Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-5839,83-5839
• Citation: 750 F.2d 1208
• Parties: 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1026, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,860, 40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1061 Gwendolyn HOWZE, Appellant, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 1208

750 F.2d 1208

36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1026,

35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,860, 40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1061

Gwendolyn HOWZE, Appellant, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP., Appellee.

No. 83-5839.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Sept. 10, 1984.

Decided Dec. 28, 1984.

Thomas J. Henderson (argued), Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

John C. Unkovic (argued), Robert F. Prorok, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.

Before SEITZ, BECKER, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SEITZ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Gwendolyn Howze, appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to defendant in this employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. Howze further appeals from the district court's denial of her motions to extend the period for discovery and to grant leave to amend her complaint. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

I. BACKGROUND

Howze alleges that she was denied a promotion by her employer, defendant Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation ("J & L"), because she is black. Since February of 1980, Howze has been a full-time employee of J & L. Although initially hired into the stenographic pool, she was later assigned as a receptionist-stenographer in J & L's Public Relations Department. While serving in that capacity, Howze claims that she was told by her supervisor that the position of Staff Assistant to the Corporate Contributions Committee (the "CCC") would be created and that she would be recommended for the position. The CCC is a Pittsburgh organization consisting of corporate representatives who are responsible for making determinations with respect to charitable contributions.

Howze alleges that on April 16, 1981, her supervisor informed her that she would not be considered for the Staff Assistant position because of her race. According to Howze, one of the functions of the Staff Assistant would be to attend the meetings of the CCC. She claims that she was told by her supervisor that since there was already one black corporate representative on the committee it was "highly unlikely" that she would be promoted to fill that position. Howze also alleges that her supervisor told her that J & L did not place blacks in positions of high public exposure.

Howze alleges that it was J & L's practice not to post job openings or to publicly seek applications. For this reason, Howze did not have the opportunity to apply for the Staff Assistant job.

On August 18, 1981, a white secretary was promoted to fill the newly created Staff Assistant position. Howze believes that she was more qualified than the white woman who was promoted because she had been performing many of the duties of the Staff Assistant before the position was created. These responsibilities included the preparation of budgets and reports, and correspondence to the CCC.

Howze filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") on February 4, 1982, the 294th day after the alleged discrimination. Following an investigation, the EEOC determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe that J & L had discriminated against Howze. A right to sue letter was issued by the EEOC on August 11, 1982.

Howze timely filed the present action in the district court on November 2, 1982. Her pro se complaint alleged instances of class-wide race discrimination as well as her individual claims. She was assisted in the preparation of her pro se complaint by a non-resident attorney whom she had contacted by telephone. Howze did not meet personally with the attorney, nor did he ever consent to represent her.

Howze's case was consolidated for pretrial proceedings with a similar action brought by fellow employee Alex Jones, whose appeal we also decide today. See Jones v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir.1984). The district court ordered that all discovery be completed within 60 days of the filing of J & L's answer. Because of the difficulties Howze experienced in attempting to obtain counsel, the period for discovery had expired before an attorney was retained in March of 1983. Howze's counsel moved to amend the complaint and to expand the period for discovery, but these motions were denied. Thus, the record before the district court on the basis of which the district court granted summary judgment consisted solely of Howze's complaint, J & L's answer, Howze's deposition, obtained while she was without counsel, an affidavit by John Purser, J & L's Vice President of Public Affairs, and Howze's affidavit. The district court granted J & L's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff had failed to file her charge with the EEOC in a timely fashion and had not made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of the EEOC Charge

A plaintiff under Title VII must file a timely charge with the EEOC before initiating suit in federal court. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 523, 92 S.Ct. 616, 617, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972). Two statutory provisions are relevant in determining whether Howze's particular claim was timely filed with the EEOC. First, the statute requires that charges be filed with the EEOC no later than 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). However, if a complainant initiates proceedings with a state or local employment discrimination agency, the filing period is extended to 300 days. Id. Second, in states that have such agencies, a federal charge will not be deemed to have been "filed," though it has been submitted to the EEOC, "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(c).

The purpose of the sixty-day deferral period is to provide the states with a limited opportunity to resolve discrimination claims locally before a complainant may seek federal relief. Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2074, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA")). The extended period for the filing of EEOC claims by deferral state complainants was intended to prevent the "forfeiture of a complainant's federal rights while participating in state proceedings." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 821, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2494, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980) (footnote omitted).

It is undisputed that Pennsylvania is a deferral state within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5. Thus, the 300-day filing period applies if Howze had initiated proceedings with the relevant state agency, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the "PHRC"). Howze admits that she did not file a charge with the PHRC. Nevertheless, she contends that she is entitled to the longer filing period because the EEOC referred her charge to the PHRC. In Love v. Pullman, supra, the Supreme Court held that an EEOC referral to the state agency satisfies the requirement that state proceedings be initiated. A state filing by the EEOC entitles the complainant to the 300 day filing limit even if, as here, the state filing is untimely under state law. Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 815-16, 100 S.Ct. at 2491-92; Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 707 F.2d 748, 751 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 164, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983).

J & L argues that, although Howze contended in the district court that the EEOC "notified" a local agency of her charge, she provided no supporting evidence of this contention. It quotes the district court's observation that "a statement in a brief is not factual evidence for purposes of a motion for summary judgment," and concludes that Howze cannot survive summary judgment on this issue. The district court did not reach this conclusion, however. It assumed, without deciding, that plaintiff was entitled to the 300-day filing period. Indeed, we cannot see how the district court could have decided the "notice" issue in J & L's favor. The record is barren on this particular issue and, of course, J & L had the burden of clearly demonstrating on the record that no genuine issue of material fact existed. See Hicks v. ABT Associates, Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir.1978). And it is worth noting that Howze's pro se complaint alleged that "[a]ll conditions precedent to the institution of this civil action have been fulfilled."

J & L next argues that the district court was correct in concluding that, even assuming the 300-day filing period is applicable to Howze's charge, it was untimely. In reaching its conclusion, the district court noted that the undisputed facts established that the date of the alleged discrimination was April 16, 1981, and that the charge was filed with the EEOC on February 4, 1982. It held that "Mohasco Corp., supra, requires that a charge filed first with the EEOC in [a] deferral state ... must be filed within 240 days of the date of the alleged discrimination." Thus, the district court concluded that Howze's charge, filed with the EEOC 294 days after the alleged discrimination, was 54 days too late.

This holding is a misreading of Mohasco. That case does hold that a filing within 240 days will "insure" that a complainant's rights are preserved. It goes on to explain, however, that even if a complaint is filed after 240 days have passed, a complainant's rights will be preserved "if the State happens to complete its consideration of the charge prior to the end of the 300-day period." 447 U.S. at 814 n. 16, 100 S.Ct. at 2491 n. 16.

J & L argues, however, what amounts to the position that the district court was entitled to conclude that the local agency's consideration was not terminated because Howze presented no evidence to the contrary in the district court. This argument is misplaced for two...