Price v. Wainwright, 83-3447

• Decision Date: 13 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-3447,83-3447
• Citation: 759 F.2d 1549
• Parties: Floyd PRICE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT and Jim Smith, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1549

759 F.2d 1549

Floyd PRICE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT and Jim Smith, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 83-3447.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 13, 1985.

John D. Middleton, Gainesville, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Margene Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Port Orange, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before RONEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and SIMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

Asserting that he was not competent to stand trial at the time he pled guilty to first degree murder in Florida, Floyd Donald Price appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief from his life sentence. Although there may be some question as to whether the district court properly applied the 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state court's finding of competency, an independent review of the record, giving proper deference to the state court's credibility choices and findings of historical facts and the district court's findings at an evidentiary hearing, reveals that the denial of habeas corpus relief must be affirmed.

On March 15, 1974, Price was indicted for first degree murder. He pled not guilty on March 27, 1974. On the basis of reports from psychiatric examinations, however, the state court found Price incompetent to stand trial on September 18, 1974 and committed him to the Division of Mental Health at the Florida State Hospital, where he remained until March 12, 1976.

On April 29, 1976, two years after Price's indictment, a competency hearing was held before the same state court judge and Price was then adjudicated competent to stand trial. On May 4, 1976, Price entered a guilty plea that had been negotiated by his attorney. The court accepted the plea after questioning Price as to his awareness of what he was doing and pursuant to the plea bargain sentenced him to life imprisonment for a minimum period of 25 years before becoming eligible for parole.

Six years later, Price commenced this habeas corpus action in federal court after the state court had denied without an evidentiary hearing his motion to vacate the conviction. The district court had before it the entire record of the 1976 state court competency hearing, at which the court had found that Price at that time was in fact sane within the contemplation of Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.210 and able to aid and assist his counsel and stand trial. The district court held this finding to be entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254(d). After examining the state record, the court then concluded that the state court finding was adequately and fairly supported by the record and that the facts were adequately developed before the trial judge. Noting that none of the other criteria listed in section 2254(d) were urged upon the court, the district judge then concluded it was bound by the state trial judge's finding of fact, unless that finding was shown by convincing evidence to be erroneous. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that petitioner had not shown by convincing evidence that the trial judge's finding as to petitioner's competence was erroneous.

There is some confusion as to whether the district court should have used this approach, or should have treated the question as one of mixed law and fact which requires a more independent review. The ultimate issue of competency has been treated as a mixed question of law and fact. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-75, 175 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 896, 905 n. 10, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058-60 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053, 97 S.Ct. 767, 50 L.Ed.2d 770 (1977); United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 907 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1598, 51 L.Ed.2d 803 (1977).

Often it is said that decisions of mixed law and fact are not entitled to the section 2254(d) presumption. See, e.g., Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1550 n. 16 (11th Cir.1984); United States ex rel. Rivers v. Franzen, 692 F.2d 491, 497 (7th Cir.1982). It would seem that the better approach on such "mixed" questions, however, is to analyze what part is law and what part is fact. See Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d at 1551 n. 16. There would seem to be no reason why the part that is fact should not be entitled to the presumption.

A competency determination, as a mixed question of law and fact, has two components. The legal standard, what a person must know or be able to do in order to be competent, is whether a defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). The factual question is whether the defendant knows or is able to do what is required by the law. The ultimate decision that a person is competent, then, is a determination which the federal court need not presume correct because that decision alone does not tell what law was applied and what facts were found in that decision. When the state court articulates the right law, however, and then finds that the defendant knows or has the ability to meet the legal standard, that finding should be deemed correct if the underlying facts upon which the state court based its decision are fairly supported by the record. In assessing those underlying facts, the federal court should usually defer to the credibility choices of the state court.

The Supreme Court, in a summary disposition without oral argument, has recently suggested that section 2254's presumption of correctness may be applicable to a state court's finding of competency. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). In a per curiam opinion joined by five justices, the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit decision which had held that the habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to relief because the record did not support the state court's conclusion that petitioner was competent to stand trial. The Court cited 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254(d)(8) in support of its holding that "[b]efore a federal habeas court undertakes to overturn factual conclusions made by a state court, it must determine that these conclusions are not 'fairly supported by the record.' " Id. at 117, 103 S.Ct. at 2264. Four justices criticized the majority for departing from established precedent by indicating that section 2254(d) should be applied to the ultimate issue of competency instead of treating the issue as a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary review. Id. at 118-20, 103 S.Ct. at 2264-65 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 120, 103 S.Ct. at 2265 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 120-21, 103 S.Ct. at 2266 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is no indication in the dissenting opinions, however, that a bifurcated analysis was made.

Maggio v. Fulford should be read to require the application of section 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness to a state court's findings of underlying historical facts on a competency issue. At the same time, the ultimate decision is reviewable to the extent that a principle of law is involved. With both the state court and the federal court applying the same law, however, the decision should be the same. As the Maggio v. Fulford Court said, "[t]here is no dispute as to the proper legal standard to be applied for determining the correctness of the trial court's actions." Id. at 116, 103 S.Ct. at 2263 (citations omitted). See Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 931-32 (3d Cir.1984) (reading Maggio v. Fulford to lead to an "inescapable conclusion ... that 'factual' conclusions based on questions of historical fact are subject to the presumption in section 2254(d) even when the ultimate issue is characterized as a mixed question of fact and law"). Thus, the federal court should make an independent review of the record to determine whether the historical facts found by the state court support its ultimate finding of competency.

In reviewing any findings of fact by another court, it is important to know the burden of proof requirements in that court. Because the state court initially committed Price to the state hospital on the basis of psychiatric evaluations, there is some question as to whether the state or Price had the burden of showing Price's competence or incompetence at the state competency hearing and the district court evidentiary hearing. If Price had been adjudicated insane, the state would have the burden of proving he had become sane. In Eason v. State, 421 So.2d 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), the court held that "[w]hile there is ordinarily a presumption that a person is sane, where the accused has been previously adjudged insane, there is a presumption he is still insane." Id. at 36. In Eason, the defendant had been adjudicated insane by a Michigan court and committed to a state mental hospital, from which he had escaped to commit the crimes at issue. In such cases, the state must overcome the presumption that the defendant is still insane and thus incompetent to stand trial or plead guilty. But under Florida law an order holding a defendant incompetent to stand trial and temporarily committing him to a hospital for treatment does not give rise to the presumption created by mental competency adjudications entered in civil commitment proceedings. The current statutory provision specifically provides:

An adjudication of incompetency to stand trial shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency ... for any other purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court order.

Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 916.13(2). The statutory language clearly indicates that such an adjudication does not give rise to the presumption. Thus, Florida...