75 U.S. 85 (1869), Ex Parte Yerger
|Citation:||75 U.S. 85, 19 L.Ed. 332|
|Party Name:||EX PARTE YERGER.|
|Case Date:||October 25, 1869|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
On motion and petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, the case being thus:
The Constitution ordains in regard to the judiciary as follows:
'The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,' &c.
'In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.'
It makes provision, also, in regard to the writ of habeas corpus, thus:
'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.'
With these provisions in force, as fundamental law, the first Congress by the 14th section of the act of September 24th, 1789, 1 to establish the judicial courts of the United States, after certain enactments relating to the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts, and the District Courts of the United States, enacted:
'That all the before-mentioned courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not especially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law, and that either of the Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as Judges of the District Courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of and inquiry into the cause of commitment: Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail unless they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.'
By statute of 1833, 2 the writ was extended to prisoners confined under any authority, whether State or National, for any act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of any order, process, or decree of any judge or court of the United States; and by an act of 1842, 3 to prisoners, being subjects or citizens of foreign states, in custody under National or State authority for acts done or omitted by or under color of foreign authority, and alleged to be valid under the law of nations.
The writ was, however, much further extended, by an act of the 5th February, 1867, 4 entitled 'An act to 'amend' the
Judiciary Act of 1789, above quoted.' This act of 1867, provided:
'That the several courts of the United States, and the several justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs ofhabeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty, in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States,' &c.
And after providing for the awarding and hearing of the writ, the act proceeds:
'From the final decision of any judge, justice, or courts inferior to the Circuit Court, appeal may be taken to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district in which the said cause is heard, and from the judgment of said Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States.'
Finally, by an act of March 27th, 1868, 5 passed after an appeal in a particular case, the subject of much party discussion, under the above-quoted act of 1867, from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, had been argued before this latter court, had been taken into advisement by it--a history more particularly set forth in Ex parte McCardle 6--Congress passed an act providing by its second section:
'That so much of the act, approved February 5th, 1867, entitled 'An act to amend an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved September 24th, 1789,' as authorized an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said Supreme Court on appeals which have been or may hereafter be taken, be, and the same is hereby, repealed.'
In this state of constitutional and statutory provisions, a writ of habeas corpus upon the prayer of one Yerger, addressed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, was directed to certain military officers
holding the petitioner in custody, commanding them to produce his body, and abide the order of the court.
In obedience to this writ, the petitioner was brought into court by Major-General R. S. Granger, who made return in due form, certifying the cause of detention to be, that the petitioner had been arrested, and was held for trial, upon a charge of murder, by a military commission, under the act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1867, 'to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States.'
Upon this return, the petitioner was ordered into the custody of the marshal, and the court proceeded to hear argument. It was admitted on the part of the United States, that the petitioner was a private citizen of the State of Mississippi; that he was being tried by the military commission, without a jury, and without presentment or indictment by a grand jury; and, that he was not, and never had been, connected with the army and navy of the United States, or with the militia in active service in time of war or invasion.
Upon this case, the Circuit Court adjudged that the imprisonment of the petitioner was lawful, and passed an order that the writ of habeas corpus be dismissed, and that the prisoner be remanded to the custody of the military officer by whom he had been brought into court, to be held and detained for the purposes, and to answer the charge set forth in the return.
To obtain the reversal of that order, and relief from imprisonment, the petitioner now asked for a writ of certiorari to bring here for review the proceedings of the Circuit Court, and for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued, under the authority of this court, to the officers to whose custody he was remanded.
The questions therefore were:
1. Whether the action of the Circuit Court was to be regarded as the cause of the commitment, to which the act of 1789 applies the writ of habeas corpus; and whether, if found unlawful, relief might be granted, although the original imprisonment was by military officers for the purpose of a trial before a military commission.
2. If the court possessed this jurisdiction, had it been taken away by the 2d section of the act of March, 1868?
Upon the suggestion of the Attorney-General, made in view of the importance of the questions which would probably arise, if the case was brought to hearing, the court ordered preliminary argument upon the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ prayed for; the only question, therefore, raised in the present stage of the case.
Messrs. P. Phillips and Carlisle, in support of the motion, conceding that this court could grant the writ only in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, yet argued, that the writ of habeas corpus, being a bulwark of freedom, demanded a liberal interpretation of clauses in the Constitution and statutes relating to it, so as to allow and preserve the writ, rather than to withhold or destroy it; that the grant of the writ as here invoked was in the exercise of an appellate power; that, as was decided in Ex parte Milligan, 7 in the face of a powerful argument by Mr. Stanbery to the contrary, proceeding in habeas corpus was a suit, a process of law, by which the party sought to obtain his rights. The proceeding in the Circuit Court was therefore a suit; and, undoubtedly, there had been an order in it; an order, namely, that the writ of habeas corpus be dismissed, and the prisoner remanded to answer the charge set forth in the return. Yerger, the prisoner in this case, was, therefore, at this time, in the possession of the military authorities, in virtue of an order of the Circuit Court. The review by this court of such an order, was an exercise of appellate power, and of no other power.
It was, therefore, unnecessary to invoke such cases as In re Kaine. 8
But if the exercise of the power which was asked, were not the exercise of a power in review of a decision of the Circuit Court, that case would still authorize this application. What was that case? Kaine was arrested as an alleged fugitive from justice, and brought before a United States Commissioner,
who made an order committing him to custody, to abide the order of the President. A writ of habeas corpus was then issued by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Kaine was brought before that court. After a hearing, the writ was dismissed, and Kaine was remanded and continued in the custody of the marshal under the arrest and commitment by the process of the commissioner.
An application was finally made in this court for a writ of habeas corpus and a certiorari to the Circuit Court, in order to review the order made by that court, remanding the prisoner to the custody of the marshal.
On the hearing of this motion, the writ was refused, not because of any doubt of the jurisdiction of the court to award...
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