Tillett v. J.I. Case Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1439,84-1439
• Citation: 756 F.2d 591
• Parties: Nancy L. TILLETT, Administratrix of the Estate of Stephen M. Tillett, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 591

756 F.2d 591

53 USLW 2474

Nancy L. TILLETT, Administratrix of the Estate of Stephen M.

Tillett, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-1439.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 1, 1984.

Decided March 11, 1985.

Donald H. Carlson, Riordan, Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Henderson, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.

Terry E. Johnson, Peterson, Johnson & Murray, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant-appellee.

Before WOOD, Circuit Judge, PELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. ^*

PELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Nancy L. Tillett, a resident of Pennsylvania and administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Stephen M. Tillett, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking damages for the allegedly wrongful death of her husband, a United States serviceman. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a), the District of Columbia court transferred Tillett's action to the Eastern District of Wisconsin after defendant J.I. Case Company demonstrated that the District of Columbia court lacked personal jurisdiction over Case. Defendant case subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the Wisconsin district court, which the court granted. Appellant Tillett appeals from this final judgment to this court.

On July 19, 1979, appellant's decedent, Stephen M. Tillett, was operating a front end loader at a United States military base in West Germany. Tillett was a soldier in the United States Army at this time, and was operating the front end loader incident to his military service. The loader overturned and crushed Tillett, resulting in his death.

The defendant J.I. Case Company, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was in Wisconsin, was the manufacturer of the front end loader. The suit was filed nearly three years after Tillett's death.

I. CHOICE OF LAW

The Wisconsin district court acknowledged the significant choice of law issues presented by this case and noted that five jurisdictions shared some degree of nexus with the parties and/or the controversy in it. Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 580 F.Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D.Wis.1984). These jurisdictions included West Germany, the situs of decedent's accident, Pennsylvania, plaintiff's domicile, Delaware, the state of defendant's incorporation, Wisconsin, defendant's principal place of business and Indiana, the jurisdiction where Case manufactured the front end loader. Id. The district court determined, however, that West Germany and Delaware had insufficient contacts with the litigation to justify application of either forum's law. Id. at 1277-78. The district court likewise determined that Pennsylvania's wrongful death statute could not apply to the case because Pennsylvania courts had declined to exercise wrongful death jurisdiction in cases involving deaths caused outside Pennsylvania. Id. at 1278. The district court then confronted a choice between Indiana and Wisconsin law.

Following the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), the district court sitting in diversity applied Wisconsin's conflict of law rules to determine whether Wisconsin or Indiana law governed Tillett's wrongful death case. ¹ Id. The court characterized the choice between the laws of these two fora as an outcome determinative choice because Tillett's action was untimely under Indiana's wrongful death statute but timely under Wisconsin's wrongful death rules. Id. The court then applied Wisconsin's choice of law approach to resolve this outcome determinative conflict. Id. Specifically, the district court analyzed the following choice-influencing considerations in deciding whether to apply Indiana or Wisconsin law: predictability of results; maintenance of interstate and international order; simplification of the judicial task; advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and application of the better rule of law. Id. The court then determined that Wisconsin courts would choose to apply Wisconsin law under the circumstances of this case. Id.

This court agrees that the jurisdictions of West Germany and Delaware possess insufficient interest in the outcome of this litigation to justify the application of either forum's law to the facts of the case. We furthermore agree that Pennsylvania courts would decline to exercise wrongful death jurisdiction over this controversy involving a West German accident. Finally, this court agrees that Tillett's action is untimely under Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, IND.CODE ANN. Sec. 34-1-1-2 (Burns Supp.1984), but timely under Wisconsin's three-year wrongful death rule. WIS.STAT. Sec. 893.54(2) (1981-82). Thus, the case presents an outcome determinative conflict between the laws of Indiana and Wisconsin.

The district court correctly stated and applied Wisconsin's choice-influencing considerations to resolve this conflict. Wisconsin courts consistently have applied these considerations to tort cases involving conflicts between the laws of Wisconsin and the laws of other interested jurisdictions. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis.2d 193, 202, 206 N.W.2d 414, 418 (1973); Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis.2d 588, 598-99, 204 N.W.2d 897, 902 (1973); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 595-96, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (1967). Wisconsin courts have also utilized this choice of law approach in cases involving conflicts between Wisconsin statutes of limitation and the limitation periods of other states. Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. H.O., Inc., 63 Wis.2d 54, 65, 216 N.W.2d 239, 244 (1974); Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis.2d at 203, 206 N.W.2d at 419. The district court found that Wisconsin courts would apply Wisconsin's wrongful death statute to analyze Tillett's claim, including that statute's three-year limitation period. Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 580 F.Supp. at 1278. This court concurs in the district court's conclusions. We therefore analyze Tillett's wrongful death claim under Wisconsin and not Indiana law.

II. WISCONSIN'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE

Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, WIS.STAT. Sec. 895.03 (1981-82), provides:

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured, provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state.

(Emphasis added). Thus, Wisconsin requires as a condition precedent to wrongful death recovery that the decedent's death have been caused by some act or omission occurring in Wisconsin. Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis.2d 345, 353, 195 N.W.2d 602, 606 (1972); Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Railway, 94 Wis. 191, 194, 68 N.W. 661, 662 (1896).

Wisconsin courts interpreting the wrongful death statute do not require that a decedent's death occur in Wisconsin, but rather merely require that some substantial factor contributing to decedent's death occur within the state. Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis.2d at 353-54, 195 N.W.2d at 607. In Schnabl, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that delivery in Wisconsin of a faulty seat belt constituted such a "substantial factor" which contributed to decedent's subsequent death by car accident in Indiana. Id., 54 Wis.2d at 353-54, 195 N.W.2d at 607. The Schnabl court likened the substantial factor requirement of the Wisconsin wrongful death statute to the proximate cause issue in negligence cases. Id., 54 Wis.2d at 353, 195 N.W.2d at 606.

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendant defectively designed the front end loader that overturned and caused the death of her husband, and concludes that defendant should be held liable in negligence, in strict products liability and/or in breach of warranty. Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant Case defectively designed the front end loader because defendant failed to equip the loader with a salvific roll-over device. Plaintiff maintains that defendant made certain design decisions in Wisconsin relating to the lack of roll-over protection. Plaintiff asserts that these decisions were a substantial factor in causing decedent's subsequent death, and thus supplied the jurisdictional prerequisite to defendant's wrongful death liability in Wisconsin.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends that it did not design the front end loader at all, and therefore made no design decisions in Wisconsin or in any other location concerning the lack of roll-over protection. Defendant maintains that any design defect causing decedent's death existed in the Government's specifications for the loader, which defendant by contract was obligated to follow. Defendant asserts that all actions on its part relating to production of the front end loader occurred at the Case plant in Terre Haute, Indiana, where defendant manufactured and eventually delivered the front end loader to the Government.

The district court agreed with defendant and found that the Government provided all specifications for the front end loader. Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 580 F.Supp. at 1279. The court furthermore found that all design, manufacture and shipment of the loader occurred in Indiana. Id. The court found the designation "J.I. Case Co. Racine, Wisconsin" on the loader insufficient to imply that a design decision relating to the front end loader occurred in Wisconsin, particularly because the designation appeared on all J.I. Case products, regardless of the site of their manufacture. Id. The district court concluded that defendant was not liable for decedent's allegedly wrongful death on...