Shannon v. United States

• Decision Date: 22 March 1935
• Docket Number: No. 1157,1158.,1157
• Parties: SHANNON v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

76 F.2d 490 (1935)

SHANNON v. UNITED STATES (two cases).

Nos. 1157, 1158.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

March 22, 1935.

Glover C. Johnson, of Fort Worth, Tex. (McLean, Scott & Sayers, Joe S. Moss, of Lufkin, Tex., and Burch & Woodruff, of Decatur, Tex., on the brief), for appellants.

George E. Massey, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl. (William C. Lewis, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for the United States.

Before PHILLIPS, McDERMOTT, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

This is a prosecution for a conspiracy to kidnap, transport the kidnapped person in interstate commerce and hold him for ransom in violation of the Act approved June 22, 1932, 47 Stat. 326, see 18 USCA §§ 408a to 408c. Albert Bates; Harvey J. Bailey; George R. Kelly and wife, Kathryn Thorne Kelly; R. G. Shannon and wife, Ora L. Shannon; Armon Shannon; Charles Wolk; Sam Kronick; Edward Berman; Peter Valder; Sam Kozberg; Clifford Skelly; and Isadore Blumenfeld were indicted jointly. The indictment charged that in July, 1933, they knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspired together and with each other to kidnap Chas. F. Urschel at Oklahoma City, transport him in interstate commerce to the Shannon ranch in Texas, and there hold him in concealment for payment of a ransom of $200,000. Thirteen overt acts were set forth. Those charged against R. G. Shannon and Ora L. Shannon were that after the victim reached their ranch in Texas, they and other named coconspirators blindfolded, shackeled, and concealed him, and that they later chained, shackeled, handcuffed, and concealed him at the nearby residence of Armon Shannon pending demand and receipt of the ransom. Bates, Bailey, the Shannons, Berman, and Skelly were found guilty. Kronick, Kozberg, Blumenfeld, Wolk, and Valder were acquitted. The Kellys had not been apprehended at that time. Bailey took a separate appeal and his conviction was affirmed. Bailey v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 74 F.(2d) 451. R. G. Shannon and Ora L. Shannon perfected this appeal.

Appellants demurred to the indictment on the ground that it failed to allege that the overt acts done by them in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed knowingly. It was charged in conventional manner that they and the others named did knowingly combine, confederate, and agree to commit the offense. The demurrer admitted all matters well pleaded and that included the charge that they knowingly entered the conspiracy. It being specifically charged and admitted that they did so, there was no necessity to allege afresh that each overt act committed in furtherance of the unlawful agreement was done with knowledge. In other words, repetition of the averment of knowledge was not required. If they knowingly went into the conspiracy, it is difficult to conceive how they subsequently committed acts in furtherance of its accomplishment without knowledge. To repeat the allegation of knowledge would approach tautology. United States v. Mitchell (C. C.) 141 F. 666; Henry v. United States (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 624.

The demurrer attacked the indictment on the further ground that it appeared from the face thereof that the overt acts charged against appellants were done after transportation of the abducted person in interstate commerce ceased, that is, after he reached the ranch in Texas, and that therefore they were unrelated to the charged conspiracy. The same question was presented by a demurrer to the evidence, by a requested instruction, and by a motion in arrest of judgment. The contention thus advanced at the several stages of the trial and renewed here rests upon an unduly restricted conception of the breadth of the statute and of the conspiracy laid in the indictment. The act makes it an offense to knowingly transport, cause to be transported, or aid and abet in the transportation of a kidnapped person in interstate commerce and hold him for ransom or reward. It is further provided that if two or more persons conspire, confederate, and agree to do the enumerated things and then commit an overt act to render such agreement effectual, they shall be punished. The substantive offense consists of two constitutent elements. They are transporting an abducted person in interstate commerce and holding him for ransom or reward. Transportation in interstate commerce is an essential element, but the other is a constituent ingredient. Holding the victim for ransom after movement in interstate commerce ceases is a continuing element. Ordinarily the object of such an offense is the collection of ransom money and its exchange for other money, hence detaining the victim until payment of the ransom is essential. The conspiracy charged in the indictment embraced both elements, it being specifically alleged that the agreement had for its object and purpose the act of kidnapping at Oklahoma City, that of transporting the abducted person in interstate commerce to Texas, and that of holding him there for the ransom. If appellants knowingly joined the conspiracy while he was being held there and did the alleged affirmative acts in fulfillment of such purpose, they became coconspirators equally guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, even though the transportation in interstate commerce had terminated. Lew Moy v. United States (C. C. A.) 237 F. 50; Murray v. United States (C. C. A.) 10 F.(2d) 409; Wilkerson v. United States (C. C. A.) 41 F. (2d) 654; Loftus v. United States (C. C. A.) 46 F.(2d) 841; Dowdy v. United States (C. C. A.) 46 F.(2d) 417; Parnell v. United States (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 324. Without detailing the evidence, we think it abundantly established the overt acts charged. Appellants sought to exculpate themselves, but the jury was not required to believe their explanations. The court, therefore, rightly held the indictment invulnerable to the attack and the evidence sufficient to take the case to the jury.

Complaint is made of the refusal of the court to give requested instructions numbered 10, 11, and 16, each stating in substance but in different phraseology that appellants should be acquitted if they acted under coercion, that is, through fear of suffering death or serious bodily injury if they refused to do the acts charged against them. They contended that Kelly and Bates threatened them and that was the source of their fear. Kelly and Bates kidnapped Urschel at his residence in Oklahoma City on Saturday night and reached the residence of appellants with him Sunday afternoon. They kept him there blindfolded and under guard until about dusk Monday evening. They then removed him to the residence of Armon Shannon, son of ...