McCleskey v. Kemp, 84-8176

• Citation: 753 F.2d 877
• Decision Date: 29 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-8176,84-8176
• Parties: Warren McCLESKEY, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Ralph KEMP, Warden, Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 877

753 F.2d 877

Warren McCLESKEY, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Ralph KEMP, Warden, Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

No. 84-8176.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 29, 1985.

Mary Beth Westmoreland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellant, cross-appellee.

Robert H. Stroup, Atlanta, Ga., John Charles Boger, Anthony G. Amsterdam, New York University-School of Law, New York City, for petitioner-appellee, cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RONEY, TJOFLAT, JAMES C. HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, ALBERT J. HENDERSON, HATCHETT, R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges TJOFLAT, JAMES C. HILL, FAY, VANCE, ALBERT J. HENDERSON and R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, join ^*:

This case was taken en banc principally to consider the argument arising in numerous capital cases that statistical proof shows the Georgia capital sentencing law is being administered in an unconstitutionally discriminatory and arbitrary and capricious matter. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing which focused on a study by Professor David C. Baldus, the district court concluded for a variety of reasons that the statistical evidence was insufficient to support the claim of unconstitutionality in the death sentencing process in Georgia. We affirm the district court's judgment on this point.

The en banc court has considered all the other claims involved on this appeal. On the State's appeal, we reverse the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief on the claim that the prosecutor failed to disclose a promise of favorable treatment to a state witness in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). We affirm the judgment denying relief on all other points raised by the defendant, that is: (1) that defendant received ineffective assistance of Thus, concluding that the district court should have denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we affirm on all claims denied by the court, but reverse the grant of habeas corpus relief on the Giglio claims.

counsel; (2) that jury instructions contravened the due process clause in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); and (3) that the exclusion of death-scrupled jurors violated the right to an impartial and unbiased jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.

FACTS

Warren McCleskey was arrested and charged with the murder of a police officer during an armed robbery of the Dixie Furniture Store. The store was robbed by a band of four men. Three entered through the back door and one through the front. While the men in the rear of the store searched for cash, the man who entered through the front door secured the showroom by forcing everyone there to lie face down on the floor. Responding to a silent alarm, a police officer entered the store by the front door. Two shots were fired. One shot struck the police officer in the head causing his death. The other glanced off a cigarette lighter in his chest pocket.

McCleskey was identified by two of the store personnel as the robber who came in the front door. Shortly after his arrest, McCleskey confessed to participating in the robbery but maintained that he was not the triggerman. McCleskey confirmed the eyewitness' accounts that it was he who entered through the front door. One of his accomplices, Ben Wright, testified that McCleskey admitted to shooting the officer. A jail inmate housed near McCleskey testified that McCleskey made a "jail house confession" in which he claimed he was the triggerman. The police officer was killed by a bullet fired from a .38 caliber Rossi handgun. McCleskey had stolen a .38 caliber Rossi in a previous holdup.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The jury convicted McCleskey of murder and two counts of armed robbery. At the penalty hearing, neither side called any witnesses. The State introduced documentary evidence of McCleskey's three prior convictions for armed robbery.

The jury sentenced McCleskey to death for the murder of the police officer and to consecutive life sentences for the two counts of armed robbery. These convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court. McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 253, 66 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980). McCleskey then petitioned for habeas corpus relief in state court. This petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The Georgia Supreme Court denied McCleskey's application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. McCleskey v. Zant, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S.Ct. 659, 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981).

McCleskey then filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court asserting, among other things, the five constitutional challenges at issue on this appeal. After an evidentiary hearing and consideration of extensive memoranda filed by the parties, the district court entered the lengthy and detailed judgment from which these appeals are taken. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F.Supp. 338 (N.D.Ga.1984).

This opinion addresses each issue asserted on appeal in the following order: (1) the Giglio claim, (2) constitutionality of the application of Georgia's death penalty, (3) effective assistance of counsel, (4) death-qualification of jurors, and (5) the Sandstrom issue.

GIGLIO CLAIM

The district court granted habeas corpus relief to McCleskey because it determined that the state prosecutor failed to reveal that one of its witnesses had been promised favorable treatment as a reward for his testimony. The State violates due process when it obtains a conviction through the use of false evidence or on the We hold that (1) there was no promise in this case, as contemplated by Giglio; and (2) in any event, had there been a Giglio violation, it would be harmless. Thus, we reverse the grant of habeas corpus relief on this ground.

                basis of a witness's testimony when that witness has failed to disclose a promise of favorable treatment from the prosecution.   Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)
                

Offie Gene Evans, a prisoner incarcerated with McCleskey, was called by the State on rebuttal to strengthen its proof that McCleskey was the triggerman at the holdup. Evans testified that McCleskey admitted to him in jail that he shot the policeman and that McCleskey said he had worn makeup to disguise his appearance during the robbery.

The "Promise"

At McCleskey's state habeas corpus hearing, Evans gave the following account of certain conversations with state officials.

THE COURT: Mr. Evans, let me ask you a question. At the time that you testified in Mr. McCleskey's trial, had you been promised anything in exchange for your testimony?

THE WITNESS: No, I wasn't. I wasn't promised nothing about--I wasn't promised nothing by the D.A. but the Detective told me that he would--he said he was going to do it himself, speak a word for me. That was what the Detective told me.

Q: (by McCleskey's attorney): The Detective said he would speak a word for you?

A: Yeah.

A deposition of McCleskey's prosecutor that was taken for the state habeas corpus proceeding reveals that the prosecutor contacted federal authorities after McCleskey's trial to advise them of Evans' cooperation and that the escape charges were dropped.

The Trial Testimony

At the trial, the State brought out on direct examination that Evans was incarcerated on the charge of escape from a federal halfway house. Evans denied receiving any promises from the prosecutor and downplayed the seriousness of the escape charge.

Q: [by prosecutor]: Mr. Evans, have I promised you anything for testifying today?

A: No, sir, you ain't.

Q: You do have an escape charge still pending, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir. I've got one, but really it ain't no escape, what the peoples out there tell me, because something went wrong out there so I just went home. I stayed at home and when I called the man and told him that I would be a little late coming in, he placed me on escape charge and told me there wasn't no use of me coming back, and I just stayed on at home and he come and picked me up.

Q: Are you hoping that perhaps you won't be prosecuted for that escape?

A: Yeah, I hope I don't, but I don't--what they tell me, they ain't going to charge me with escape no way.

Q: Have you asked me to try to fix it so you wouldn't get charged with escape?

A: No, sir.

Q: Have I told you I would try to fix it for you?

A: No, sir.

The State Habeas Corpus Decision

The state court rejected McCleskey's Giglio claim on the following reasoning:

Mr. Evans at the habeas hearing denied that he was promised anything for his testimony. He did state that he was told by Detective Dorsey that Dorsey would 'speak a word' for him. The detective's ex parte communication recommendation alone is not sufficient to trigger the applicability of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 [92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104] (1972).

The prosecutor at petitioner's trial, Russel J. Parker, stated that he was unaware of any understandings between Evans and any Atlanta Police Department detectives regarding a favorable recommendation to be made on Evans' federal escape charge. Mr. Parker admitted that there was opportunity for Atlanta detectives to put in a good word for Evans with federal authorities. However, he further stated that when any police officer has been killed and someone ends up testifying for the State, putting his life in danger, it is not surprising that charges, like those against Evans, will be dropped.

In the absence of any other evidence, the Court cannot conclude an agreement existed merely because of the subsequent disposition of criminal charges against a witness for the State.

Although it is reasonable to...