Jackson v. Buckman

• Citation: 756 F.3d 1060
• Decision Date: 27 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1165.,13–1165.
• Parties: Sarah JACKSON, Special Administrator for the Estate of Troy Allen Tucker, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Joseph BUCKMAN, Dr., St. Vincent Hospital; Pulaski County Detention Facility; Williams, Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC; James, Assistant Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC;—Cobbs, Major, Tucker Unit, ADC; Rectenwald, Dr., Tucker Unit, ADC, Defendants Doc Holladay, Sheriff, Pulaski County; originally sued as Doc Holiday; Carl Johnson, Dr., Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; Catherine Smith, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as C. Smith; Rhonda Anderson, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as Anderson; Donna Washburn, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as Washburn, Defendants–Appellees Wright, Deputy, Pulaski County Detention Facility; K. Lacking, Deputy, Pulaski County Detention Facility; Felix, Dr., Diagnostic Unit, ADC; Hall, Major, Diagnostic Unit, ADC; John Doe, Warden, Diagnostic Unit, ADC, Defendants Randy Morgan, Defendant–Appellee Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

756 F.3d 1060

Sarah JACKSON, Special Administrator for the Estate of Troy Allen Tucker, Plaintiff–Appellant

v. Joseph BUCKMAN, Dr., St. Vincent Hospital; Pulaski County Detention Facility; Williams, Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC; James, Assistant Warden, Tucker Unit, ADC;—Cobbs, Major, Tucker Unit, ADC; Rectenwald, Dr., Tucker Unit, ADC, DefendantsDoc Holladay, Sheriff, Pulaski County; originally sued as Doc Holiday; Carl Johnson, Dr., Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; Catherine Smith, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as C. Smith; Rhonda Anderson, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as Anderson; Donna Washburn, Nurse, Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility; originally sued as Washburn, Defendants–AppelleesWright, Deputy, Pulaski County Detention Facility; K. Lacking, Deputy, Pulaski County Detention Facility; Felix, Dr., Diagnostic Unit, ADC; Hall, Major, Diagnostic Unit, ADC; John Doe, Warden, Diagnostic Unit, ADC, DefendantsRandy Morgan, Defendant–AppelleeMaxim Healthcare Services, Inc., Defendant.

No. 13–1165.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 11, 2014.

Filed: June 27, 2014.

Amber Davis–Tanner, argued, Little Rock, AR (Michael N. Shannon and Chad Pekron, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Appellant.

Patrick Lee Spivey, argued, Little Rock, AR (Whitney F. Moore and David M. Fuqua, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Appellee Randy Morgan, Mr. Doc Holladay, Catherine Smith, and Donna Washburn.

Michael Alan Thompson, argued, Little Rock, AR (Jerry Jon Sallings, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Appellee Rhonda Anderson.

Catherine Melissa Corless, argued, Little Rock, AR, for Appellee Carl Johnson.

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Troy Tucker brought this lawsuit alleging that, during his incarceration as a pretrial detainee, he received constitutionally deficient medical care and that medical officials used excessive force against him while responding to his medical emergency.¹ The district court ² granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to Tucker's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed his state-law claims without prejudice. Tucker appeals, and we affirm.

I. Background

Tucker was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility (“PCRDF”) from approximately September 28, 2009 until March 1, 2010. Shortly after his arrival, Tucker began complaining about various medical concerns, including a surgical thread that was protruding from a wound on his abdomen (the “surgical wound”). This surgical wound arose after Tucker underwent bowel obstruction surgery almost a year earlier. Although Tucker testified that the surgical wound was “[n]ot really” infected when he arrived at PCRDF, Tucker complained of bleeding from and severe pain around the surgical wound in a grievance dated September 30, 2009. Tucker alleges that, around this same time, Nurse Catherine Smith told him that she did not have to treat the surgical wound because it predated his incarceration. Tucker raised further concerns about the surgical wound in early October 2009, this time complaining in a grievance that “sometimes pus[ ] and/or blood seeps out of it.” Tucker worried that an “[i]nfection could set in” around the surgical wound. Tucker filed another grievance shortly thereafter, which he addressed to Randy Morgan, the Chief of Detention at PCRDF, that reiterated his concerns about the surgical wound.

