Ramstad v. Hodel
| Decision Date | 02 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-3605,82-3605 |
| Citation | 756 F.2d 1379 |
| Parties | Stuart Grant RAMSTAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald HODEL, * The Secretary of the Interior of the United States; Board of Land Appeals: Gail M. Frazier, Edward W. Stuebing and James L. Burski, members of the Interior Board of Land Appeals; Robert F. Burford, Director of Bureau of Land Management of the United States Department of the Interior; Curtis V. McVee, State Director for Alaska Bureau of Land Management United States Department of Interior, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Eugene F. Wiles, Delaney, Wiles, Hayes, Reitman & Brubaker, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. Carol Williams, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.
Before CANBY, BOOCHEVER and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Ramstad brought this action to review a decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals denying his application to purchase land in Alaska upon which Ramstad operated a hunting and fishing camp and guide service. The district court granted summary judgment 1 in favor of the government defendants, and Ramstad appeals. We disagree in part with the ruling of the district court, and reverse the judgment.
For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants accepted as true the allegations of the complaint. The facts, therefore, are not in material dispute for purposes of this appeal.
On December 25, 1962, Ramstad staked out eighty (80) acres of public land as a trade and manufacturing site pursuant to the Trade and Manufacturing Site Act, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a, repealed effective Oct. 21, 1986, Pub.L. 94-579, Title VII, Sec. 703(a) (1976). That Act permitted the purchase of up to eighty (80) acres of such land "upon submission of proof that said area embraces improvements of the claimant and is needed in the prosecution of such trade, manufacture, or other productive industry." Id. Ramstad subsequently operated a hunting and fishing camp and guide service on the site and over a period of time made improvements exceeding $200,000 in value.
On April 15, 1967, Ramstad attempted to file a notice of location, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a-1, repealed effective Oct. 21, 1986, Pub.L. 94-579, Title VII, Sec. 703(a) (1976), and 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2562.1 (1983). That statute, which the regulation tracks, provides that claimants of trade and manufacturing sites and homestead or headquarters sites under Sec. 687a:
... shall file a notice describing such claim ... in the United States land office 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a-1 (1976). 2 Ramstad's notice of location was not accepted at the office of the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") because the desired land had been classified for multiple use and consequently had been withdrawn from all forms of public appropriation on March 8, 1967, thirty-eight days before Ramstad attempted to file his notice. 32 Fed.Reg. 3838 (March 8, 1967); Multiple Use Classification AA-818, 32 Fed.Reg. 14971 (Oct. 27, 1967). The withdrawal contained an express exception for "valid existing rights." 32 Fed.Reg. at 3838.
for the district in which the land is situated within ninety days from April 29, 1950 or within ninety days from the date of the initiation of the claim, whichever is later. Unless such notice is filed ... within the time prescribed the claimant shall not be given credit for the occupancy maintained in the claim prior to the filing of (1) a notice of the claim ... or (2) an application to purchase, whichever is earlier. Application to purchase claims ... must be filed within five years after the filing of the notice of claim under this section.
On December 14, 1968, the BLM office notified Ramstad that he must cease use of the land and remove all improvements. After a meeting in which Ramstad explained to BLM personnel that he had occupied the land and made improvements prior to the withdrawal, the BLM vacated its December 4, 1968 request that he remove the improvements and asked Ramstad to submit evidence to document his commercial use prior to March 8, 1967.
In January 1969, Ramstad again visited the BLM office and was once again advised that he would not be permitted to file his trade and manufacturing site location notice because the lands had been withdrawn from entry. On February 24, 1969, however, the BLM sent a letter to Ramstad referring to its previous agreement to vacate its request that Ramstad remove improvements and stating that it still had not received data from Ramstad substantiating his commercial use prior to March 8, 1967. The letter gave Ramstad 30 days to provide such evidence or face legal action to remove the improvements. In several visits to the BLM office thereafter, however, Ramstad was advised that his notice would not be accepted for filing, and he did not provide the substantiating evidence as requested in the February 24, 1969, BLM letter.
