Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co.
| Decision Date | 29 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-8330,84-8330 |
| Citation | 758 F.2d 1545 |
| Parties | , 1 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1113 Richard A. FARNSWORTH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, et al., Defendants/Appellants, v. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Movant/Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Lawrence R. Elleman, Cincinnati, Ohio, Dan B. Wingate, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants, appellants.
Nina L. Hunt, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for movant, appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before RONEY and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Procter and Gamble (P & G) appeals from a discovery protective order granted by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) denying it access to the names and addresses of women who gave the Center for Disease Control (Center) personal information as participants in the Center's Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) studies. The sole issue on appeal is whether the order was within the district court's discretion. 101 F.R.D. 355. We affirm.
Plaintiffs filed product liability actions in United States District Courts in Massachusetts, Missouri, Washington, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Indiana and Tennessee, seeking to recover damages from Procter and Gamble for Toxic Shock Syndrome allegedly caused by "Rely" tampons manufactured by P & G. Because plaintiffs intended to introduce into evidence a certain Center study purportedly linking "Rely" tampons with TSS, P & G served the Center with a subpoena seeking to discover the names and addresses of women who participated in the study. P & G hoped to discredit the Center study by pointing out certain purported "biases" in the methodology, and asserts that it needs to personally contact each woman involved in the study to adequately detail those faults. The Center, a non-party resident in Georgia, then moved for the protective order granted by the District Court in the Northern District of Georgia.
It is undisputed that the information sought by P & G is of a highly personal nature. The questions answered for the study concerned medical histories, sexual practices, contraceptive methods, pregnancy histories, menstrual activity, tampon usage, and douching habits. Participants provided this information on a voluntary basis. While no guarantee of anonymity was given, the Center fears that disclosure of such potentially embarrassing information would inhibit future studies by causing the public to fear disclosure of personal information given to the Center.
Responding to earlier P & G discovery requests, the Center turned over approximately 34,000 TSS-related research documents. The Center apparently provided P & G with every piece of information regarding its TSS studies, with the exception of the names and addresses of the participants. The Center has indicated to P & G its willingness to update the information provided to P & G with the exception of the personal information.
Approximately 300 women were involved in the study. To provide P & G with some of the information it seeks while maintaining the privacy of the study participants, the Center contacted those women and asked if they would consent to have their names and addresses released to P & G. The Center agreed to release the identities of any woman consenting to disclosure. As of October 31, 1983, 32 women had agreed to disclosure, 119 had not agreed, and 26 letters were returned as undeliverable. P & G had independently obtained the consent of 20 women to the disclosure and received their records.
The law's basic presumption is that the public is entitled to every person's evidence. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S.Ct. 252, 255, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932); Richards of Rockford v. Pacific Gas & Electric, 71 F.R.D. 388 389 (N.D.Cal.1976). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery whenever possible. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The trial court, however, is given wide discretion in setting the limits of discovery, Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.1979), and its judgment will be overturned only when a clearly erroneous principle of law is applied or no evidence rationally supports the decision. Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.1975). The abuse of discretion standard of review applies. Perel v. Vanderford, 547 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.1977).
The district court based its ruling on Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) which provides that a court "for good cause shown ... may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense...." While Rule 26(c) articulates a single standard for ruling on a protective order motion, that of "good cause," the federal courts have superimposed a somewhat more demanding balancing of interests approach to the Rule. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1277-78 (7th Cir.1982); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D.Cal.1976); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F.Supp. 871, 872-75 (E.D.Mich.1982); Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 497 (N.D.Ill.1983). Under that...
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