Pitts v. Freeman, 84-8286

• Decision Date: 22 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-8286,84-8286
• Citation: 755 F.2d 1423
• Parties: 23 Ed. Law Rep. 535 Willie Eugene PITTS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert FREEMAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1423

755 F.2d 1423

23 Ed. Law Rep. 535

Willie Eugene PITTS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert FREEMAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-8286.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

March 22, 1985.

Donald P. Edwards, David F. Walbert, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Gary M. Sams, Charles L. Weatherly, Decatur, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN ^*, district judge.

PITTMAN, District Judge:

In 1969, the district court issued a desegregation order that required the defendants to dismantle the previously dual school system and to institute a unitary system. In 1983, the black plaintiff class filed a motion in that proceeding to enjoin the defendants from expanding and constructing certain school facilities to relieve overcrowding at the Redan High School. In ruling on that motion, the district court, without giving notice and holding a hearing on the issue, stated that the DeKalb County School System was unitary. It proceeded to find that the defendants did not act with discriminatory intent and denied the injunction. The plaintiffs appealed. They contended the district court erred in characterizing the DeKalb system as unitary and in making proof of discriminatory intent a requisite to affording requested relief. We agree and reverse and remand for further consideration.

The plaintiffs raised these three issues:

I. Whether the district court erred in holding that the DeKalb County School System was a unitary system and that plaintiffs were therefore required, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to show purposeful discrimination in order to prevail.

II. Whether the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs must prove purposeful discrimination to prevail since the complaint in this action is predicated on Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the regulations thereunder, and proof of invidious motives need not be shown in connection with such claims.

III. Whether the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that the plaintiffs had failed to show purposeful and intentional discrimination and whether the court's findings were inadequate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.

We resolve issue I in favor of the appellants. Issue II was not addressed by the district court nor is it necessary to be addressed by this court. It may be appropriate to address it on remand. Issue III is moot because of the court's holding on the first issue.

The plaintiffs, in a black class action, originally instituted this action in 1968 against the DeKalb County Board of Education and various school authorities alleging that the DeKalb County School System was unconstitutionally segregated on the basis of race. The school system at that time operated under a "freedom of choice" plan. Although each school had a corresponding neighborhood school attendance district to delineate which students were to attend which school, students were free to transfer to schools outside their attendance district. The action resulted in a 1969 desegregation order that required the defendants to dismantle the previous dual school system, to eliminate its effects, and to institute a unitary system. The court ordered that all students be assigned to the school in their respective neighborhoods. Students thus were required to attend the school located in the attendance district in which they resided. Each attendance district contained only one school. The attendance districts served no other purpose than to delineate which students were to attend which schools. The district court retained jurisdiction to oversee implementation of the order. The court exercised this jurisdiction several times during the succeeding years to enter orders on matters brought before it by motion. This appeal arises from such an order in which the district court refused to enjoin the expansion and construction of certain school facilities proposed by the school board to relieve overcrowding at Redan High School.

Redan High School, which has a predominantly white student population, has been operating in excess of its capacity since the 1978-79 school year. The number of students attending Redan has continued to increase at such a rate that they exceeded the school's capacity by 808 students in the 1984-85 school year. As an interim solution to this overcrowding problem, school officials have added portable classrooms to Redan on three occasions. As a more permanent solution, the school board decided to construct a new facility to accommodate the excess of students. Under this "Redan II" plan, Redan's attendance district would remain unchanged. Students in the tenth through twelfth grades would continue to use the existing Redan High facility, while students in the eighth and ninth grades, who previously would have attended Redan High, would use the new facility. This arrangement would be unique in DeKalb County because it has no middle schools.

The plaintiffs in 1983 filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal seeking to enjoin the defendants from expanding the capacity of Redan High School by adding portable classrooms and constructing a new building. The plaintiffs alleged that the increased capacity of Redan, which would accommodate the existing overflow of white students there, avoided reassignment of those white students to nearby undercapacity high schools that were predominantly black. The school board's solution to the overcrowding, the plaintiffs argued, was intended to avoid desegregation and indeed would have a segregative effect. The plaintiffs argued that this avoidance of segregation--even if unintentional--violated the 1969 injunction requiring that the construction and expansion of school facilities be carried out "with the objective of eradicating segregation and perpetuating desegregation." Pitts v. Cherry, Civil Action No. 11946 at 7 (N.D.Ga. June 12, 1969) (currently sub nom Pitts v. Freeman ). The plaintiffs proposed several alternative solutions to the Redan overcrowding problem. These proposals sought to relieve the overcrowding by redrawing the boundary lines of certain of the schools' attendance districts. The attendance districts as redrawn under the plaintiffs' proposals would require some students, who previously would have attended Redan, to attend other, undercapacity high schools within the DeKalb County School System. Unlike the defendants' plan, the plaintiffs asserted, these proposals would have a desegregative effect and would carry out the defendants' duty to eliminate the vestiges of its previous dual school system.

The district court, after a hearing, refused to enjoin the planned expansion of Redan High School on the grounds that the defendants' actions were not motivated by discriminatory intent. The court asserted at the outset that "[i]n 1969 the DeKalb County School System was converted from a dual to a unitary system." Pitts v. Freeman, Civil Action No. 11946 at 1 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 22, 1984) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that no hearing with notice had been held to determine whether the DeKalb County School System had been converted to a unitary system. The court proceeded to hold that in reviewing the planned expansion of Redan High School, it had to "examine whether defendants' actions were unlawfully motivated and were designed to deprive class members of equal protection of the law." Id. at 5. "At issue," the court stated, "is whether defendants' actions in proposing an addition to Redan were discriminatory or designed to promote segregation and to hinder desegregation in the DeKalb County School System." Id. at 1. The court then found, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the defendants' decision to expand Redan High School "was not motivated by unlawful racial considerations." Id. at 8. It thus denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction. The court expressly declined to examine whether the plaintiffs' proposed solutions to the overcrowding would provide for better educational growth or more integration in the school system. Id. at 9.

The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court erred in characterizing the DeKalb County School System as unitary and in making proof of discriminatory intent a requisite to affording the requested relief. This court agrees, and, therefore, must reverse the district court's decision and remand the case for further consideration.

A line of Fifth Circuit cases ¹ established the procedure to be used in this circuit in bringing school desegregation cases to a conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit A), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1002, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 584 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.1978). The courts consistently have recognized that a previously segregated dual school system does not automatically become desegregated just because a constitutionally acceptable plan is adopted and implemented. See, e.g., Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d at 508. District courts must retain jurisdiction over such cases to insure not only the implementation of...