State v. Dean, CR-02-0427-PR.

Citation76 P.3d 429,206 Ariz. 158
Decision Date15 September 2003
Docket NumberNo. CR-02-0427-PR.,CR-02-0427-PR.
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellant, v. Donald Gene DEAN, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Arizona

Terry Goddard, Attorney General by Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section and Billie A. Rosen, Section Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement and Violent Crimes Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.

James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender by Garrett W. Simpson, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

HURWITZ, Justice.

¶ 1 We granted review in this case to address a recurring Fourth Amendment issue—whether the search of an automobile is "incident" to the arrest of a defendant. In this case, the search occurred after the defendant was arrested in a house, some two and one-half hours after he had exited the vehicle. The superior court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment; the court of appeals reversed. For the reasons below, we hold that the superior court correctly found that the search in this case did not fall within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

I.

¶ 2 On February 7, 2001, Phoenix police officers received a tip that Donald Dean, the subject of two felony drug arrest warrants, was residing at a house on East Cholla Street in Phoenix. The police set up surveillance of the house and, at about 6:00 p.m., observed a Jeep Grand Cherokee leaving the residence, driven by a person fitting Dean's description. Several officers followed the Jeep in a marked patrol car; after a short time, the officers activated their overhead lights. Dean, who was in fact driving the Jeep, did not pull over, but instead returned to the East Cholla residence and parked in the driveway. He jumped out of the Jeep, leaving the keys in the ignition, and ran into the garage of the house. One of the officers then took the keys from the Jeep.

¶ 3 The officers on the scene summoned a tactical team from the Phoenix Special Assignment Unit. After obtaining permission from the owner of the house, the tactical team went inside. The team eventually found Dean hiding in the attic, arrested him, and took him to a waiting patrol car.

¶ 4 Dean's arrest occurred approximately two and one-half hours after he fled the Jeep. After Dean was arrested, officers searched the Jeep and discovered methamphetamine in the passenger compartment. Based on this discovery, the police obtained a warrant to search the residence and, in executing that warrant, discovered additional quantities of methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and weapons. Dean was subsequently charged with possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs, possession of dangerous drugs for sale, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

¶ 5 Dean filed a motion in the superior court to suppress all evidence seized from the Jeep, alleging unlawful search and seizure. The superior court granted the motion to suppress. The trial court rejected the State's contentions that the vehicle was abandoned and that the search was simply an administrative inventory of the vehicle contents. The superior court also rejected the State's argument that the warrantless search of the Jeep was incident to Dean's arrest, noting that "[t]he arrest took place two and a half hours later at a different location."

¶ 6 The State timely appealed the suppression order pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 13-4032(6) (2001). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Jeep search fell within the "incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Dean, 203 Ariz. 408, 409 ¶ 1, 55 P.3d 102, 103 (App. 2002). The court of appeals reasoned that because the police could have searched the vehicle incident to an arrest if Dean had been apprehended either inside the vehicle or directly outside of it, Dean could not "evade a search by leaving the vehicle before the officers arrest him." Id. at 411 ¶ 10, 55 P.3d at 105.

¶ 7 Dean filed a petition for review, and we granted review to address the applicability of the "incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement in this situation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.19(c)(3), and A.R.S. §§ 13-4032(6) and -4033(A)(2) (2001).

II.

¶ 8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and provides that search warrants shall be issued only upon "probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Searches conducted without a judicially approved warrant "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (internal citations omitted). The State suggests that the warrantless search of Dean's Jeep can be justified by virtue of three of those "exceptions": (1) because the Jeep was "abandoned"; (2) because the search was an administrative "inventory" of its contents; and (3) because the search was "incident" to Dean's arrest.1

A.

¶ 9 The State's first two arguments do not require extended discussion. The superior court specifically found that the Jeep, which was parked in the driveway of Dean's residence, was not abandoned. In reviewing an order involving a motion to suppress, we review the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the order, and will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent "clear and manifest error." State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 265, 921 P.2d 655, 668 (1996). See State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 8, 49 P.3d 273, 277 (2002) ("Clear and manifest error ... is really shorthand for abuse of discretion."). We find no such error here.

¶ 10 The State's attempt to justify the search as an "inventory" of the Jeep fails on similar grounds. While police have the power to perform a warrantless "administrative" search of an impounded vehicle for "community caretaking functions," see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976),

such a search must be "routine," and not "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive." Id. at 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092. The officer who conducted the search of the Jeep testified at the suppression hearing that his purpose was "to search for evidence." In light of that testimony, the superior court did not err in concluding that the search was not an administrative inventory.2

B.

¶ 11 We therefore turn to the only remaining applicable justification for the warrantless search here, the "search incident to arrest" exception. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court explained both this exception and its justifications. Chimel involved the arrest of a defendant inside his home and the subsequent warrantless search of the home. The California Supreme Court upheld the search as "incident to a valid arrest." Id. at 755, 89 S.Ct. 2034. In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.

¶ 12 Chimel began from the premise that when a search is conducted without a warrant, "[t]he scope of [a] search must be `strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Id. at 762, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). When a search is conducted incident to a valid arrest, Justice Stewart explained, two sets of circumstances justify departure from the general warrant requirement:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.

Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

¶ 13 Chimel taught that these twin aims of the search incident to arrest exception—officer safety and preservation of evidence— provide "ample justification" for a warrantless search "of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. The search in Chimel was of the defendant's entire house, taking between forty-five minutes and an hour after the arrest. Because the search "went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could be used as evidence against him," the Court held that there was no constitutional justification for departing from the general warrant requirement and that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.

C.

¶ 14 Under the rule announced in Chimel, determining whether a particular area in which evidence was found was within an arrestee's "immediate control" required an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each arrest. This case-by-case analysis "presented a significant burden to courts and police" when the arrest occurred in or near an automobile and police had to decide at the time of the arrest which portions of the automobile were within the arrestee's immediate control. Glasco v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 433, 513 S.E.2d 137, 143 (1999) (Lacy, J., concurring). In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court recognized the...

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