Farnsworth v. Whiting

CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
Citation76 A. 909,106 Me. 430
PartiesFARNSWORTH v. WHITING et al. (two cases).
Decision Date01 March 1910

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox.

County.

Bills by Lucy C. Farnsworth, administratrix, against George F. Whiting and others. Decrees for defendants, and plaintiff appeals, brings exceptions, and moves for a new trial. Decree affirmed as to one case, and partly reversed and verdict set aside as to the other.

See, also, 76 Atl. 942. Two bills in equity in the nature of equitable replevin, brought by the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of James R. Farnsworth, deceased, to compel the defendants to return to her, as administratrix aforesaid, certain notes, bonds, etc., alleged to belong to the said James R. Farnsworth, and to deliver to her in her said capacity the keys to a certain safe deposit box rented to said James R. Farnsworth. by the Security Trust Company, one of the defendants in the second entitled suit. For a more full and complete statement of the facts see Farnsworth, Adm'x, v. Whiting et al., 104 Me. 488, 72 Atl. 314. The defense in the answers to both bills was a claim of title in the defendants Whiting and Martin by reason of a gift causa mortis to them by the said deceased, James R. Farnsworth.

Both causes were tried together, and in the first entitled cause the following issues were submitted to the jury:

(1) "Did the said James R. Farnsworth, on the 6th day of May, A. D. 1905, or at any time, give to George F. Whiting the personal property enumerated and described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's bill, to be equally divided as stated in defendants' answer thereto?"

(2) "Did the defendants, Whiting and Martin, take or sequester any of said property or effects belonging to the estate of said James R. Farnsworth?"

The jury answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.

In the second entitled cause the following issues were submitted to the jury:

(1) "Did the said James R. Farnsworth, on the 6th day of May, A. D. 1905, or at any time before his death, give to the said George F. Whiting the personal property and securities mentioned in paragraph 4 of plaintiff's bill, marked and described therein as 'Schedule A,' in box No. 41 in the vault of the Security Trust Company in Rockland, to be equally divided as stated in defendants' answer to said paragraph?"

(2) "Do the property and securities mentioned in plaintiff's bill, paragraph 4, marked and described as 'Schedule R,' belong to the estate of said Helen A. Farnsworth, deceased?"

The jury answered both questions in the affirmative.

Final decrees were made by the presiding justice in accordance with the findings of the jury.

In each cause the plaintiff filed a general motion for a new trial, and appealed from the decree, and also excepted to certain rulings made during the trial.

Argued before WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, SPEAR, CORNISH, KING, and BIRD, JJ.

Heath & Andrews, for plaintiff.

David N. Mortland, Rodney I. Thompson, and Arthur S. Littlefield, for defendants.

BIRD, J. Two bills in equity brought by complainant, in her capacity of administratrix with the will annexed of the estate of James R. Farnsworth, deceased, against the same defendants, save that in the second case the Security Trust Company is also made a defendant. The relief sought is in the nature of equitable replevin. The defense in the answers to both bills is claim of title in defendants Whiting and Martin by reason of a gift causa mortis to them by deceased.

In both cases, among other issues framed and submitted to a jury was the question whether in the respective cases deceased did in his lifetime make a gift to defendants Whiting and Martin. In each case the question was answered in the affirmative, and following the verdict the sitting justice entered a decree in favor of defendants. In each case plaintiff seasonably filed a general motion for new trial and appealed from the decree. Plaintiff took sundry exceptions to the admission and exclusion of evidence and to certain instructions and refusals to instruct of the sitting justice. In reference to the exceptions, it need only be said that they have received due consideration from this court in arriving at its conclusions. Redman v. Hurley, 89 Me. 428, 434, 36 Atl. 906.

