Wood v. Toyota

• Decision Date: 05 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1511,1511
• Citation: 760 A.2d 315,134 Md. App. 512
• Parties: Anita J. WOOD v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

760 A.2d 315

134 Md. App. 512

Anita J. WOOD v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, et al.

No. 1511, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

October 5, 2000.

Andrew P. McGuire (Samuel A. Bogash on the brief), Washington, DC, for appellant.

H. Bruce Dorsey (Joel A. Dewey and Pieper, Maybury, Rudnick & Wolfe, LLP on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and DAVIS and LEONARD L. RUBEN (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

In the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Anita Wood, appellant, asserted a products liability action in which she claimed that the driver's air bag in her 1993 Toyota Tercel automobile ("Tercel") had been defectively designed. After the Honorable Michelle D. Hotten granted appellees' motions (1) in limine and (2) for summary judgment,¹ this appeal followed, in which appellant presents two questions for our review:

I. Did the circuit court err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment?

II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by granting appellee's motion in limine and excluding the testimony of appellant's expert witness?

For the reasons that follow, we shall answer "no" to each question and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Background

Appellant claimed that on April 25, 1995, while driving her Tercel, she was involved in an automobile accident during which she suffered chemical burns to her cheek when she was struck in the face by the air bag on the driver's side of the vehicle.² Appellant identified Michael D. Leshner as an expert witness who would testify that the chemical burns she sustained in the accident were caused by a design defect in the air bag.³ Toyota moved in limine to exclude Mr. Leshner's testimony. Judge Hotten granted that motion. Toyota then moved for summary judgment on the ground that the cause of action asserted in this case requires the presentation of expert testimony. Judge Hotten granted that motion and this appeal followed.

Discussion

I. Expert Testimony in Air Bag Cases

When ruling on Toyota's motion for summary judgment,⁴ Judge Hotten stated the following explanation for her conclusion of law that expert testimony is required to generate the issue of whether a person's injury was caused by a design defect in a vehicle's air bag:

The standard is whether a fair minded jury could find for the plaintiff in light of the pleadings and the evidence presented, and there must be more than a scintilla of evidence in order to proceed to trial, as set forth in the case of Seaboard Surety Company v. Richard Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 603 A.2d 1357, which was a 1992 appellate decision.

Additionally, if the facts are susceptible to more than one inference, inference must be drawn in favor of the moving party....

The main issues before the court relative to the plaintiff's complaint and amendments thereto are issues relative to products liability negligence and breach of warranty, among others.

The plaintiff's assertion, which has been set forth in exhausting detail by the testimony of Mr. Leshner, and as set forth in the appropriate pleadings and arguments is that in fact as a result of a defect in the air bag system that she was injured, and that there was a causal connection between that defect and the injury.

As such, the plaintiff, to support her theories, must assert or establish that, one, a defect existed. Two, that somehow the defect was peculiarly within the perview of the defendant; that is, that the defect is somehow attributable to the defendant under the appropriate legal theory or standard, and that the plaintiff was injured, and that there is a causal relationship between this defect and her injuries.

The general rule is well established that expert testimony is only required when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman.

Experts are not required, however, on matters on which the jurors would be aware by virtue of common knowledge.

Air bag technology is highly specialized, and while no Maryland cases have been decided on this issue, other jurisdictions have required an expert in air bag deployment and defect cases.

Without expert testimony in this case the peculiar issues before the court are outside the realm of lay juror's understanding, and without it the theories asserted by the plaintiff are speculative at best.

The court does not believe that the theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur is appropriate under the circumstances and the issues presented.

Accordingly, upon consideration of the arguments that have been presented relative to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court's review of the record and the pleadings, the court at this time grants the motion for summary judgment in the defendant's favor, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501.