On September 23, 1974, the BLM served Ramstad with a notice of trespass. Ramstad made several more visits to the BLM office. In early 1979 he was advised by BLM personnel to submit an application to purchase and to request an equitable adjudication of his claim. He did so.
The BLM denied Ramstad's application, relying on departmental regulation 43 C.F.R. Sec. 2562.3(d)(2) (1983). 3 The BLM reasoned that because the land had been withdrawn first in 1967 and then again in 1971 by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1610 (1982), the land was not "unoccupied, unimproved, and unappropriated by any [other] person" as Ramstad appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, which affirmed the BLM's decision. The Board reasoned that 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a-1 requires claimants to file a notice of location within ninety days of initiating their claims or lose credit for occupancy maintained prior to filing. The Board found that Ramstad had filed more than ninety days after initiating occupancy. His entry date therefore became his filing date. Because that date fell after the withdrawal, Ramstad had no valid existing right at the time of withdrawal. Even if Ramstad had filed a notice of location when he first attempted to do so in April 1967, the same result would have followed: he had been in occupancy more than ninety days and his entry date would then have been April 15, 1967, after the land had been withdrawn. The Board also denied equitable adjudication on the ground that there had been no substantial compliance with the law.
the regulation required in order for the land to be subject to location. Although the 1967 and 1971 withdrawals were both subject to "valid existing rights," the BLM ruled that Ramstad's use and improvement of the site did not create a valid existing right because he had not filed a notice of location or application to purchase until March 1, 1979. See 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a-1. At that time, the land had been withdrawn and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. had filed a selection application for it pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The BLM also denied Ramstad's request for equitable adjudication on the ground that he had not shown substantial compliance with the law as required by 43 C.F.R. Sec. 1871.1-1 (1983). 4
The district court held that the Board had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to law. It accordingly rendered summary judgment for the federal defendants.
The district court was bound to uphold the determination of the Board unless it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A) (1982). "[G]reat deference is shown to an administrative agency's interpretation of the law which it is charged with administering." Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 932, 101 S.Ct. 332, 66 L.Ed.2d 157 (1980). We review de novo, however, the district court's decision applying these standards, because the district court is in no better position to review the administrative record than is this court. Asarco, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 616 F.2d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir.1980).
The interpretation of 43 U.S.C. Sec. 687a-1 which the Board adopted is rational and not arbitrary. Section 687a-1 provides that a notice of location must be filed within 90 days of the initiation of a claim. There is no dispute that Ramstad entered and staked eighty acres as a trade and manufacturing site in 1962, and his complaint so alleges. He did not attempt to file a notice of location until April 1967. Section 687a-1 states that unless notice is filed within the prescribed 90 days after initiation of the claim, no credit for occupancy 5 can be granted prior to filing of the notice of location or application to purchase, whichever first occurs. The Board gave effect to the plain meaning of these provisions in ruling that the statute did not allow Ramstad credit for occupying his site prior to April 1967 at the earliest. Since the land had been withdrawn from settlement in March 1967, 32 Fed.Reg. 3838 (March 8, 1967), Ramstad was not legally entitled to perfect his claim. The Board did not err in ruling that the statutory scheme provided no compelling legal basis to establish Ramstad's claim as a "valid existing right" excepted from the withdrawal.
Ramstad's claim of legal right to purchase does not fall within the rule of James Milton Cann, 16 I.B.L.A. 374 (1974), which applies only where the occupancy of the claimed land began less than 90 days before withdrawal. In denying Ramstad's petition for reconsideration, the Board overruled Edwin William Seiler, 20 I.B.L.A. 221 (1975) (on reconsideration), to the extent that it may have extended the Cann rule to situations where occupancy began more than 90 days prior to withdrawal. The Board may...
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