76 Hawai'i 46, Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu

• Decision Date: 18 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 16457,16457
• Parties: 76 Hawai'i 46 William S. RICHARDSON, Henry H. Peters, Oswald K. Stender, Myron B. Thompson, and Matsuo Takabuki, in their capacities as Trustees of the Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, a Hawai'i municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Hale Coalition, Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1193

868 P.2d 1193

76 Hawai'i 46

William S. RICHARDSON, Henry H. Peters, Oswald K. Stender,

Myron B. Thompson, and Matsuo Takabuki, in their capacities

as Trustees of the Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop

Estate, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, a Hawai'i municipal

corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Hale

Coalition, Intervenor-Appellee.

No. 16457.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 18, 1994.

Reconsideration Denied March 7, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In interpreting general statutes that may appear to be in conflict with specific statutes relating to the same subject matter, three rules of statutory construction are particularly germane. First, legislative enactments are presumptively valid and should be interpreted in such a manner as to give them effect. Second, laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other; what is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another. Third, where there is a plainly irreconcilable conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the same subject matter, the specific will be favored; however, where the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, because repeal by implication is disfavored.

2. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 46-1.5(6) (Supp.1992), 46-61 (1985), 46-62 (1985), and 101-2 (1985) are in pari materia, inasmuch as they all relate generally to the subject matter of the counties' power of condemnation by eminent domain. However, they are complementary rather than conflicting.

3. By construing the statutes in pari materia, the following general scheme is distilled: (1) HRS §§ 46-1.5(6) and 101-2 confer upon the counties the general power of eminent domain for public purposes; (2) HRS § 46-61 delineates the public uses for which the counties may condemn land and includes any unenumerated "other public uses" consonant with HRS § 101-2; and (3) HRS § 46-62 clarifies the procedures to be followed by the counties in exercising the power.

4. HRS §§ 46-61, 46-62, and 101-2 neither limit the counties' general power of eminent domain, as set out in HRS § 46-1.5(6), nor divest them of the authority to enact ordinances allowing for the condemnation of land for any particular public purpose.

5. Although the Department of Housing and Community Development (Department) of the City and County of Honolulu (City) is empowered to designate land for acquisition pursuant to Honolulu, Haw., Rev.Ordinances §§ 38-2.2, 38-3.2, and 38-4.2 (Apr. 1992 Rev.), the Department merely facilitates the City's acquisition of the land subject to the decision of the City, through its City Council, actually to exercise the power of eminent domain as prescribed by HRS §§ 101-13 (1985) and 101-14 (1985). In other words, the ordinances accord the Department the authority to assist the City's statutorily designated governing authority in the ultimate exercise of that power; they do not confer the power to condemn land on the Department itself.

6. Because the Department's mere designation of land, as a means of facilitating its acquisition by the City, is only a preliminary step in the condemnation process at the behest of the City Council, Ordinance 91-95 does not entail the sort of impermissible delegation of the power of eminent domain from the City Council to the Department that would violate HRS § 101-13.

7. HRS § 46-1.5(13) (Supp.1992) is an oxymoron. Read literally, it counsels that a county may enact an ordinance so long as it is not intended to be exclusive or uniform throughout the state. Inasmuch as an ordinance is a local law of a municipal corporation prescribing general, uniform and permanent rules of conduct relating to the corporate affairs of the municipality, it cannot, by definition, evince such an intent.

8. Departure from a literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd result and the literal construction in the particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.

9. A literal reading of HRS § 46-1.5(13) would not only produce an absurd result, but would also be clearly inconsistent with its purposes and policies. HRS § 46-1.5(13) was enacted in 1988 because the legislature expressly intended to expand the scope of HRS § 70-105 (1985), which was limited to the City and County of Honolulu, to all of the state's counties. But because HRS § 46-1.5(13) emerged from HRS § 70-105 otherwise substantively intact, it is clear that HRS § 46-1.5(13) was intended to be a provision mandating the preemption of any ordinance that either conflicted with the intent of a state statute or legislated in an area already staked out by the legislature for exclusive and statewide statutory treatment.

