Barney v. Schmeider
| Decision Date | 01 December 1869 |
| Citation | 9 Wall. 248,19 L.Ed. 648,76 U.S. 248 |
| Parties | BARNEY v. SCHMEIDER |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, the case being thus:
Schmeider sued Barney, collector for the port of New York, in the court below, in an action of assumpsit with the common counts only, to which Barney pleaded the general issue. The plaintiff's claim was for duties on certain woven goods alleged to have been unlawfully collected of him by the defendant as collector of the port of New York, and which had been paid under protest. The act under which the goods were rated for duties, provided that on all delaines, cashmere delaines, muslin delaines, barege delaines, comprised wholly or in part of worsted, wool, mohair, or goat's hair, and on all goods of similar description, not exceeding fifty cents in value per square yard, two cents per square yard shall be paid. And the point in dispute was whether the goods of plaintiffs, on which the two cents per yard had been assessed, were goods of a similar description to those above mentioned, within the meaning of the act. A jury was called and sworn, and directed by the court to find a verdict for the plaintiffs, which was done, and judgment rendered for the amount claimed.
A paper was found in the record under the caption of 'Case and Exceptions,' signed and sealed by the judge who presided at the trial. This paper set forth some things which were said to be shown by the evidence, some things which appeared in evidence, and a large part of it was the evidence itself. There was also the full charge of the court, the prayer for instructions on the part of the defendant, which were refused, and the exceptions of the defendant.
Among other matters found in the bill of exceptions was this statement in the charge of the court to the jury:
The court then proceeded to tell the jury what this evidence showed that was material to the issue, and to make a very able argument on the law of the case, and directed the jury to find for the plaintiff, or rather said, 'the verdict ought to be for plaintiffs.' To this part of the charge the defendant excepted specially.
In the course of the trial the plaintiff, having given the defendant due notice to produce at the trial the original appeals made by him to the Secretary of the Treasury, was permitted to use copies proved by witnesses who mailed the originals, because defendant did not produce the originals. This was also excepted to. The questions now here were these:
1. Whether it was error in the court below, under the circumstances described, to tell the jury that their verdict ought to be for the plaintiff.
2. Whether it was error to allow the plaintiff to use the copies proved by the witnesses who mailed the originals.
3. Whether, on a right construction of the tariff act already quoted, the expression, 'goods of a similar description,' was confined to one ascertained species of goods, or was applicable to others in addition; this last question, however, not being necessary to be passed on, if either of the others were decided in the affirmative.
Mr. Hoar, Attorney-General, and Mr. Field, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States. Mr. Evarts, contra.
The seventh amendment of the Constitution declares, that in suits at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
This right may be waived by the party. The act of March 3d, 1865,1 provides a mode by which the parties to a suit may submit the matter proper for a jury to the court; and the case of Norris v. Jackson, decided a few days ago,2 gives the mode of proceeding under that statute, and explains what may be received in such cases, and how the matter proper for review may be brought before this court.
If, then, the parties in the present case had been willing to waive a jury and permit the court to find both the law and the facts, there was no difficulty in doing this, and in presenting the law to this court for review. For it is never to be forgotten that, in common law cases, it is the ruling of the inferior court on the law alone which this court is authorized to review. The common law admitted of no re-examination of the facts found by a jury, except by granting a new trial in the same court in which the verdict was rendered, and the constitutional amendment just referred to, forbids any other mode of...
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Galloway v. United States
...was for the jury. Drakely v. Gregg, 8 Wall. 242, 268, 19 L.Ed. 409; Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197, 201, 19 L.Ed. 551; Barney v. Schmeider, 9 Wall. 248, 253, 19 L.Ed. 648. Cf. United States v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 15 L.Ed. 900; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 359, 15 L.Ed. 16 For example......
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Hardin v. Ill. Central Railroad Co.
...to which it relates to the jury, because it is their province to weigh and balance the testimony and not the court's." [Barney v. Schmeider, 9 Wall. 248, 19 L. Ed. 648.] There is another principle correlated with these rules, namely: "In every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, ......
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Hardin v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
...to which it relates to the jury, because it is their province to weigh and balance the testimony and not the court's." [Barney v. Schmeider, 9 Wall. 248, 19 L.Ed. 648.] There is another principle correlated with these namely: "In every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is......
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Irish v. Gimbel
...admissible in evidence may be used to illustrate the testimony of witnesses or the arguments of counsel. 3. In Barney v. Schmeider, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 248, 19 L.Ed. 648 (1869), the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court's act of summarizing evidence from a prior proceeding wit......