Walton v. Dawson
| Decision Date | 30 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–4000.,12–4000. |
| Parties | Cody Lee WALTON, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Robert DAWSON, Defendant–Appellant. Jon Dwiggins; Nathaniel Eugene Flennory; Drew Belt; Alan R. Wyatt; Unknown Deputy, Defendants David Moore, Defendant–Appellant Michael Shively, Macon County Deputy Sheriff in his official and individual capacity; Adair County Commission, in their official capacity; Unknown Macon County Deputy, Sheriff in his official and individual capacity; Gary D. Jones, Commissioner of Adair County, Missouri, in his individual and official capacity; Robert T. Hardwick, Sheriff of Adair County, Missouri, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John Boyd Morthland, Hannibal, MO (Amy Lee Ohnemus, Hannibal, MO, on the brief), for appellant.
Stephen Sherman Wyse, Columbia, MO, for appellee.
Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
While in pretrial detention at the Macon County Jail (jail) in Missouri, Cody Lee Walton was the victim of a sexual assault. A troubled youth who bounced in and out of foster care, Walton was nineteen years old and weighed 135 pounds at the time of the assault. The thirty five year old rapist, Nathan Flennory, was a 195–pound registered sex offender with a history of violence: he stood convicted of second-degree assault on a law enforcement officer, domestic assault, and unlawful use of a weapon, and just four days before his assault on Walton, he pled guilty to forcible rape. Because the jailer did not lock the cell doors at night, Flennory was able to enter Walton's cell, threaten to “kill [Walton] in [his] sleep,” and leave Walton physically bloodied and emotionally bruised.
Walton brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state law claims against those he considers responsible for the assault. At issue in this interlocutory appeal are Walton's Fourteenth Amendment failure to train claims against Robert Dawson, the sheriff of Macon County, and David Moore, the jail administrator (collectively, officials). On summary judgment, the district court denied both officials qualified immunity, concluding the facts showed the officials were indifferent to the known risk posed by leaving cell doors unlocked overnight while Flennory was an inmate. Although the district court denied Moore qualified immunity based on a careful, individualized assessment, the district court offered no particularized basis to deny Sheriff Dawson qualified immunity. We exercise our limited interlocutory jurisdiction, affirming in part and reversing in part.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Walton arrived in the jail on August 25, 2010, after extradition from Indiana, to face charges relating to the theft of an automobile and carrying a gun without a permit—charges to which Walton later pled guilty and received a sentence of probation and community service. At the time of the sexual assault, Walton had not yet been arraigned. Before the assault, the individual cell doors were never locked while Walton was an inmate.
The rape occurred in the predawn hours of August 30, 2010. Flennory left his own unlocked cell, entered Walton's unlocked cell, and had Walton follow him back to his cell. Walton did not call for help because he “was really terrified” and Flennory threatened, “Don't say a word, or I'll kill you.” Flennory sodomized Walton and again threatened to kill him. After Flennory left him alone, Walton used toilet paper to wipe himself and saw blood running down his leg. Walton then wrote a message on a piece of paper: Fearing Flennory might return, Walton hid the paper until a female guard delivered breakfast. Presumably because Flennory in a nearby cell could overhear, Walton simply handed the paper to the guard and said nothing. The guard left before reading the note, but quickly returned and removed Walton from the cell block. Another officer took Walton to the local hospital, where he received treatment.
The jailer on duty the night of the assault was Ryszard Bilinski. That was not the first night Bilinski left the cell doors unlocked. Though the jail had an unwritten policy that doors were to be locked at night, Walton presented evidence the policy was routinely ignored. On a prior occasion, Moore arrived at the end of Bilinski's night shift and learned Bilinski left the cell doors unlocked overnight. Moore says he verbally reprimanded Bilinski, and Bilinski “indicated that he understood and that he would lock the jail cells down at night.” Bilinski said that during the “almost three months” before the rape, Moore “ never questioned [his] not-adhering to that rule.” (Emphasis added).
Three months before the rape at issue in this case, Flennory entered another inmate's unlocked cell at night while the inmate was asleep and bit the inmate's penis. The inmate awoke and pushed Flennory away, then reported he had “been sexually assaulted.” Moore admits he knew about this incident, but claims he did not know the inmate suffered “any physical injury ... as a result of the incident.” The inmate avers the assault drew blood. Flennory was temporarily placed in segregation, then returned to the general population shortly before Walton's rape after Flennory displayed suicidal tendencies and promised to behave.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Walton, the district court saw enough “to refute [the officials'] claim” that “they had no knowledge the jail cells were not being locked down at night.” Based on Moore's personal knowledge of Bilinski's failure to lock the cell doors and the relatively recent assault involving another inmate, the district court found “Walton's submissions [on the failure to train claim] sufficient to survive summary judgment.” Much of the district court's analysis focused specifically on Moore's culpability, and the district court only discussed Sheriff Dawson's knowledge in general terms. The district court “recognize[d] Walton's claim against Moore is stronger than that against Dawson.”
It is undisputed that upon learning of Walton's rape, Sheriff Dawson issued written reprimands to both the jail administrator, Moore, and the jailer on duty, Bilinski. In his reprimand to Bilinski, the sheriff noted Walton's rape “was a very tragic event”—“one of the most serious events to occur in the jail during [his] time as Sheriff”—and emphasized “[t]he fact that another employee may not be following policy is no reason for [Bilinski] not to follow it.” Bilinski “cited training and equipment as well as the fact [he was] a new employee as [his] primary reason[s] for not following policy.” Sheriff Dawson “w[ould] not accept them as a legitimate excuse for not following ... the policy of locking the inmates down at night.”
In his reprimand to Moore, Sheriff Dawson explained that had the “policy been followed[,] it may have prevented this very serious incident.” The sheriff took “disciplinary action, for [Moore] not enforcing [the] policy,” and “plac [ed] [Moore] on probation for the next 90 days.” Sheriff Dawson noted that he had “learned from talking to [Moore] after the [sexual assault of Walton], [that] some of the jailers ha[d] not been adhering to th[e] policy on a regular basis.” (Emphasis added).
Both officials appeal the denial of qualified immunity, and Walton moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
II. DISCUSSIONA. Jurisdiction
We begin with jurisdiction, which is always our “ ‘first and fundamental question.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900)). A denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage “is immediately appealable if it ‘resolve[s] a dispute concerning an abstract issu[e] of law relating to qualified immunity.’ ” Lockridge v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.2003) (en banc) (alterations in original) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996)). Such a denial is not immediately appealable if it rests solely on a determination of “whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Questions of law may be appealed right away, but questions of fact may not. See, e.g., id. at 313–18, 115 S.Ct. 2151.
This does not mean a district court can guide a case to trial without ever deciding the “essentially legal question” whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Where a district court “simply d[oes] not rule on the qualified immunity issue,” we have jurisdiction to require the district court to issue such a ruling. Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam). But it does mean that if the parties agree on the law but disagree about the facts, there is no issue for us to decide on an interlocutory appeal. SeeAaron v. Shelley, 624 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.2010).
Applying these principles to this case, we have no jurisdiction at this juncture to decide whether “the district court's determination of evidentiary sufficiency” was correct. Thomas v. Talley, 251 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir.2001). We can, however, accept the district court's factual findings as true and decide whether those facts, as a “purely legal issue,” involve a clearly established violation of federal law. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151. Because this is what the officials' appeal asks us to do, we have jurisdiction over this case under the collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528–30, 105 S.Ct. 2806.
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