Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist.

Citation759 F.3d 266
Decision Date17 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–2192.,13–2192.
PartiesJanet BATCHELOR, individually and on behalf of her son; R.B., a Minor, Appellants v. ROSE TREE MEDIA SCHOOL DISTRICT; The Board of School Directors of the Rose Tree Media School District; Linda Bluebello, Director of Pupil Services of Rose Tree Media School District; Eric Bucci, Assistant Principal of Penncrest High School; Norman Harrison, Assistant Principal of Penncrest High School; Richard Gregg, Principal of Penncrest High School; Karen Walker; Patricia Barta.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Frank Schwartz, Esq., Argued, Lamm Rubenstone Trevose, PA, Counsel for Appellants.

Craig D. Ginsburg, Esq., Argued, Michael I. Levin, Esq. Levin Legal Group Huntingdon Valley, PA, Counsel for Appellees.

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Janet Batchelor (Ms. Batchelor), individually and on behalf of her son, Ryan Batchelor (Ryan) (collectively Appellants) filed suit against the Rose Tree Media School District (“District”), and six individual District employees 1 (“Individual Appellees) (collectively Appellees) 2, asserting their entitlement to the statutory protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400– 1482, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101– 12213. The District Court dismissed Appellants' federal claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants intentionally failed to exhaust the administrative remedies under the IDEA. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court erred in concluding that their federal claims are subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Alternatively, they argue that their claims are exempt from exhaustion. For the reasons provided below, we determine that Appellants' federal claims indeed fall within the ambit of the IDEA and require exhaustion, and further, that no exception to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies under the facts presented. We will therefore affirm the District Court's dismissal of Appellants' federal claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual Background

Because we are reviewing the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), it is appropriate to draw the facts from the allegations contained in the Complaint, and to accept them as true. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir.2006).

1. Ryan's Freshman (20082009) and Sophomore Years (20092010)

In December 2008, during his freshman year at Penncrest High School, Ryan was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, which is designated as a disability within the meaning of Section 504. (Compl. ¶ 20.) The District developed and implemented a written 504 Plan (“504 Plan”) for Ryan, pursuant to which the District placed Ryan in an achievement center for support and provided Ryan with counseling and tutoring.3 These services continued throughout Ryan's freshman year; however, in October 2009, Ms. Batchelor learned that Ryan's guidance counselor had failed to schedule Ryan for placement in the achievement center for his sophomore year. More important, Ryan's teachers did not receive a copy of his 504 Plan. ( Id. at ¶¶ 22–25.) Despite Ryan's subsequent assignment to the achievement center, in December 2009 and again in March 2010, Ryan's guidance counselor reported to Ms. Batchelor that Ryan was failing his classes. ( Id. at ¶ 27.)

On March 15, 2010, Ms. Batchelor met with Vice Principal Harrison to discuss Ryan's struggles, and informed him that the District was not providing Ryan with the support services required by the 504 Plan. ( Id. at ¶ 28.) Appellants allege that Mr. Harrison was hostile and offensive during the meeting, and, at its conclusion, Ms. Batchelor informed Mr. Harrison she would be contacting an attorney. ( Id.)

The next month, in April 2010, Ms. Batchelor and her attorney met with District representatives to discuss the District's failure to implement Ryan's 504 Plan. ( Id. at ¶ 36.) After this meeting, the District assigned Ryan to a resource room, provided tutoring, and, in an effort to better identify the nature of Ryan's learning disability, administered additional testing and evaluations. ( Id. at ¶ 37.) Following testing, which evidenced that Ryan had an additional math disability, an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) meeting was held with the District and Ms. Batchelor, and subsequently, the District developed an IEP for Ryan.4 ( Id. at ¶ 38.)

As a result of the April 2010 meeting, the District offered Appellants a settlement whereby Ms. Batchelor would waive all claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA, and the District would provide compensatory education services to Ryan. ( Id. at ¶ 39.) Specifically, the settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) required the District to “establish a[ ] fund for compensatory education consisting of one hundred sixty hours of tutoring....” Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for a TRO and Imposition of a Prelim. Inj. Ex. 3, Ryan Batchelor, et al. v. Rose Tree Media School District, et al., Case No. 2:11–cv–06733–CDJ (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2011), ECF No. 6–3. The Settlement Agreement became effective at the beginning of Ryan's junior year, on September 24, 2010. (Compl.¶¶ 39–40.)

2. Ryan's Junior Year (20102011)

The District failed to reimburse Ms. Batchelor for the costs of private tutoring incurred between January and April 2011, despite its obligations to do so under the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, Ms. Batchelor filed a breach of contract action, which resulted in the District partially reimbursing her for the tutoring costs. Nevertheless, the District refused to reimburse Ms. Batchelor for the cost of tutoring services incurred thereafter. ( Id. at ¶ 62.)

Appellants allege that, in addition to failing to implement the Settlement Agreement, during Ryan's junior year the District engaged in retaliatory acts against them. ( Id. at ¶¶ 42–50). For example, Appellants allege that, in an act of retaliation, the District changed Ryan's math tutor from a teacher he had worked well with to a tutor who was sarcastic, impatient, and mean, causing Ryan to “feel badly about himself.” ( Id. at ¶ 43.) In another example of retaliation, Appellants allege that the District assigned Ryan to a teacher whom they knew Ryan considered to be a bully. Indeed, on Ryan's first day of class, he was wrongly disciplined and humiliated. ( Id. at ¶ 57.)

3. Ryan's Senior Year (20112012)

Due to the District's failure to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Ryan's IEP, as well as the continuing acts of bullying and retaliation Ryan and Ms. Batchelor suffered, Ryan withdrew from Penncrest for his senior year and enrolled in Twenty First Century Cyber Charter School. ( Id. at ¶ 66.) In another act of alleged retaliation, the District refused to allow Ryan to participate in Penncrest's choir and dance teams during his senior year even though he remained a District resident. ( Id. at ¶ 67.)

Appellants allege that, collectively, the District's retaliatory actions were severely detrimental to Ryan's educational achievement and health.

B. Procedural History

On October 27, 2011, Appellants filed the Initial Complaint, and on March 5, 2012, filed the Complaint at issue here. In the Complaint, Appellants make three federal claims: (1) retaliation/failure to provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (Count II, Appellants v. District ); (2) retaliation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Count III, Appellants v. District ); and (3) retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Count IV, Appellants v. District & Individual Appellees ). 5 Appellants seek compensatory damages, statutory damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and “such other further relief as this court deems just and appropriate.” (Compl.¶¶ 82, 92, 101.)

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which Judge Sitarski granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the ground that Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA. See Magistrate Judge Sitarski's Report & Recommendation, Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media School Dist., 11–cv–6733, 2012 WL 7990542, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 2, 2012) ( hereinafter R & R). Judge C. Darnell Jones, II of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted Judge Sitarski's Report and Recommendation.

On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court erred in concluding that their claims are subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. (Appellants' Br. 10.) Alternatively, Appellants argue that their claims are exempt from the IDEA's exhaustion requirement because: (1) they seek only monetary damages, which are unavailable under the IDEA ( id. at 13–15); (2) the implementation exception applies ( id. at 15–19); and/or (3) the futility exception applies. ( Id. at 19–20.)

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over Appellants' IDEA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise plenary review over a district court's order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188. Because Appellees made a facial challenge to the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), that is, they contested the sufficiency of the pleadings, we review only whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true,...

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