Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc.

Decision Date28 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–2109.,13–2109.
Citation760 F.3d 119
PartiesSantos RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CAROLINA DREAM, INC., Defendant, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Matthew Viveiros, with whom Hunt & Viveiros, LLC was on brief, for appellant.

Joseph A. Regan, with whom Sean P. Scanlon and Regan & Kiely LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Before HOWARD, STAHL and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Santos Ramirez, a seaman, became ill while working aboard a fishing vessel and was immediately hospitalized when he returned to shore. Shortly thereafter, he was diagnosed with aplastic anemia, a serious blood condition that prevented him from returning to work as a seaman. He subsequently brought this personal injury action against his employer, seeking a remedy under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and general maritime law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, Carolina Dream, Inc., on each of appellant's alleged causes of action. On appeal, Ramirez challenges only dismissal of his maritime claim for maintenance and cure, arguing that he is entitled to that remedy until he reaches “maximum medical recovery.” Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962). Because we agree that the record would permit a factfinder to find that appellant is entitled to maintenance and cure, we vacate the district court's ruling and remand for further proceedings.

I.
A. Factual Background

In recounting the facts, which we present in the light most favorable to appellant Ramirez, see, e.g., Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 750 F.3d 73, 76 (1st Cir.2014), we borrow liberally from the district court's clear and succinct recitation.

Ramirez had been a crew member on the commercial fishing boat F/V DEFIANT for about eight years when, in December 2008, rough seas during a scallop fishing trip off the New Jersey coast bounced the vessel and caused him to strike his jaw against his bunk. He sustained a laceration inside his mouth, felt dizzy the next day, and began to feel weak and sick to his stomach about three days after the incident. Although appellant asked to be brought ashore, the captain refused and instructed him to perform his duties until the end of the trip.

Appellant's condition worsened before the vessel returned to its home port in Seaford, Virginia, several days later, and his wife took him directly from the dock to a hospital emergency room for treatment. He remained hospitalized for about a month, was discharged in mid-January 2009, but then was readmitted to a different hospital a week later because of continuingsymptoms. 1 He was then diagnosed with aplastic anemia, [a] rare and serious condition” that occurs when the body stops producing sufficient new blood cells. See Mayo Clinic Staff, “Aplastic Anemia, Definition,” http:// www. mayoclinic. org/ diseases- conditions/ aplastic- anemia/ basics/ definition/ con- 20019296 (last visited July 9, 2014).

One of appellant's treating doctors reported that the exact cause of appellant's disease would likely remain unknown—“as is the case in many occurrences of aplastic anemia”—but the doctor noted his history of hepatitis C, a typical “culprit of aplastic anemia.” Before the trip during which he became ill, appellant had experienced no symptoms and “was doing [his] work well.” Ramirez states in his brief that he continues to undergo treatment for aplastic anemia and remains unable to work.

Ramirez filed this action in August 2011 alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. He asserts that his injury “and the delay in receiving the proper medical treatment” caused “a serious infection that lead to [a]plastic [a]nemia.” In opposing summary judgment, he averred that a factfinder could reasonably infer “manifestation of [his] aplastic anemia during his service to the FV DEFIANT.” As noted above, appellant on appeal has challenged only the summary judgment for Carolina Dream on his cause of action for maintenance and cure. We thus limit our analysis to that claim.

B. The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure

The owner of a vessel has a duty to pay maintenance and cure to a seaman “who [is] injured or fall[s] ill while ‘in service of the ship.’ Whitman v. Miles, 387 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting LeBlanc v. B.G.T. Corp., 992 F.2d 394, 396 (1st Cir.1993)); see also Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 413, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 174 L.Ed.2d 382 (2009); Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531, 82 S.Ct. 997.2 “Maintenance” refers to the cost of food and lodging during the period of illness or recovery from injury, and “cure” covers the reasonable medical expenses incurred for the seaman's treatment. Atl. Sounding, 557 U.S. at 413, 129 S.Ct. 2561; Whitman, 387 F.3d at 71.

