Prins v. Coughlin

Decision Date20 February 1996
Docket NumberD,No. 709,709
Citation76 F.3d 504
PartiesBrian PRINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas COUGHLIN, III; David Morgenstern, Rabbi; Christopher Artuz, Superintendent; Denis Bliden, Deputy Supt.; Gail Dougherty, Correction Counselor; Jack Alexander, Direction of Classification, (each in their official and individual capacities), Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-2458.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Brian Prins, pro se, as Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York (Ronald Turbin and Rosemary Dibenedetto, Assistant Attorneys General, New York City, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: WINTER, JACOBS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Brian Prins, incarcerated and pro se, appeals a June 26, 1995 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Mukasey, J.), denying his motion to amend his complaint and granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Prins was an inmate in the custody of New York State's Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), was transferred from the Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven") to the Clinton Correctional Facility ("Clinton"), and is now apparently confined in a Florida correctional facility. On March 24, 1994, Prins filed the present complaint against Thomas Coughlin III, Commissioner of DOCS, and Green Haven administrators, claiming that his transfer substantially burdened his exercise of religious freedom as a Jew in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Green Haven is located in the Southern District of New York; Clinton is located in the Northern District of New York.

The complaint alleged that Prins (1) has "a sincere and strongly held religious belief that his hair and beard must not be shaved, cut, or trimmed and that he MUST maintain a KOSHER DIET at all times"; and (2) has "a sincere and strongly held religious belief that, he should be in a facility that has daily prayer services with a minyan as required by Jewish law, and permitted by DOCS officials in this State." However, the sole articulated legal theory was that the defendants had "deprived plaintiff of his right to a Hot Kosher Diet each and every day he is under the control of DOCS." In his demand for relief, the only equitable relief Prins specifically On August 2, 1994, after a hearing conducted in June, the district court denied Prins' application for a preliminary injunction ordering his return to Green Haven so that he could have hot kosher food. On November 22, 1994, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On December 26, 1994, Prins filed a Rule 3(g) statement in opposition to the defendants' motion, in which he described how the Jewish services at Clinton were less frequent and less traditional than those he attended at Green Haven; Prins also complained about DOCS's one-inch beard rule.

                requested was an "injunction from violating the plaintiff's right to a 'Hot Kosher Diet' that is prepared in a 'Kosher Kitchen'."   Prins also requested compensatory and punitive damages
                

On June 23, 1995, the district court issued a memorandum and order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Prins' complaint. The district court found Prins had failed to present any evidence that the kosher diet at Clinton failed to meet the standards of Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.1975), and that Prins therefore was unable to demonstrate that his exercise of religion was "substantially burdened" by government action in this respect. The district court treated Prins' Rule 3(g) statement as a motion to amend the complaint for the purpose of adding claims as to the quality of religious services at Clinton and for relief against enforcement of the one-inch beard rule. The court then denied that motion to amend as to the religious services, on the ground that Prins did not allege that the services at Clinton were inadequate. The court denied the motion to amend as to the one-inch beard rule, on the ground that the rule is a general DOCS regulation that is unrelated to the transfer, and that any complaint regarding the application of the rule at Clinton would have to be brought in the Northern District of New York. Prins thereafter brought this appeal.

DISCUSSION
A.

Although not raised by either party, we first consider whether we lack jurisdiction by reason of mootness. In order for a federal court to retain jurisdiction over a case, an actual controversy must exist "at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 2334, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (citations omitted). A case is deemed moot where the problem sought to be remedied has ceased, and where there is "no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." Id. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)).

It is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility. Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 3224, 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989); Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir.1986). On the other hand, the transfer does not moot an action for damages. Young, 866 F.2d at 568 n. 1. Since Prins is no longer incarcerated at either Green Haven or Clinton, he cannot get injunctive relief. Prins, however, also sought compensatory damages for harm caused by his transfer from Green Haven to Clinton, and that aspect of his complaint--and presumably of his putative motion to amend--are not moot.

B.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.1993). On appeal, Prins does not dispute the district court's conclusion that the kosher diet at Clinton was adequate under the RFRA, nor does he dispute the legal analysis used to arrive at that conclusion. Rather, he appeals on the ground that all of the problems he identified in his complaint and Rule 3(g) statement should have been considered by the district court as a single interrelated set of claims bearing upon his freedom to worship. We analyze these claims--as the district court did--one by one. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Prins' In its August 2, 1994, Opinion and Order denying Prins' motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court observed in a footnote that "a prison inmate ordinarily has no due process right to avoid a transfer from one prison...

To continue reading

Request your trial
194 cases
  • Green v. Martin, 3:15–CV–1553 (CSH)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
    • December 14, 2016
    ...to him while he was an inmate at CCI, such claims would, in any event, be considered moot and would also be futile. See Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the......
  • Keitt v. New York City, 09 Civ. 8508 (GBD) (DF)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • August 26, 2011
    ...to Attica does not moot his action for monetary damages for harm allegedly suffered during his prior incarceration. See Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996). The State Defendants move to dismiss Keitt's request for punitive damages as to his Section 1983 claims. (State Defs. M......
  • Alster v. Goord
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • September 10, 2010
    ...that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir.1996). Accordingly, Alster's claims for injunctive relief are moot.IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Ref......
  • Roseboro v. Gillespie
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • May 24, 2011
    ...Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1047 (2d Cir. 1989); accord, e.g., Taylor v. Levesque, 246 F. App'x 772, 774 (2d Cir. 2007); Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, defendants are granted summary judgment dismissing Roseboro's due process claims.IV. DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUD......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT