Aguilar v. State

• Decision Date: 11 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 17057,17057
• Citation: 1988 NMSC 4,106 N.M. 798,751 P.2d 178
• Parties: Javier AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 178

751 P.2d 178

106 N.M. 798

Javier AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico, Respondent.

No. 17057.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 11, 1988.

Jacquelyn Robins, Chief Public Defender, Bruce Rogoff, Asst. Public Defender, Santa Fe, for petitioner.

Hal Stratton, Atty. Gen., Tracy Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for respondent.

OPINION

RANSOM, Justice.

Javier Aguilar (defendant) was convicted of the commercial burglary of Dexter Hardware. This conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. We granted certiorari. The defendant raises five issues in his petition for certiorari. We address only one, whether the defendant's confession should have been suppressed as involuntary. As to that issue, we reverse the opinion of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial, disallowing the admission of the confession. As to the remaining issues, we find them either to be without merit or rendered moot by our disposition of the case.

On the night of November 9, 1985, after discovering a broken window at Dexter Hardware, a police officer entered the premises, found the defendant and arrested him. The next day, Dexter Chief of Police Carlos Barela read defendant his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant read and signed an advice of rights waiver.

Chief Barela said he read and explained the Miranda warning to the defendant prior to questioning him and the Chief thought the defendant understood what was being said. Chief Barela had known Chief Barela explained on cross-examination: "[W]hat I intended to convey to him was that if I had to work and the D.A.'s had to put a lot of work into it, this would not be good." The defendant confessed.

[106 NM 799] the defendant for several years; he knew that the defendant's family had had problems with the defendant and that the defendant had been committed to the New Mexico State Hospital. Chief Barela acknowledged that he encouraged the defendant to confess to the Dexter Hardware burglary by assuring him that a confession to the crime would be taken into favorable consideration by everyone concerned. Chief Barela further admitted having told the defendant that the police had found the perpetrator's fingerprints at the scene of the burglary, although no fingerprints were introduced at trial. Finally, Chief Barela admitted having implied that, if the defendant did not confess, the defendant could be charged in connection with unrelated incidents of vandalism in Dexter.

Defendant has a history of mental illness. He was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. In the eighteen months preceding his arrest, he was twice committed to the New Mexico State Hospital suffering from both visual and auditory hallucinations. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was on a discharge plan from the state hospital that required him to take antipsychotic medication daily and to attend weekly mental therapy counseling. In addition, defendant's I.Q. of seventy placed him on the borderline of mental retardation.

Frank Everitt, a forensic evaluator, opined that the interrogation would have been stressful to the defendant, possibly causing him to act impulsively. Further, Everitt testified that due to the defendant's subnormal intelligence and his mental illness, defendant more than likely had difficulty in appreciating the meaning of Chief Barela's assurances and in distinguishing whether a deal had been made. The defendant stated to Everitt that he thought the Chief of Police was promising him a "good deal."

The appropriate standard of review applicable to coerced confession claims is adequately set out in the court of appeals opinion. As there stated, appellate courts have a duty to examine the entire record and the circumstances under which the confession was made, and to make an independent determination of the ultimate question of voluntariness. See, e.g. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958). Accordingly, New Mexico has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test. State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705 (Ct.App.1986); State v. Aguirre, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).

Although the court below announced the correct standard, the majority does not appear to have applied it. Rather than examine the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals focused upon only that evidence favorable to a finding of voluntariness. See State v. Aguilar, (Ct.App.1987) (Bivins J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). [Opinion attached herewith to Justice Stowers' dissenting opinion.] In any event, our review on certiorari entails an independent examination of the record to determine whether evidence of voluntariness preponderates.

The court of appeals relied upon the following evidence to affirm the trial court's determination that the defendant's confession was voluntary. The defendant was no stranger to the criminal justice system. The defendant signed an advice of rights waiver. Although the defendant had a history of mental illness, his behavior during the interrogation appeared normal. The defendant's I.Q. of seventy could possibly be the result of the test being conducted in English while Spanish is the defendant's primary language. Notwithstanding his subnormal I.Q. and failure to graduate from high school, the defendant had a tenth grade reading level.

In examining voluntariness claims, we follow the three phase analytical framework set out in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). The first phase addresses the totality The due process standards are that the confession must have been freely given and not induced by promise or threat. State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960); State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. at 198, 718 P.2d at 708. The state bears the burden of establishing voluntariness. State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. at 198, 718 P.2d at 708. If the state fails to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court must rule that the confession was involuntary as a matter of law. Id. Consequently, if the state only adduces evidence proving an equal likelihood that the confession was either voluntary or involuntary, the state has not satisfied its burden.

[106 NM 800] of circumstances surrounding the procurement of the contested confession. The second and third phases of the analysis involve the largely inferential determination of how the accused reacted to the external facts and the application of the due process standards to the court's perception of how the defendant reacted. Under these phases of the analysis, the appellate court must draw its own conclusions based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 604-06, 81 S.Ct. at 1880-81; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

We find that the state did not meet its burden. Here, due to the subnormal intelligence and mental illness of the accused, he unquestionably had difficulty in appreciating the meaning of the assurances given to him by Chief Barela and in distinguishing whether a deal had been made. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus."). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08, 83 S.Ct. 745, 754, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Further, the forensic evaluator testified that the interrogation would have been so stressful to the defendant that he might have acted impulsively.

Chief Barela's interrogation alternated between threatening the defendant with charges in connection with unrelated incidents of vandalism in Dexter and assuring the defendant that a confession to the burglary would be looked upon favorably by all concerned. In the totality of the circumstances, this interrogation technique is preponderant. In comparison with all evidence to the contrary, these implied threats and promises, especially when knowingly made to a defendant with diminished mental capacity, rendered the confession involuntary as a matter of law. See State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705 (Ct.App.1986).

Therefore, under the standard of review set forth above, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the state did not meet its burden of establishing that the confession of the defendant was freely given and not induced by promise or threat. We remand to the district court for a new trial, disallowing the admission of defendant's confession.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SCARBOROUGH, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and WALTERS, J., concur.

STOWERS, dissents.

STOWERS, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent and incorporate herein the decision of the court of appeals.

The ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the court must assess the totality of all of the circumstances surrounding the confession which include the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973); State v. Aguirre, 91 N.M. 672, 673, 579 P.2d 798, 799 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).

The court of appeals properly considered the following factual circumstances. Defendant was twenty-four years old when Chief Barela's statements during the interrogation did not constitute an express promise of leniency. See State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 199, 718 P.2d 705, 709 (Ct.App.1986). His statements that no deals were made, that the district attorney would make the final determination, that a confession to the crime would be taken...