10. If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void. A conflict exists if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. Local legislation is duplicative of general law when it is coextensive therewith. Similarly, local legislation is contradictory to general law when it is inimical thereto. Finally, local legislation enters an area that is fully occupied by general law when the legislature has expressly manifested its intent to fully occupy the area, or when it has impliedly done so.

11. A municipal ordinance may be preempted pursuant to HRS § 46-1.5(13) if (1) it covers the same subject matter embraced within a comprehensive state statutory scheme disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive and uniform throughout the state or (2) it conflicts with state law.

12. The statutory scheme circumscribed by HRS §§ 46-61, 46-62, and ch. 101 is "uniform" but not "comprehensive" because, although it controls the mechanics of the taking process, it neither expressly nor impliedly addresses (1) the preliminary subject of the rights of lessees to lease-to-fee conversion via the mechanism of the counties' (and therefore the City's) power of condemnation or (2) the subsequent subject of the manner by which lessees might acquire the fee interest in their land from the City before, during, or after the City has accomplished the takings.

13. Ordinance 91-95 establishes the rights of persons holding long-term condominium, cooperative, and residential planned development leases to purchase the fee simple title to the underlying land. The ordinance also governs, inter alia, the designation of the leased fee interests to be taken, the qualifications of lessees for purchase, the actual purchases by lessees, and the preliminary negotiations with lessors required of lessees. These provisions have no counterparts in HRS §§ 46-61, 46-62, or ch. 101.

14. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Ordinance 91-95 covers the same subject matter embraced within HRS §§ 46-61, 46-62, and ch. 101. That being the case, the state statutory scheme encompassed therein does not indicate a legislative intent to be the exclusive legislation applicable to the domain of the ordinance--the right of certain otherwise statutorily uncovered classes of residential lessees to involuntary lease-to-fee conversion.

15. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo. When construing a statute, the foremost obligation of the reviewing court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be gained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the sole duty of the appellate court is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.

16. By its plain and unambiguous language, the subject matter of HRS ch. 516 (1985 and Supp.1992) (Hawai'i Land Reform Act) is limited to the involuntary lease-to-fee conversion of "lots" of land that are two acres or less in size and are used or intended for use as the principal residences for one or two families. As such, the Hawai'i Land Reform Act does not cover the same subject matter embraced within Ordinance 91-95.

17. The fact that the Hawai'i Land Reform Act was expressly not meant to supersede or preclude any other remedy at law available to residential leasehold lessees demonstrates that the legislature could not have intended the act to be the exclusive legislation applicable to the involuntary lease-to-fee conversion of all residential leaseholds.

18. The Hawai'i Land Reform Act does not set forth an exclusive and comprehensive state statutory scheme covering involuntary lease-to-fee conversion and, accordingly, cannot preempt Ordinances 91-95 on that basis.

19. Because the subject matter embraced within HRS ch. 516D (Supp.1992) is not the same as that covered by Ordinance 91-95, the former does not preempt the latter on that basis.

20. HRS chs. 519 (1985 and Supp.1992), 514A (1985 and Supp.1992), and 421H (Supp.1992) all cover subject matters distinct from that of involuntary lease-to-fee conversion, and, accordingly, no legislative intent to preempt Ordinance 91-95 may be implied.

21. Article VIII, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution (1978) and its implementing statute, HRS § 50-15 (1985), are necessarily implicated whenever the issue of "preemption-by-conflict" arises with respect to a county ordinance because the preemption doctrine raises issues regarding the supremacy of state law.

22. If an ordinance truly conflicts with Hawai'i statutory law that is of statewide concern, then it is necessarily invalid because it violates article VIII, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution and HRS § 50-15--the state's supremacy provisions. A law of general application throughout the state is a law of statewide concern within the meaning of article VIII, section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution.

23. Ordinance 91-95 does not enter an area fully occupied by the Hawai'i Land...