Pinder v. Pinder, 97-04888.

Decision Date25 June 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97-04888.,97-04888.
Citation750 So.2d 651
PartiesJacqueline PINDER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Herbert L. PINDER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Mary Ellen Borja, Clearwater, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Karol K. Williams and Allison M. Perry, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

BLUE, Judge.

Jacqueline Pinder appeals the equitable distribution and alimony award in the dissolution of her fifteen-year marriage to Herbert L. Pinder. She raises six issues, challenging: (1) the valuation of a preschool business and determination that fifty percent of the business was a marital asset; (2) the valuation of certain Pennsylvania real estate (the preschool property) and determination that fifty percent of the real estate was a marital asset; (3) the equitable distribution of certain nonmarital assets; (4) the failure to distribute marital debt;1 (5) the valuation of intangible marital assets; and (6) the award of a Florida house to Mr. Pinder as lump sum alimony. Mr. Pinder cross-appeals with five issues, challenging: (1) the lack of permanent alimony; (2) the failure to award special equity in the preschool business; (3) the determination that the Florida house was a nonmarital asset; (4) the failure to recognize an enhancement and/or special equity in the Florida house; and (5) the failure to award attorney's fees and costs. Based on the errors discussed below, we reverse and remand. In doing so, we offer some sympathy for the trial court's work in attempting to sort out the complicated financial affairs of these parties. Nevertheless, further work is necessary to fashion an equitable distribution that comports with the dictates of chapter 61, Florida Statutes (1995).2

We start first with a very brief factual background. Mr. and Mrs. Pinder were married in 1982, shortly after Mrs. Pinder was divorced from her first husband. Mrs. Pinder bought a house in Florida and the parties lived there after moving from Pennsylvania. Although titled in Mrs. Pinder's name alone, both parties contributed to the mortgage payments and worked on the house. The property settlement from the first marriage was not completed until several years into the second marriage. In the property settlement, Mrs. Pinder received sole title to a four-story building in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with a preschool business located in the basement and first floor. (The real property and preschool are hereafter referred to as the Philadelphia assets.) The preschool was started by Mrs. Pinder prior to her second marriage and she has continued to run the business. Mr. Pinder assisted his wife in the operation of the preschool throughout the marriage, teaching and handling all manner of duties, including administration and maintenance. After several years in Florida, the parties moved back to Philadelphia and lived in the upper floors of the four-story building. Mr. Pinder performed and/or financed some of the renovations on this space. In her first and second issues, Mrs. Pinder challenges the trial court's determination that fifty percent of the Philadelphia assets were marital property. We do not agree with the trial court's classification of these assets and reverse. Section 61.075(5)(a)1 defines marital assets as those "acquired ... during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them." Section 61.075(5)(b)1 defines nonmarital assets as those acquired before the marriage and "assets acquired... in exchange for such assets." Although Mrs. Pinder received sole title to the Philadelphia assets during her second marriage, when the paperwork from the dissolution of her first marriage was settled, these assets were received in exchange for assets she had acquired before the second marriage. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's classification of fifty percent of the Philadelphia assets as marital property. On remand, after setting aside the Philadelphia assets as Mrs. Pinder's nonmarital property, the trial court shall recalculate the equitable distribution.3 The trial court must also determine whether their value has been enhanced by marital assets or labor. See Cornette v. Cornette, 704 So.2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)

. The enhancement, if any, would be a marital asset subject to distribution. See Gill v. Gill, 632 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Because the trial court's valuation of these assets is conflicting, we reverse and remand for the trial...

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