Debruce v. Comm'r

• Decision Date: 15 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 11–11535.,11–11535.
• Parties: Derrick Anthony DEBRUCE, Petitioner–Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

758 F.3d 1263

Derrick Anthony DEBRUCE, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 11–11535.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

July 15, 2014.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. D.C. Docket No. 1:04–cv–02669–IPJ.

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Derrick Anthony DeBruce, an inmate on Alabama's death row, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his death sentence. DeBruce contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in both the guilt and the penalty phases of his capital murder trial.

DeBruce was convicted of fatally shooting a customer during the robbery of an AutoZone store which he committed with five other men.¹ DeBruce argues that his retained trial attorney, Erskine Mathis, was constitutionally ineffective in failing to cross-examine state witness LuJuan McCants, a co-participant in the robbery who identified DeBruce as the shooter at trial, with McCants's earlier allegedly contradictory statements. He also argues that Mathis was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence about DeBruce's mental capacity and background during the penalty phase of his trial. ²

I.

A district court's grant or denial of a habeas corpus petition is reviewed de novo.Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir.2010). Because DeBruce filed his federal petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See Guzman v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 663 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir.2011). Where, as here, a state court has denied an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits, the standard a petitioner must meet to warrant federal habeas relief “was intended to be, and is, a difficult one.” Johnson v. Sec'y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir.2011) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)).

AEDPA allows federal courts to grant habeas relief only if the state court's resolution of those claims:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent in either of two respects: (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519–20, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To determine whether a state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, we are mindful that “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland³ standard itself.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (footnote added). As a result, “[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Id. at 786 (quotation marks omitted).

In addition, a state court's factual determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). AEDPA's “statutory presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact made by the state court, not to mixed determinations of law and fact.” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.2001). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law and fact not entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Cade v. Haley, 222 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir.2000) (stating Strickland 's deficient performance and prejudice prongs “present mixed questions of law and fact reviewed de novo on appeal”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), we must presume the state court's factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 2254(e)(1); Parker, 244 F.3d at 835–36. Although the Supreme Court has “not defined the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1),” Burt v. Titlow, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013), it has emphasized “that a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Id. (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

If we determine that the state court's adjudication of DeBruce's Strickland claims was unreasonable under § 2254(d), we must then undertake a de novo review of the record. See McGahee v. Ala. Dep't of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir.2009).

To establish that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, DeBruce must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064. Deficient performance for purposes of the Sixth Amendment is representation which falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness” measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Trial “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. “To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed to act reasonably considering all the circumstances.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Since it is DeBruce's burden to overcome this presumption, “the absence of evidence cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Titlow, 134 S.Ct. at 17 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Given the deference owed counsel under Strickland in combination with AEDPA, our review of counsel's performance is “doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009); see also Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403.

To establish that his counsel's deficiency prejudiced his defense, DeBruce “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is one that sufficiently undermines confidence in the outcome. Id. But “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. That said, to show prejudice at either phase of a capital trial, “a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The Supreme Court has explained this is so because an ineffective assistance of counsel “claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. “The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” Id. In making the determination about whether there is a reasonable probability that DeBruce would have received a different sentence, a reviewing court must “consider the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453–54, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

II.

First, we address DeBruce's arguments pertaining to the guilt phase of his trial, then those pertaining to the sentencing phase.

A. Guilt–Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Testimony at trial established that five armed men were involved in the robbery. During DeBruce's trial, McCants was the only witness who testified that DeBruce fired the gunshot that killed Douglas Battle,a customer in the store.⁴ According to McCants's trial testimony, Battle entered the store while the robbery was in progress. McCants saw Battle and ordered him to get down on the floor. Battle threw his wallet at McCants, but did not get onto the ground. DeBruce approached Battle from behind and hit him with his pistol, causing Battle to fall to the ground. DeBruce and Battle then engaged in a verbal altercation. After all of the robbers other than DeBruce left the store, McCants heard a gunshot from inside, and then saw DeBruce run out. McCants testified that while DeBruce and McCants were riding in the same car escaping from the crime scene, DeBruce admitted to McCants that he shot Battle. McCants also testified that all of the robbers had agreed prior to the robbery that if they encountered resistance from anyone in the store, the lead robber, Charles Burton, “would take care of it.” Finally, McCants identified the handguns...