Amobi v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corr.

Decision Date27 June 2014
Docket NumberNo. 12–7090.,12–7090.
PartiesStephen Ifeanyi AMOBI and Ngozi Amobi, Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:08–cv–01501).

J. Michael Hannon Jr. argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Richard S. Love, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General at the time the brief was filed. Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General and Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, entered appearances.

Before: TATEL and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge:

The facts giving rise to this case are as curious as they are disturbing. Eight years ago, Derrick Brown (“Brown” or “the Inmate”), a conniving prisoner serving a series of weekend sentences at the District of Columbia Jail, assaulted Correctional Officer (“CO”) Stephen Amobi. Despite the fact that Amobi was the victim of an unprovoked attack whose injuries required medical attention, Amobi was arrested, criminally prosecuted, and fired from his employment. Even after being acquitted at his subsequent criminal trial, after Brown admitted to initiating the confrontation and assaulting the officer, and after prevailing in a contested administrative hearing, Amobi was not reinstated until a D.C. Superior Court judge intervened.

Amobi and his wife sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. Department of Corrections (DOC), and several Jail officials, seeking relief under federal law and D.C. common law for conspiracy, false arrest, malicious prosecution, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), deprivation of due process, aiding and abetting, and loss of consortium. The Defendants moved for summary judgment and, in a perfunctory nine-page opinion, the district court granted the motion. On appeal, Amobi challenges the district court's judgment in favor of the Defendants. Concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the false arrest, malicious prosecution, and IIED claims, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I
A

The puzzling details of this dispute begin on the morning of June 4, 2006, when the Jail was locked down because of the escape of two extremely dangerous inmates the day before. Brown, who is transgendered, was serving the third of fifteen weekends for simple assault and was scheduled for release at noon. The lockdown slowed the release process and Brown became increasingly agitated as he waited to be released from his cell. When Amobi arrived, Brown was argumentative and abusive. By the time Amobi and Brown arrived at the sally port, the verbal altercation had escalated into a nose-to-nose shouting match. Amobi attempted to retreat into the “Bubble,” a round glass enclosure separating the sally port from the inmate housing units, but Brown obstructed his path.

As Brown later testified, when he saw the officials approaching the sally port, he wanted to lure Amobi into attacking him so he could file a civil suit and “get some money.” Brown was in a position to see, and be seen by, someone in the adjacent hallway. Warden Robert Clay, Deputy Warden Stanley Waldren, and Major Elbert White were conducting a fire and safety inspection. As the officials approached the sally port, Brown took advantage of their restricted line of sight and punched Amobi on his right forearm. Amobi reacted immediately by restraining Brown and forcing him against the wall. The officials, who saw Amobi's reaction, but not the assault that precipitated it, sprinted to the sally port, ordered Amobi to release Brown, and turned a deaf ear to Amobi's attempt to explain he had acted in self-defense. White ordered Amobi not to speak until instructed to do so.

After receiving medical attention, Amobi was taken to the Command Center where his injuries were photographed. When he proceeded to Waldren's office, as instructed, he found the three officials who had stopped the altercation, the Director of the Office of Internal Affairs (Wanda Patten) and an OIA investigator (Valerie Beard). Amobi was ordered placed on administrative leave, and he and the witnesses, including the witnesses who had actually seen what happened or heard Brown boast that he had just set up a lawsuit, completed incident reports.

The initial investigation ignored this exculpatory evidence and focused instead on an alleged interview with Brown in which Patten and Beard claimed Brown wanted to press criminal charges. While Amobi was preparing his incident report, the police were summoned. The responding police officer, Albert Henley, was shown the incriminating incident reports of Clay, Waldren, and White, but none of the exculpatory reports. Officer Henley was also told that the Inmate had made a corroboratingstatement witnessed by Patten and Beard. As a result, Amobi was arrested, charged with simple assault, and released.

