United States v. Bingham
Decision Date | 26 March 1935 |
Docket Number | No. 2983.,2983. |
Citation | 76 F.2d 573 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. BINGHAM et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Arnold Raum, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Norman D. Keller, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for the United States.
George S. Fuller, of Boston, Mass. (Burnham, Bingham, Pillsbury, Dana & Gould, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Massachusetts in a proceeding to recover a refund of an estate tax assessed under section 402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1057, 1098), and paid by the executors.
The basis of the tax was seven insurance policies, all taken out by the testator prior to 1900 and either assigned to his wife or made payable to his wife or son.
Four policies issued by the Berkshire Life Insurance Company, a Massachusetts company, were originally payable at the death of the testator to his executors, administrators, or assigns. In June, 1904, the testator assigned the four policies to the company as security for a loan of $5,900, which was outstanding at his death on February 27, 1921.
In July, 1904, the testator assigned the four policies, subject to the prior assignment, to his wife, provided she survived him.
A fifth policy was issued by the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., and named the wife of the testator as beneficiary, with a provision that if she did not survive him, it was payable to his children; and if there were no children or descendants thereof living at his death, it was payable to his estate. It was also further provided that at the end of ten years, it being a ten-payment life policy, the insured could himself draw the cash value of the policy, or at the end of each five-year period thereafter. The testator did not avail himself of the provision before his death, the last five-year period ending May 22, 1918, and the next five-year period did not end until 1923, more than two years after his death.
The sixth and seventh policies were issued by the Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York, one of which was made payable to his wife, and the other to his son. Neither contained a provision for a cash surrender value or the right to change the beneficiary.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue included in the gross estate of the testator the proceeds of all of the policies above the exemption provided in section 402 (f) of the Act of 1918. His ruling was rejected by the District Court on the authority of Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487, 488, 69 L. Ed. 934, on the ground that the policies were all issued prior to the enactment of the Revenue Acts, and section 402 of the Revenue Act of 1918 was not made retroactive.
An examination of the Frick Case, however, leads us to the conclusion that it is not determinative of the present case. While it is claimed that some of the policies in the Frick Case, though payable to his wife and children, contained provisions for a change of beneficiaries, these provisions, if they existed, were not referred to by the court in its opinion. The contentions raised in that case were directed more particularly to the constitutionality of section 402 of the 1918 Act on the ground that there was no transfer of property of the testator at death, and that the proceeds of insurance policies belonged to the wife and daughter, and, therefore, could not be taxed as property passing at the testator's death.
The court said: It avoided a decision of these questions by holding that the statute of 1918 was not retroactive and, therefore, did not apply to policies issued prior to the enactment of the Revenue Acts imposing estate taxes, adding, as its reason for this interpretation that, "acts of Congress are to be construed if possible in such a way as to avoid grave doubts of this kind."
Since this decision, the Supreme Court has more clearly defined what passes at death in the case of trusts and insurance policies, and held that, if the vesting of the property in a donee, grantee, or beneficiary is not complete until the death of the grantor, donor, or testator, and there is a complete shifting of the economic interest at death, there is a transfer subject to a tax under the Revenue Acts.
It is "transfers at death," as later interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chase National Bank et al. v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126, 127, 73 L. Ed. 405, 63 A. L. R. 388, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410, 66 A.L.R. 397, Tyler et al. v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996, Klein et al. v. United States, 283 U. S. 231, 51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996, and Third National Bank & Trust Co. of Springfield et al. v. White (D. C.) 45 F.(2d) 911, affirmed in 287 U. S. 577, 53 S. Ct. 290, 77 L. Ed. 505, that are taxed under the acts of 1918 and 1921.
While the insurance policies in the case of Chase National Bank et al. v. United States, supra, were issued after the passage of the act of 1918, the court held that in case of a reservation of a right to change beneficiaries:
The court in this case, referring to the case of Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565, as supporting its conclusion, said, pages 336, 337 of 278 U. S., 49 S. Ct. 126, 128:
We think this case disposes of the constitutional objection to the provisions of the acts of 1918 and 1921 raised in the Frick Case, and it matters not that the policies were issued prior to the enactment of these acts, if the testator still retained control of the policies and retained an interest therein which passed by his death to the beneficiary or assignees after these acts were passed.
This interpretation has been followed in all decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals following the decision in Chase National Bank Case, Heiner v. Grandin, 44 F. (2d) 141; Liebes v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 870, 92 A. L. R. 938; Levy's Estate v. Commissioner, 65 F.(2d) 412; Cook et al. v. Commissioner, 66 F.(2d) 995; Scott et al. v. Commissioner, 69 F.(2d) 444, 92 A. L. R. 531. In Heiner v. Grandin there was a minority opinion following the opinion in the Frick Case; but the Grandin Case was decided before the decision in the Chase National Bank Case. After the decision in the Chase National Bank Case, there was a reargument in the Grandin Case, and the court in a per curiam, 56 F.(2d) 1082,...
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