In the first case, after careful examination of the record, we are of the opinion that the decree appealed from must be sustained. It is not shown that it is clearly wrong. Young v. Witham, 75 Me. 536; Proctor v. Rand, 94 Me. 313. 318, 47 Atl. 537; Herlihy v. Coney, 99 Me. 469, 471, 59 Atl. 952; York v. Mathis, 103 Me. 67, 74, 75, 68 Atl. 746.

In the second case, in which it is sought to recover the contents of the box in the safe deposit vault of the Security Trust Company occupied by the testator in his lifetime, and the keys of the box, we feel that the decree cannot be sustained.

More than half a century ago this court declared that "donations made, not in conformity to the statute of wills and frauds, but suited to contravene them, are not favored by the law, but are admitted with the greatest caution." Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422, 433.(1850). See, also, Goulding v. Horbury, 85 Me. 227, 234, 27 Atl. 127, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357. In express recognition of this doctrine, it was later held, in a case where it was unsuccessfully sought to support a gift causa mortis of money and bonds, by showing delivery of the key of the trunk containing them, that to establish a gift causa mortis the law requires clear and unmistakable proof, not only of an intention to give, but of an actual gift, perfected by as complete a delivery as the nature of the property will admit of—a delivery actual and complete, such as deprives the donor of all further control and dominion. Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 327, 331, 96 Am. Dec. 464. The doctrine of this case has been repeatedly recognized with approval since its enunciation (Drew v Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 242, 243, 17 Atl. 63, 3 L. R. A. 230, 10 Am. St. Rep. 255; Goulding v. Horbury, 85 Me. 227, 234, 27 Atl. 127, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357; Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 518, 34 Atl. 408, 51 Am. St. Rep. 440), and, save as it may be modified by Goulding v. Horbury, ubi supra, is reaffirmed.

A careful examination of the record by no means satisfies us that either an intention to give or a delivery of the keys with an intent to give either them or the contents of the box are shown by that clear and unmistakable proof which the law requires. Hatch v. Atkinson, ubi supra; Goulding v. Horbury, 85 Me. 227, 27 Atl. 127, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357. See, also, Liberty v. Haines, 103 Me. 182, 191-193, 68 Atl. 738. It is apparent that the jury must have labored under a misconception of the law or of the nature and degree of the proof required to uphold the contention of the defendants. The decree of the sitting justice is based upon the verdict (Young v. Witham, ubi supra), and must be reversed. See Metcalf v. Metcalf, 85 Me. 473, 481, 27 Atl. 457.

It is however, strenuously contended by the defendants that, inasmuch as the controversy between the parties is one concerning property, trial by...

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14 cases
  • State v. Anton
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 14 Julio 1983
    ...Improvement Commission, 307 A.2d 1, 28 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035, 94 S.Ct. 532, 38 L.Ed.2d 326 (1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910) (citing Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334, 62 N.E. 401 (1902)); see Opinion of the Justices, 315 A.2d 847 (Me.1974) (uphold......
  • Cyr v. Cote
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 26 Enero 1979
    ...Improvement Commission, Me., 307 A.2d 1, Appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035, 94 S.Ct. 532, 38 L.Ed.2d 326 (1973); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909 (1910). Plaintiffs' complaint asserted deceit, undue influence, duress, and mental incapacity. A constructive trust or damages were re......
  • Nugent v. Shambor
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 25 Marzo 1980
    ...required for a judgment notwithstanding verdict, to disregard that verdict. Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P. 39(c); Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 435, 76 A. 909, 911 (1910). The trial court made findings, and appellate review of them is as though no jury were present. American Lumbermens Mu......
  • Zimmerman v. Kitzan, 7192
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 26 Agosto 1950
    ...510. Prondzinski v. Garbutt, supra; 19 Am.Jur. page 277, section 404; 53 Am.Jur. pages 780-781 section 1124. See also Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 A. 909; Colie v. Tifft, 47 N.Y. 119; Randall v. Randall, 114 N.Y. 499, 21 N.E. It naturally follows that where an advisory verdict has......
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