759 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 2013-1448, Stoncor Group, Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc.

• Judge: Before TARANTO and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.[*]
• Parties: STONCOR GROUP, INC., Appellant, v. SPECIALTY COATINGS, INC., Appellee
• Date: 16 July 2014
• Docket Number: 2013-1448
• Citation: 759 F.3d 1327,111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Page 1327

759 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649

STONCOR GROUP, INC., Appellant,

v.

SPECIALTY COATINGS, INC., Appellee

2013-1448

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit

July 16, 2014

Page 1328

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in Opposition No. 91187787.

CHARLES N. QUINN, Fox Rothschild LLP, of Exton, Pennsylvania, argued for appellant.

MATTHEW SEIFERT, Hoxie & Associates, LLC, of Millburn, New Jersey, argued for appellee. On the brief was THOMAS HOXIE.

Before TARANTO and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.^[*]

OPINION

Page 1329

Hughes, Circuit Judge .

This is a trademark case. The appellant, StonCor Group, Inc., owns the registered trademark " STONSHIELD." When a different company, Specialty Coatings, Inc., sought registration of a competing mark, " ARMORSTONE," StonCor opposed the registration, asserting a likelihood of confusion between ARMORSTONE and STONSHIELD and that ARMORSTONE is merely descriptive of Specialty Coatings' products. The Board dismissed StonCor's opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion and that ARMORSTONE was not merely descriptive. StonCor appeals. Although the Board erred in part of its analysis, namely its conclusion that STONSHIELD would not be pronounced as " STONE SHIELD," the error is harmless because the Board's dismissal is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. Thus, we affirm.

I

StonCor and Specialty Coatings are competitors in the market for epoxy coatings used on concrete floors. In 1992, StonCor registered the mark STONSHIELD with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in connection with " floors and flooring systems comprised of epoxy resins . . . for use in industrial and institutional applications," among other products. STONSHIELD, Registration No. 1,689,713. In 2008, Specialty

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Coatings applied to the USPTO for registration of the mark ARMORSTONE in connection with " [e]poxy coating for use on concrete industrial floors," among other products. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,428,195 (filed Mar. 21, 2008). StonCor filed a notice of opposition to Specialty Coatings' application.

StonCor opposed registration of ARMORSTONE on six grounds, two of which it raises on appeal. First, StonCor argued that the USPTO should not allow registration of ARMORSTONE because consumers would likely confuse the mark with STONSHIELD when ARMORSTONE is used in connection with epoxy floor products. Second, StonCor argued that ARMORSTONE is not eligible for registration because the mark is merely descriptive and Specialty Coatings has not provided evidence of secondary meaning.

The Board analyzed the likelihood of confusion by considering the thirteen factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). The parties presented evidence regarding factors one through eight, ten, and eleven. The Board addressed each of these factors, finding no likelihood of confusion because the marks are too distinct in sound, appearance, and commercial impression. StonCor Grp., Inc. v. Specialty Coatings, Inc., Opposition No. 91187787, 2012 WL 2588576, at *5-*9 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2012). StonCor challenges the Board's findings as to DuPont factors one and six:

(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.. . .

(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.

DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Starting with factor one, the Board considered how prospective consumers would pronounce STONSHIELD. StonCor presented evidence that the " o" would be pronounced by consumers with a long vowel sound, as in the word " stone." The Board reasoned, however, that the spelling of " STON" and ordinary rules of English dictate that the " o" would be pronounced with a short vowel sound, as in the word " on." [WL] at *6. Thus, the Board found that there was a dissimilarity in pronunciation.

The Board went on to describe additional differences between the marks. It found that " STON" is spelled differently from " STONE" ; that " STON--" appears at the beginning of STONSHIELD while " --STONE" appears at the end of ARMORSTONE; that STONSHIELD is two syllables while ARMORSTONE is three syllables; and that STONSHIELD would create a different commercial impression from ARMORSTONE. Taking all of these differences into account, the Board found that factor one weighed against finding a likelihood of confusion.

The Board next found factor six neutral because neither party provided evidence regarding the number of marks similar to STONSHIELD. [WL] at *8. In the Board's view, StonCor's evidence describing other oppositions filed by StonCor was insufficient to turn this factor in StonCor's favor.

Turning to StonCor's claim that ARMORSTONE is merely descriptive, the Board analyzed whether the mark ARMORSTONE, in its entirety, " immediately conveys information concerning a significant quality, characteristic, function, ingredient, attribute or feature of the product or service in connection with which it is used." [WL] at *10 (citing to In re Eng'g Sys. Corp., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075 (T.T.A.B. 1986) and In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 U.S.P.Q. 591 (T.T.A.B. 1979)). Finding that StonCor did not provide sufficient evidence that ARMORSTONE meets this

Page 1331

standard, the Board concluded that StonCor failed to meet its burden of proof.

StonCor appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

II

Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act provides that a trademark may be refused registration if it " so resembles" a prior mark " as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). Likelihood of confusion is a question of law with underlying factual findings made pursuant to the DuPont factors. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc'ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We review the Board's factual findings on each DuPont factor...