U.S. v. Medina

• Decision Date: 30 January 1985
• Docket Number: 84-1214,Nos. 84-1213,s. 84-1213
• Citation: 755 F.2d 1269
• Parties: 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 332 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. MEDINA and Ronald Crowder, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1269

755 F.2d 1269

17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 332

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. MEDINA and Ronald Crowder, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 84-1213, 84-1214.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 24, 1984.

Decided Jan. 30, 1985.

C. Joseph Russell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.

Jessie A. Cook, Helmann & Cook, Robert L. Wright, Wright, Shagley, Lowery & Crawford, Terre Haute, Ind., for defendants-appellants.

Before BAUER, WOOD and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

In this case, yet another testament to brutal prison violence, we are called upon by Steven Medina and Ronald Crowder, inmates at the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, to review their convictions of first degree murder and conveying weapons within a penal institution. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1111 and 1792. Medina and Crowder challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdicts on the conveyance charges, and the admission of prejudicial testimony. Medina further claims the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

I.

At approximately 8:25 A.M. on March 21, 1983, Wayne Holbrook, a correctional officer, went to inmate Steven Aries' cell, number 123, because Aries had failed to report for work in the prison kitchen. There he found Aries sitting in a pool of blood. Two physicians, Clark and Harrowe, testified that Aries had died from a loss of blood caused by thirty-seven stab wounds. Harrowe described six wounds to Aries' left hand and forearm as defensive wounds. He was unable to determine whether the wounds had been inflicted by one or more weapons or by one or more persons.

A search of Aries' cell revealed two crudely-made, bloodstained knives, a glove, two pair of bloodstained khaki trousers turned inside out, two khaki shirts, and a bloodstained sweatshirt. All bloodstains were of the same blood type--Aries'. One of Crowder's thumbprints was found on the bottom layer of electrical tape which formed the handle of one of the knives found in Aries' cell. The khaki shirts and trousers were institution garb; identifying numbers had been cut out.

The government perforce presented its case against Medina and Crowder largely through the testimony of other inmates at the penitentiary. One of these witnesses, Pedro Flores, became acquainted with Medina in February, 1983. He testified to conversations he had with Medina prior to Aries' murder. The specifics of these conversations will be detailed in the section of this opinion addressing defendants' claim that the testimony's probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It suffices to say here that the conversations revealed that Medina was angry with Aries because Aries refused to murder another inmate believed to be an informant.

Inmate Larry Mercer testified that on March 20, 1983, the night before the murder of Aries, Medina asked him if he had a pair of surgical gloves. Mercer did not, but gave him two sandwich bags. Later that evening, when Aries walked by Mercer and Medina, Medina stated that Aries "would get what his hand called for sooner or later." Mercer interpreted this statement as a death threat.

Inmate David McLain testified that on the evening of March 20, 1983, Medina told him that they were "going to move on that dude tomorrow." After Aries' murder, Medina asked McLain to check with another inmate to determine whether anyone had seen him leave a particular cell. McLain further testified that Crowder had told him that inmate Satterfield had seen Crowder leave a particular cell.

Inmate Herman Rodgers testified that in the early morning hours of March 21, 1983, he acted as "look out" for Crowder, who, along with Medina, was going to murder Aries. He testified that he walked down the tier to Aries' cell where he observed "hand motions" made by Crowder and Medina, each of whom grasped "something" in his hand. Crowder later told Rodgers to clean up the bloody footprints outside of Aries' cell. Rodgers also testified that there was a knife in the cell he shared with Crowder; the knife was left in their cell the morning of the murder.

Inmate John Light testified that upon waking on the morning of March 21, 1983, he heard what he believed to be the sounds of a fight. He left his cell, walked to a location where he could see the upper tier of cells, and observed Medina and Crowder exiting cell 123.

Inmate Robert Satterfield testified that on the morning of March 21, 1983, he stepped out of his cell, which was located on the upper tier across the range from cell 123. He observed inmate Rodgers standing in front of cell 123 and saw Crowder and Medina enter the cell. Satterfield entered his cell, replaced his coffee cup, and looked back at cell 123. He then observed Crowder's head "going up and down" and heard "loud noise and two grunts."

Lieutenant Thomas testified that in August, 1983, Medina said to him:

How did you--Thomas, I want to know something. I want to know how you went from nothing to everything.

Thomas believed this was a reference to the successful investigation and subsequent arrest of Medina and Crowder for the murder of Aries. As Thomas was walking away from Medina's cell, Crowder, who was in an adjoining cell, said:

That's all right Thomas. I'll beat you on the next one. I'll leave one at your office door and you won't know who did it.

Medina offered an alibi defense. Inmate Sims testified that Medina was in the television room at the time of the murder. Inmate Brown testified that both Medina and Crowder were in the television room at that time. Inmate Belt testified, on behalf of Crowder, that on the morning of March 21, 1983, he saw two inmates enter Aries' cell. Neither, he testified, was Crowder. Crowder testified that he was not involved in Aries' murder. He admitted, however, to keeping "two, three knives" with him at all times, and to having three knives on the day of the murder.

II.

Medina contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the elements of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. ¹ He argues that the evidence of his "strong dislike" for Aries and the testimony of inmate Light that he heard emanating from Aries' cell what could have been the sounds of a fight provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the lesser included offense instruction. Without hesitation, we disagree.

As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense "if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973) (citing Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965)); Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 134, 76 S.Ct. 685, 688, 100 L.Ed. 1013 (1956); Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 323, 16 S.Ct. 839, 843, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896). See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). ² Although this requirement usually is satisfied by the presentation of sharply conflicting testimony on the element distinguishing the greater offense from the lesser offense, Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349-50, 85 S.Ct. at 1009-10, it also may be satisfied where there is no conflict in the testimony but the conclusion as to the lesser offense fairly may be inferred from the evidence presented, "including a reconstruction of events gained by accepting the testimony of one or more witnesses only in part." United States v. Sinclair, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C.Cir.1971).

Medina did not contend that he killed Aries in the heat of passion. The trial therefore was not characterized by the presentation of conflicting testimony on the circumstances surrounding the murder which would allow the jury to infer malice on the one hand or heat of passion on the other. Rather, Medina relied upon an alibi defense. The evidence he presented was completely exculpatory; if it had been believed, Medina would have been acquitted of the charge of first degree murder. Medina created a factual dispute only in that he claimed he did not kill Aries. Even though Medina claimed he was not present at the murder scene, he would have this court now hold that he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction because "heat of passion" could be inferred from the evidence presented by the government.

Assuming arguendo that a defendant need not actually present a particular theory to the jury in order to be entitled to an instruction based upon it, cf. United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 636 (8th Cir.1981), we find the evidence presented by the government's witnesses to be an insufficient basis for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. There was absolutely no evidence of sudden provocation in this case. We hold that on the basis of the evidence presented, Medina was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction; a jury could not have rationally found Medina not guilty of first degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter. ³

III.

Medina and Crowder also challenge the admission of certain testimony under Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, claiming the testimony was irrelevant and, alternatively, that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, they challenge the admission of certain testimony by correctional officer Thomas and inmate Flores.

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." Fed.R.Evid. 403. The probative value of evidence...