We agree with that analysis, which is consistent with other appellate courts that have considered the question, including Britt v. Chrysler Corp., 699 So.2d 179 (Ala. 1997), in which the Civil Court of Appeals of Alabama affirmed the entry of summary judgment against a plaintiff who had failed to proffer expert testimony:

The airbag system involved in this case is comprised of clock spring sensors, diagnostic units, and an airbag/inflator unit. Therefore, we hold that an airbag system is "precisely the type of complex and technical commodity that [requires] expert testimony to prove an alleged defect."

Britt, 699 So.2d at 181 (internal citations omitted).⁵

In a products liability case, the plaintiff must prove "(1) the existence of a defect; (2) the attribution of the defect to the seller; and (3) a causal relation between the defect and the injury." Jensen v. American Motors Corp., 50 Md.App. 226, 234, 437 A.2d 242 (1981). It is well settled that expert testimony is required "when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession that it is beyond the ken of the average layman." Hartford Accident and Indemnity Comp. v. Scarlett Harbor Assoc. Limited Partnership, 109 Md.App. 217, 257, 674 A.2d 106 (1996), aff'd. 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997) (citing Virgil v. "Kash N' Karry" Service Corp., 61 Md. App. 23,23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984), cert. denied, 302 Md. 681, 490 A.2d 719 (1985)).

Although "[e]xpert testimony is not required . . . on matters of which the jurors would be aware by virtue of common knowledge," Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 307, 138 A.2d 375 (1958), the issue of whether an air bag was defectively designed is well "beyond the ken of the average layman." The correct resolution of that issue requires the application of science, mechanics, and engineering, rather than of matters that jurors "would be aware [of] by virtue of common knowledge." We therefore hold that the products liability plaintiff who claims to have been injured due to the defective design of an air bag must present expert testimony to generate a jury issue on whether the air bag was defective.⁶

II. Expert Testimony

Judge Hotten stated the following explanation for her decision to grant Toyota's motion in limine:

Maryland Rule 5-702 governs expert testimony, and provides such testimony will be admitted if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, or determine a fact in issue, and if, one, the witness is qualified to render the expert opinion by virtue of knowledge, skill, training or experience or education; and two, that there is a sufficient factual basis to support the expert factual opinions made by that witness; and three, that the expert testimony is appropriate on this subject.

Mr. Leshner's testimony, unfortunately, does not meet the requirements of Maryland Rule 5-702 in terms of his qualifications and sufficiency of the factual basis for his opinions or assumptions.

Had Mr. Leshner been minimally qualified to render the expert opinions proffered, I would have agreed with plaintiff's counsel that any objections by the defendant relative to Mr. Leshner's training, expertise or basis of knowledge would go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility.

Unfortunately, such is not the case at bar. Accordingly, reluctantly, upon consideration of testimony, the motion at this time is granted.

Appellant asserts that this ruling was incorrect.⁷ We are not persuaded, however, that Judge Hotten's decision constituted an unfairly prejudicial abuse of discretion.⁸

A. The Qualifications Issue

Mr. Leshner has been a mechanical engineer for twenty-six years and has a state license in professional engineering. He has a bachelor's degree in science and completed one year of graduate studies. He worked as mechanical engineer for several companies on systems such as automotive cooling and heating, air conditioning, defrosting, engine electronics, control systems, and hospital equipment.

Mr. Leshner is a member of several societies, including the National Society of Professional Engineers, National Forensic Center, National Association of Professional Accident Reconstruction Specialists, and National Academy of Forensic Engineers. He had held 15 U.S. patents and some corresponding foreign patents on automotive electronic control systems, medical products, stoves, and combustion. Mr. Leshner admitted that none of these patents related to air bag systems or components. He has also published several articles, but none of the articles involved air bags.

Mr. Leshner has never been accepted as an expert witness in a trial involving air bag design. His knowledge of air bags was mostly (if not entirely) derived from his employment as a litigation consultant.⁹ He is not a medical doctor and has no medical training. He does not have any "hands on" experience relating to air bag technology, and none of the courses he has taken involved "air bag design, manufacture or assembly."

Although Mr. Leshner held himself out as a "expert in air bag technology," "air bag denting," and "air bag folding...