Dawson v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 27 May 2014 |
Docket Number | Record No. 1226–13–2. |
Citation | 758 S.E.2d 94,63 Va.App. 429 |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | Robert Wayne DAWSON, II v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael L. Donner, Sr. (Dunton, Simmons & Dunton, LLP, White Stone, on brief), for appellant.
Rosemary V. Bourne, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges HUMPHREYS, KELSEY and PETTY.
Robert Wayne Dawson, II (“Dawson”) appeals his conviction of strangulation, in violation of Code § 18.2–51.6, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Lancaster County (“trial court”). Dawson argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the strangulation caused a wounding or bodily injury to the victim.
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). In this light, the evidence established the following.
In July 2012, Dawson was living at the Knight's Inn hotel in Richmond with his girlfriend and their young child (collectively, “the family”). Knight's Inn was forcing the family to leave due to lack of funds. Dawson called his mother, Penney Pittman (“Pittman”), the victim, and told her this news and that the family was going to live in a tent in the woods. Pittman drove from Lancaster County to pick up the family on July 25, 2012. Pittman and the family arrived at Pittman's home in Lancaster County in the early evening of July 25. The family spent the night at Pittman's house, and Pittman washed the family's clothes from 6:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. on July 26.
Around 10:00 a.m. on July 26, Pittman informed Dawson that he could not stay on her property and he became upset. Dawson started cursing his mother and blaming her for their homelessness. Pittman was holding the child as Dawson was working himself up and yelling at Pittman. Dawson took the child and put him outside on the back deck. As Pittman was trying to go past Dawson to get the child, Dawson started grabbing her upper arms. Pittman pushed Dawson's chest to get away from him. Dawson grabbed Pittman several times—grabbing her arms, shoulders, and shirt—and then he hit her in the face. Pittman told Dawson to stop, and she turned away from him because the child was watching.
Once they were on the back deck, Dawson yanked Pittman's wrist down to the deck and spun her so that he was behind her and her back was physically touching his chest. His right hand was holding her right wrist and he pinned her hand into the side of her neck and squeezed her neck with the muscle from his right arm. Meanwhile, he “slammed” into her chest with his left hand. Pittman continued, She reiterated that the pressure was from her hand that Dawson was holding beside her neck on one side and from his upper right arm muscle on the other side. Pittman felt like she was “drowning without water” because of the pressure inside of her head, and her heartbeat was getting louder and louder.
Pittman believes she lost consciousness, but she could not say for certain. She remembered reaching for Dawson's girlfriend, who backed away, and then the next thing she knew is that she was on her knees as if Dawson had just dropped her there on the deck beside the picnic table. Once she realized she was down on the deck, she saw blood on her hands and she had a pain in the left side of her chest. At first she thought she had been stabbed. She felt the deck shaking as she was trying to get her “wits together.” As she started to turn, she saw Dawson coming towards her with his right hand raised. He was walking fast and hard towards her while she was still on her knees holding on to the picnic table and trying to get up. Dawson hit Pittman in the back of her head, and her face hit the deck railing. Dawson went inside the house for a few seconds and then came back out, yelling at Pittman again.
While waiting for help to arrive, Pittman noticed that her nose was bleeding and that physically she was in a “pretty bad situation.” She was also bleeding inside of her mouth on the same side that her face hit the railing. Her arms and chest were hurting. “I was hurting from my neck to my ankles.” Later that day, Pittman's bruises started to appear. She had bruises on her upper arms and lower arms, a large bruise on her chest, a bruise on her left torso, and bruises all the way down both of her legs.
The day after the incident, Pittman's friend took her to the Chesapeake Medical Group where nurse practitioner Christine Collins (“Collins”) examined her. Collins testified that Pittman On cross-examination, Collins again testified that Pittman had a dark red bruise on her neck. There was no break in the skin on Pittman's neck.
Collins was suspicious that Pittman had a rib fracture and head injuries so she sent Pittman to Rappahannock General for X-rays. X-rays showed that Pittman sustained a fracture to the rib.1 Pittman received several prescription medications for her pain. Pittman returned to see Collins two days later, and Pittman was transferred to the Medical College of Virginia where she was admitted for four days with post-concussive syndrome and post-traumatic stress symptoms. Pittman did not have any lasting effect from the injuries around her neck.
Without elaborating on its findings of fact, the trial court found Dawson guilty of assault and battery and strangulation. Dawson does not contest his assault and battery conviction on appeal.
Dawson's assignment of error is:
The circuit court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant/appellant, Robert W. Dawson, II, (“Dawson”) in Indictment No. CR12–238 (violation of Va.Code § 18.2–51.6) by ruling “I do believe the evidence supports that charge,” because the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that any strangulation caused a wounding or bodily injury to Pittman, the victim.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we must “ ‘examine the evidence that supports the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’ ” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20, 710 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2011) (quoting Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 S.E.2d 137, 139–40 (2008)). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and determine whether “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “Furthermore, we ‘accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.’ ” Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 95, 712 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2011) (quoting Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130, 654 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2008)).
Code § 18.2–51.6, enacted in 2012, provides that, “Any person who, without consent, impedes the blood circulation or respiration of another person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such person resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such person is guilty of strangulation, a Class 6 felony.” Pertinent to this appeal is the interpretation of the terms “wounding” and “bodily injury.” While these terms are not defined in the statute, they have been interpreted as used in other statutes in the Virginia Code, particularly the malicious wounding statute, Code § 18.2–51,2 to which this Court may look for guidance. See King v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 708, 710, 347 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1986) () .
“[T]o prove the existence of a ‘wound,’ the Commonwealth must show that the victim's skin was broken or cut.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 303, 317, 709 S.E.2d 175, 182 (2011) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 409, 413, 35 S.E.2d 594, 595 (1945)). Here, it is uncontested that any breaks in Pittman's skin, or “wounds,” were caused by Dawson's battery of Pittman and not the act of strangulation. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Pittman suffered a “bodily injury” as a result of Dawson applying pressure to her neck.
Neither Code § 18.2–51 nor Code § 18.2–51.6 defines bodily injury. “[C]ourts have been reluctant to give juries a definition [of bodily injury] because the phrase has an ‘everyday, ordinary meaning.’ ” Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 827, 832, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43 (2000) ( ).3 “ ‘Bodily injury comprehends, it would seem, any bodily hurt whatsoever.’ ” Id. at 831, 531 S.E.2d at 43 (quoting Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 316, 53 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1949)) (emphasis in original).
In Luck, two state troopers were treated in the hospital after the appellant's vehicle collided with their vehicle. One trooper suffered stiffness for four to five days and took prescription medication for his low back pain. The other trooper “had similar...
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