B

On July 12, 2006, Amobi was summarily removed from his position. The basis for Amobi's dismissal included the interview with Inmate Brown which, as subsequent events revealed, was fictional. Amobi promptly challenged the Department's actions and, after a hearing on August 3, 2006, the hearing officer determined Amobi had acted in self-defense and recommended reinstatement. DOC's Director, Devon Brown, disagreed, and Phuoc Nguyen, the hearing officer, under pressure from the administration, reconsidered and recommended termination. Amobi appealed, but for reasons never explained in the record, the appeal was never resolved. Consequently, Amobi demanded arbitration in accordance with his union's collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

C

The criminal prosecution, which had stalled in August 2006 when the District was unable to produce the photos of Amobi's injuries, see United States v. Amobi, 2006 CMD 012120 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2006), was reopened in October 2006, after the U.S. Attorney's Office was, according to Amobi, pressured to refile the charges. The government's case fell apart when Brown took the stand, however, and for the first time, provided a damning, self-inculpatory account of the artifice he employed during the June 2006 assault. Brown admitted he wanted to “set Mr. Amobi up so someone could witness [Amobi] do something to [him].” S.A. 297.1 Brown confessed he knew the three Jail officials were “important people 2 and that, in wake of the inmate escape, the officials “were very suspicious about things that were going on in the jail.” Id. at 296–97. Exultant over having secured the Jail officials as witnesses to his ruse, Brown boasted to CO Wayne Taylor of his exploits, which CO Stephen Harris overheard and documented in his incident report. And true to his word, Brown made good on his plan to file a civil suit. See Brown v. D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 2006 SC3 014278 (D.C.Super.Ct. Dec. 22, 2006). Brown explained his motivation for the stunt was a desire to get even with those who ridiculed him for being transgendered “when [he] was coming to do [his] sentence.” S.A. 305–06. Ultimately, Brown owned up to “turn[ing] the altercation from verbal to physical ... [so] that [he] would get a response from Mr. Amobi[,] ... get ... money[,] ... and ... get ... witnesses.” S.A. 312. Following Brown's bombshell testimony, the trial judge found Amobi not guilty—the verdict coming exactly one year to the day of the June 4, 2006 altercation.

D

Although Amobi had requested the arbitration, to which he was entitled under his CBA, he requested that, in light of his exoneration, he be allowed to return to work immediately. The District's attorney, Repunzelle Johnson, also counseled against proceeding with the scheduled arbitration and instead advised Director Brown to return Amobi to work. In an October 1, 2007 memo to Director Brown, Johnson laid bare the numerous discrepancies in the District's case. First, Johnson recounted how each of the three Jail officials acknowledged they did not see what happened prior to the alleged assault. Second, Johnson highlighted the fact that DOC “did not do an independent investigation to determine what happened prior to the assault of Inmate Brown.” S.A. 398. Third, and perhaps most seriously, Johnson cautioned that although the police had relied on DOC's eyewitness statements, Patten and Beard's supposed interview of Brown was pure fiction, and Amobi's incident report was never given to the police. Fourth, Johnson reminded Director Brown of the Inmate's incriminating testimony and that CO Ernest Wallace also corroborated Amobi's account. Fifth, Johnson informed Director Brown that, in addition to Amobi's visit with Dr. Boakai, the District had “independent medical documentation from a private physician which supports that Amobi had a bruise on his right arm.” 3Id. Sixth, Johnson lamented DOC's inability to locate the three photographs taken of Amobi's injuries. Finally, Johnson admonished the Director for failing to consider all the Douglas Factors, which, on balance, suggested “termination is probably not warranted.” 4 S.A. 399.

Despite Amobi's request and Johnson's appeal to reason, Director Brown proceeded with the arbitration hearing and refused to reinstate Amobi. Hearings were held on October 2 and 3, 2007. A little less than three months later, the arbitrator concluded Amobi had applied appropriate self-defense techniques and that his summary dismissal was without cause. The arbitrator further ordered that Amobi be reinstated with full backpay and benefits and that DOC correct, remove, or destroy all records...

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