimed for each horse or mule damaged should not exceed the sum of $75; and this defendant alleges that by reason of said contract, fairly entered into between plaintiff and defendant, for valuable consideration, the plaintiff is estopped from claiming a greater sum than $75 for loss of or damage to either or any of the horses or mules alleged in the complaint to have been damaged, or to have died, and is estopped from setting up the value of any of the said horses or mules at point of destination."
Other defenses were set up, but not relied on at the hearing. The case was first tried before Judge Shipp and a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed. Upon motion of defendant, Judge Shipp granted a new trial, on the ground he had committed error in ruling out volume 13, Interstate Commerce Reports, offered to be introduced in evidence by defendant's counsel. The case was then tried before Judge Prince and a jury in 1911, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff for $275.88, which represented the value of the horses, as limited in the bill of lading, and damage to others and freight and expenses. At the trial plaintiff offered to introduce in evidence volume 13, Interstate Commerce Reports, which Judge Prince ruled out. After verdict, plaintiff appeals and alleges error on part of the presiding judge in 12 exceptions. Exceptions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 question the correctness of his honor's ruling in holding virtually that Congress has legislated upon this subject, and the Virginia statute will not control. These exceptions are as follows:
Exception 4: "In holding 'that this contract, being for an interstate shipment, is regulated by the Interstate Commerce Law, and not by the laws of Virginia'; whereas it is submitted that, Congress not having legislated on the subject, the Interstate Commerce Law did not apply, and the contract should have been construed according to the laws of the state of Virginia, where the contract was made."
Exception 5: "In not charging the jury that the contract for shipment of the horses in question, having been made in the state of Virginia, was to be construed according to the laws of Virginia, and under the statute law of Virginia and the decisions of its courts a common carrier could not limit the common-law liability for negligence; and therefore the stipulation in the bill of lading in question undertaking to do so was null and void, and the shipper was not bound thereby."
Exception 6: "In charging the jury, 'Now, it is competent for a common carrier to limit its common-law liability to a certain extent,' in the face of the statute law of Virginia, and the decisions of the Virginia courts construing it, which had been introduced in evidence; the contract in question having been entered in the state of Virginia."
Exception 7: "In charging the jury that the stipulation contained in the bill of lading limiting the amount to be recovered in case of loss for each horse to $75, if there was a reduction of the rate of freight caused by that limitation, was valid."
Exception 8: "In not charging the jury that the attempt of the defendant to limit its common-law liability for negligence, as shown by the bill of lading introduced in evidence, was null and void under the laws of the state of Virginia, where the contract in question was entered into, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of the damages sustained, not exceeding the amount claimed, provided he had sustained loss and damage through the negligence of defendant."
Exception 9: "In not charging the jury that they should disregard that part of the bill of lading which undertook to limit the defendant's liability for damages caused by its negligence."
Exception 10: "In not charging the jury that, even if the Interstate Commerce Law was applicable, the stipulation in the bill of lading undertaking to limit the defendant's common-law liability for damages caused by its negligence was void, for the reason that the amount fixed in the bill of lading does not purport to be an agreed valuation, but was fixed arbitrarily by the defendant, without reference to the real value of the horses in question."
There is no question, if Congress has legislated upon the question we are now considering, that the state statute of Virginia must give way, and, if the act in question of the Virginia Legislature burdens interstate commerce, that it must also give way but if Congress has not legislated upon this precise question, and the Virginia act does not burden interstate commerce, then this appeal must be determined by the Virginia statute. The Virginia statute is as follows: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial