Tapia v. State

Decision Date20 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 45S03-0011-PC-708.,45S03-0011-PC-708.
PartiesJose Angel TAPIA, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Dale Allen, Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew L. Hedges, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SULLIVAN, Justice.

A post-conviction court denied Jose Angel Tapia's request to withdraw without prejudice his petition for post-conviction relief. Tapia had no such right to withdraw his petition; our rules give post-conviction courts discretion in disposing of such request. We find no abuse of the post-conviction court's discretion here.

Background

The facts of petitioner Jose Angel Tapia's crime are detailed in our opinion on direct appeal. See Tapia v. State, 569 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ind.1991)

. In short, Tapia was convicted of Murder1 and Felony Murder2 for killing a friend's grandmother while stealing a stereo. Id. at 656-57. On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction in most respects, but remanded because the trial court had entered judgment and sentenced Tapia for both felony murder and murder in violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. Id. at 658.

In January, 1993, Tapia filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction case appears to have sat dormant for another three years, as the record does not reflect any activity between early 1993 and early 1996. Frustrated by the slow pace of his case, Tapia sought leave to proceed pro se, which was granted by the post-conviction court in April, 1996.

Acting pro se, Tapia asked for an evidentiary hearing on his claims and the post-conviction court scheduled a hearing for May 20, 1997. On May 1, Tapia filed a motion to continue the hearing and a motion to amend his petition for post-conviction relief. The court denied these motions. Subsequently, Tapia filed a motion to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief without prejudice. The court received this motion on May 19—the day before the hearing—although Tapia's certificate of service stated that he mailed it on May 14. The post-conviction court orally denied Tapia's motion during the hearing. On June 24, 1999, the post-conviction court denied Tapia's petition for relief by adopting the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tapia appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the post-conviction court was required to allow Tapia to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief without prejudice unless the State could show that it would be harmed by the delay. See Tapia v. State, 734 N.E.2d 307, 310 (Ind. Ct.App.2000)

. We granted transfer, Tapia v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind.2000) (table), and now affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I

Tapia contends that the post-conviction court should have granted either his joint motions for a continuance and to amend his petition or his subsequent motion for leave to withdraw his petition without prejudice. In reviewing these claims, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Tapia the chance to withdraw without prejudice. Tapia, 734 N.E.2d at 310-11. The Court of Appeals analogized Tapia's argument to a civil plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal under Trial Rule 41(A)(2). Id. at 309. The Court of Appeals determined that such motions should be rejected only when the non-movant

[W]ill suffer some prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. [Therefore] substantial prejudice to the defendant should be the test. Where substantial prejudice is lacking the district court should exercise its discretion by granting a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Tapia, 734 N.E.2d at 310 (quoting Levin & Sons, Inc. v. Mathys, 409 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (quoting in turn 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 41.05 (2d ed. 1948) (citations omitted))). Finding that the State would have suffered no harm if the post-conviction court granted Tapia's motion, the Court of Appeals reversed. Tapia, 734 N.E.2d at 310-11 ("In sum, because the record contains no showing of prejudice to the State from the prospect of allowing Tapia to withdraw his petition without prejudice, the trial court erred in denying his motion.").

The types of motions at the heart of this case are primarily matters of trial court discretion, and appellate courts should review those matters only for an abuse of that discretion. As for the motion to withdraw that proved determinative in the Court of Appeals, the terms of Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(c) give the trial court the discretion—but not a mandate—to allow the petitioner to withdraw the petition without prejudice: "[a]t any time prior to entry of judgment the court may grant leave to withdraw the petition." (emphasis added). Therefore the plain language of the Rule compels us to review the post-conviction court's actions in this regard under an abuse of discretion standard.

Outside of the plain language of the rule, two additional arguments support an abuse of discretion review. First, employing an abuse of discretion standard gives the post-conviction court the ability to curtail attempts by petitioners, including those in capital cases, to delay final judgment on their petitions. Second, abuse of discretion is the well-established standard of review for voluntary motions to dismiss in the somewhat rare cases when such motions are subject to appeal. See Mattingly v. Whelden, 435 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982)

(using abuse of discretion standard to analyze the trial court's grant of summary judgment in lieu of his motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 41(A)(1)). Cf. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Knostman, 966 F.2d 1133, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The dismissal of a plaintiff's action without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is within the `sound discretion of the district court' and may only be reversed if the appellant shows an abuse of that discretion.") (citation omitted).

Our reliance on the abuse of discretion standard invokes some of its well-worn contours. Typically, a fact-finding court is given discretion to act on an issue when it is in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the factual context surrounding the issue. We will second-guess the fact-finding court only when it responds to that factual context in an unreasonable manner. Prof. Stroud has provided the following description of this standard of review:

Abuse of discretion review, like all mixed question review, consists of an evaluation of facts in relation to legal formulae. In the final analysis, the reviewing court is concerned with the reasonableness of the action in light of the record.

4A Kenneth M. Stroud, Indiana Practice § 12.8 at 246 (2d ed. 1990) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a trial court's exercise of discretion should be upset only when the court reached "`an erroneous conclusion and judgment, one clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.'" Id. (quoting Dahnke v. Dahnke, 535 N.E.2d 172, 174 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), reh'g denied). See also McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind.1993)

("Discretion is a privilege afforded a trial court to act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.").

Relying on cases determined under Indiana Trial Rule 41(A), the Court of Appeals concluded that a petitioner was entitled to withdraw a petition for post-conviction relief unless the State could make a "showing of prejudice." Tapia, 734 N.E.2d at 310.3 However, as discussed supra, the Post-Conviction Rule grants the post-conviction court discretion to determine whether to allow a petitioner to withdraw a petition. Id. While prejudice to the non-moving party is one indicia of an abuse of discretion,4 it is not a proxy for the post-conviction court's discretion in the face of plain language in the Rule to the contrary.

Applying the abuse of discretion standard, we conclude that the post-conviction court's refusal to allow Tapia to withdraw his petition was not "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court." Stroud, supra. Paramount among the "facts and circumstances" surrounding Tapia's motion to withdraw is that fact that Tapia made little effort to explain what he would gain by delaying the proceedings. Tapia asserted that he "recently discovered substantial errors which he verily believes warrant relief." Tapia did not explain what these errors were or why he could not develop evidence to support them in the four years since he filed his petition for post-conviction relief.5 The post-conviction court could balance what speculative benefit Tapia would derive from a delay against the costs to the court in wasted time, and conclude that Tapia was not entitled to withdraw his petition.6 Without any valid explanation as to what would be gained from further delay, we cannot say that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by rejecting Tapia's motion.

Because the Court of Appeals determined that the post-conviction court erred by denying Tapia's motion to withdraw, it did not address his motion for a continuance or his motion to amend his petition. Again we analyze the post-conviction court's actions for abuse of discretion. First, it is well-established that we review the grant or denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Troutman v. State, 730 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ind.2000),

Wine v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1369, 1379 (Ind....

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