Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 28349.,28349.
• Citation: 76 P.3d 951,139 Idaho 207
• Parties: Marty Mark ROBISON and Anzhelika Robison, individually and as a marital community, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BATEMAN-HALL, INC., an Idaho corporation, Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Shilo Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., Defendant. Bateman-Hall, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Cross Claimant-Third Party Plaintiff, v. Shilo Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., Cross Defendant, and Thomas D. Robison, Roofing, Inc., Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

76 P.3d 951

139 Idaho 207

Marty Mark ROBISON and Anzhelika Robison, individually and as a marital community, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BATEMAN-HALL, INC., an Idaho corporation, Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Shilo Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., Defendant.

Bateman-Hall, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Cross Claimant-Third Party Plaintiff, v. Shilo Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., Cross Defendant, and Thomas D. Robison, Roofing, Inc., Third-Party Defendant.

No. 28349.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2003 Term.

July 18, 2003.

Rehearing Denied September 15, 2003.

Holland & Hart, Boise, for appellants. Walter H. Bithell argued.

Anderson, Nelson, Hall, Smith, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Blake Hall argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is a claim for personal injury asserted against a property owner and a general contractor. Fred Meyer Stores (Fred Meyer) owned a partially vacated strip mall in Pocatello, Idaho. Fred Meyer contracted with general contractor, Bateman-Hall, Inc. (Bateman-Hall), to build a second building on the site. Bateman-Hall, in turn, contracted with Plaintiff Marty Robison's direct employer, Thomas D. Robison Roofing, Inc. (Robison Roofing), to perform the roofing work on the project. On September 1, 1999, Robison, while attempting to access the roof on the Fred Meyer construction site, hit his head on a sprinkler pipe and fell 15 to 18 feet, landing on a concrete floor. As a result of the fall, Robison was seriously injured.

Robison filed a worker's compensation claim against Robison Roofing, which paid all of Robison's worker's compensation benefits. Subsequently, Robison filed this third-party negligence action against Fred Meyer, Bateman-Hall, and Shilo Automatic Sprinklers. Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall responded with a motion for summary judgment, stating the claims against Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall should be dismissed since both parties were immune from third-party tort liability pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223.

The district judge allowed the parties to conduct some limited discovery regarding whether Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall were "statutory employers" and, following a hearing on the summary judgment motion, the district judge issued his decision in favor of Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall. The district judge determined that (1) the 1996 amendments to I.C. § 72-223 eliminated this Court's statutory employer analysis, (2) Fred Meyer was immune from third-party liability, because it owned the property, and (3) Bateman-Hall was immune from liability as a general contractor. Robison appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the same standard used by the trial court in originally ruling on the motion. Sun Valley v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 3, 981 P.2d 236, 238 (1999) (citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994)). Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment must be entered when "the pleadings depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Id. at 4, 981 P.2d at 239 (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994)). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane, 125 Idaho at 272, 869 P.2d at 1367.

III. DISCUSSION

This case requires this Court to consider the third-party tort immunity provided under I.C. § 72-223 of the Idaho Workers Compensation Act (Act). In general, the Act provides employees a definite remedy for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. I.C. § 72-201.¹ However, while providing "sure and certain relief" to workers, the Act also limits the liability of employers. I.C. § 72-209(1)²; I.C. § 72-211.³ The exclusive nature of the worker's compensation remedy is referred to as the exclusive remedy rule.

I.C. § 72-223 provides a limited exception to the exclusive remedy rule. Under I.C. § 72-223, an individual's right to receive worker's compensation benefits does not preclude that individual from bringing a civil action for damages against a "third party." The statute provides:

[t]he right to compensation under this law shall not be affected by the fact that the injury, occupational disease or death is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than the employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor, such person so liable being referred to as the third party.

I.C. § 72-223(1). However, the Act clearly excludes certain parties from third-party liability.

Such third party liability shall not include [1] those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include [2] the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.

I.C. § 72-223(1). With regard to injuries arising from the tortious acts of these immune third parties, worker's compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy. The central issue in this case is whether the district judge correctly determined Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall are immune from third-party tort liability pursuant to I.C. § 72-223.

The first question on appeal is whether the district judge should have applied this Court's "statutory employer" analysis to this particular provision of the Act. Second, Robison asks this Court to consider whether the district judge erred in holding I.C. § 72-223 rendered Fred Meyer and Bateman-Hall immune from third-party liability. Third, Robison asks this Court to consider whether granting immunity based on contingent liability violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. For reasons set forth below, this Court holds: (1) the "statutory employer" analysis applies to I.C. § 72-223; (2) in applying the correct legal analysis, immunity is lawfully granted to Bateman-Hall but not to Fred Meyer; and (3) the district judge did not err in dismissing Robison's alleged equal protection claim.

A. Statutory Employer Analysis

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises de novo review. V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519, 521 (2000). The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative intent. Albee v. Judy, 136 Idaho 226, 230, 31 P.3d 248, 252 (2001). Legislative intent begins with the literal language of the statute. Id. at 231, 31 P.3d at 253. To determine the meaning of a statute, the Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and, where possible, every word, clause and sentence should be given effect. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 153 (1995); In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992). Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993).

Robison argues the district judge erred in holding, "[t]he 1996 amendment to Idaho Code § 72-223 eliminates any need for making a determination of whether a third party is a statutory employer." The district judge concluded it is unnecessary to consider this Court's statutory employer analysis, because I.C. § 72-223 clearly and unambiguously "excludes employers described in Idaho Code § 72-216 and owners and lessees of premises."

This Court holds the district judge's interpretation of § 72-223 is in error. The plain language of I.C. § 72-223 refers to the term "employer," which has a specific definition under the Act. For at least the last 60 years, this Court has interpreted this statutory definition and has developed significant case law to help give the term meaning. See, e.g., Jones v. Packer John Mines Corp., 60 Idaho 653, 95 P.2d 572, 573 (1939) (examining whether owner was employer for purposes of worker's compensation coverage). As this Court has explained, this statutory definition of employer is "an expanded definition designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability under the workmen's compensation statutes by subcontracting the work to others who may be irresponsible and not insure their employees." Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 440, 958 P.2d 594, 597 (1998). Thus, a statutory employer is anyone who, by contracting or subcontracting out services, is liable to pay worker's compensation benefits if the direct employer does not pay those benefits. I.C. § 72-216(1), (2). See also, Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 719, 992 P.2d 164, 168 (1999)

. The case law surrounding the definition of the term "employer" is what the Court refers to as the statutory employer analysis. Because the legislature used the identical language from the statutory definition when crafting third-party tort immunity under I.C. § 72-223, this Court determines the statutory employer analysis is a necessary tool in determining the meaning and scope of I.C. § 72-223.

Prior to 1996, I.C. § 72-223 provided for third-party tort liability and specifically included certain statutory employers. "Such third party shall include those employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of section 72-301, Idaho Code." However,...