Tucker met with Dr. Carl Johnson, a physician who worked at PCRDF, on or about October 16, 2009. During this appointment, Tucker raised his concern about the surgical wound as well as numerous other medical concerns, including his history of colon cancer, his asthma, pain in his fingers and toes, and soreness around his port—a medical device that had been implanted under the skin on Tucker's chest to facilitate his previous chemotherapy treatment. Dr. Johnson's report shows that he ordered Tucker to continue taking six of his prescriptions, provided Tucker with cream for his hands, and had Tucker sign a form consenting to the release of his previous medical records to PCRDF. Dr. Johnson also examined Tucker's abdomen, which Dr. Johnson reported as being soft, non-tender, and non-distended, with bowel sounds being present. Dr. Johnson thus concluded that “[t]here was nothing unusual about [Tucker's] stomach, per se, that was a major concern at that point.” Tucker concedes that Dr. Johnson examined his abdomen but nonetheless asserts that Dr. Johnson failed to examine the surgical wound visually by lifting Tucker's shirt. Dr. Johnson does not recall whether he performed a visual examination of the surgical wound at this time.

Less than a week later, Tucker complained in a grievance appeal that Dr. Johnson had not examined the surgical wound. Tucker expressed concern that the “thread hanging out could cause [an] infection.” On November 3, Tucker filled out a sick call form in which he repeated his concerns about the surgical wound. Two weeks later, on or about November 17, Tucker saw Dr. Johnson for a second time. It is undisputed that Dr. Johnson visually examined the surgical wound this time. Dr. Johnson reports observing a “small purulent wound with a mild rash on [Tucker's] mid-abdomen” that he described as “minor.” Dr. Johnson prescribed an oral antibiotic, antibiotic cream, and pain medicine as treatment for Tucker. Tucker acknowledges that Dr. Johnson treated his surgical wound this time but testified that the surgical wound was still bleeding and draining pus when he left PCRDF.

On January 7, 2010, Tucker lost consciousness near the door of his cell. Several guards and nurses, including Nurse Rhonda Anderson and Nurse Donna Washburn, responded to the emergency medical code. Upon their arrival, Tucker contends that Nurse Anderson administered an ammonia inhalant so that he would regain consciousness and, while doing so, hit his nose. Tucker analogized the blow to a “karate hit.” Tucker, however, never received any medical treatment for his nose. It did not bleed, and the “karate hit” did not leave a cut, a scratch, or a bruise. Tucker's contemporaneous descriptions of the incident, contained in a grievance and an appeal therefrom, do not mention this alleged “karate hit.”

Before moving him from the floor, Tucker concedes that the nurses checked his heart rate and blood pressure. Once this check was complete, the nurses asked the guards to carry Tucker to his bed. The guards, Tucker alleges, refused to help the nurses. As a result, Nurse Anderson and Nurse Washburn lifted Tucker, who was 6'3? and weighed approximately 170 pounds, by his arms and dragged him to his bed. Tucker testified that rather than place him gently on his bed, the nurses dropped him on it, causing the middle part of his back to strike the side of the bed and leading to an injury to his back. As evidence of his injury, Tucker points to Nurse Washburn's report documenting this incident, which recounts that once Tucker had been placed on the bed, she cleaned and dressed a “[q]uarter size skin tear” on Tucker's left hip. The nurses then left Tucker's cell, at which point Tucker contends that Nurse Anderson said “that ought to wake him up.”

Tucker sued Dr. Johnson, Nurse Smith, Nurse Anderson, Nurse Washburn, and various other officials, including Doc Holladay, the Sheriff of Pulaski County, Arkansas, and Morgan. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to Tucker's § 1983 claims and dismissed Tucker's state-law claims without prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, Reed v. City of St. Charles, 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir.2009), affirming if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In order to survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment, there must be more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A. Deliberately Indifferent Medical Care

As a pretrial detainee, Tucker's right to medical care arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Vaughn v. Greene Cnty., 438 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir.2006). Although Tucker's claim is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply the deliberate-indifference standard that governs claims brought by convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment. See id.; Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir.2014).

Whether an official was deliberately indifferent requires both an objective and a subjective analysis. Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339–40 (8th Cir.2014). Under the objective prong, Tucker must establish that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need. See id. at 340. To be objectively serious, a medical need must have been “diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or must be “so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Id. (quoting Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1997)). Under the subjective prong, Tucker must show that an official “actually knew of but deliberately disregarded his serious medical need.” Id. This showing requires a mental state “akin to criminal recklessness.” Id. (quoting Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d...