The remedy of maintenance and cure is deliberately expansive, see Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4, 95 S.Ct. 1381, 43 L.Ed.2d 682 (1975) (noting the “breadth and inclusiveness of the shipowner'sduty”), and it is not “restricted to those cases where the seaman's employment is the cause of the injury or illness,” Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 58 S.Ct. 651, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938) [Taylor]. [T]he obligation can arise out of a medical condition such as a heart problem, a prior illness that recurs during the seaman's employment, or an injury suffered on shore.” 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 6–29, at 380 (4th ed.2001); see also Haskell v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 237 F.2d 707, 709 (1st Cir.1956) ([I]t arises when [the seaman] is taken ill from whatever cause during a voyage.”).

The doctrine is “so broad” that the seaman's “negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct ... will not relieve the shipowner of the responsibility.” Vella, 421 U.S. at 4, 95 S.Ct. 1381 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Messier v. Bouchard Transp., 688 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.2012) (noting that maintenance and cure “is a far more expansive remedy” than workers' compensation); DiBenedetto v. Williams, 880 F.Supp. 80, 86 (D.R.I.1995) ([M]aintenance and cure may still be awarded plaintiff notwithstanding a pre-existing condition as long as that condition is not deliberately concealed and is not disabling at the time the seaman signs on for the voyage.”). The wide scope of the duty springs from the status of seamen as “emphatically the wards of the admiralty,” Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D.Me.1823) (No. 6,047) (Story, J.), and advances multiple purposes, among them to protect seamen “from the hazards of illness and abandonment while ill in foreign ports” and to induce maritime employers to guard against safety and health risks. Taylor, 303 U.S. at 528, 58 S.Ct. 651 (citing Harden, 11 F.Cas. at 483).

The shipowner's ancient duty to provide maintenance and cure for the seaman who becomes ill or is injured while in the service of the ship derives from the “unique hazards (which) attend the work of seamen,” and fosters the “combined object of encouraging marine commerce and assuring the well-being of seamen.” ... [The shipowner's duty] “has few exceptions or conditions to stir contentions, cause delays, and invite litigations.”

Vella, 421 U.S. at 3–4, 95 S.Ct. 1381 (quoting Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 727, 63 S.Ct. 930, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516, 69 S.Ct. 707, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949)).

The duty of maintenance and cure applies until the seaman has fully recovered or is “so far cured as possible,” Farrell, 336 U.S. at 518, 69 S.Ct. 707—the latter alternative taking into account that the seaman's condition might stabilize short of full health. The obligation to pay maintenance and cure is thus described as extending until the seaman “reaches maximum medical recovery.” Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531, 82 S.Ct. 997; see also, e.g., Haskell, 237 F.2d at 709 (explaining that “cure” is “cure in the sense of care until medical science can do no more”); Robert Force, Federal Judicial Center, Admiralty & Maritime Law 94 (2d ed.2013) (defining the cutoff point as “when the condition is cured or declared to be incurable or of a permanent character”).

With these legal principles in mind, we now examine the district court's conclusion that appellant did not adduce sufficient evidence to support a claim for maintenance and cure.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Hicks v. Johnson, No. 13–1741, 755 F.3d 738, 742–43, 2014 WL 2793806, at *2 (1st Cir. June 20, 2014). Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Hicks, 755 F.3d at 742–43, 2014 WL 2793806, at *2.

Appellant asserts that he is entitled to maintenance and cure until he has reached maximum recovery from aplastic anemia, which he contends has not yet occurred. The district court rejected his entitlement to any maintenance and cure on the ground that appellant failed to produce evidence that the disease arose during his service on the F/V DEFIANT—[o]ther than asserting that he was in ‘normal health’ prior to the fishing voyage and hospitalized upon returning to port.” The court's rationale reflects a too-narrow view of both the facts and the vessel owner's responsibility.

As detailed above, appellant began feeling weak and dizzy shortly after he sustained an injury onboard the F/V DEFIANT, and he required more than a month's hospitalization immediately after disembarking. A doctor's report stated that he was admitted to a second hospital “due to continued symptoms” a week after he was initially discharged, at which time he was diagnosed with aplastic anemia. Hence, the record shows that appellant became ill during the December 2008 fishing voyage and remained ill continuously through the time he was determined to have the blood condition. Before that voyage, appell...

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    ...injured seaman may reinstate a demand for maintenance and cure when new curative treatments become available. Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc. , 760 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir.2014), citing Farrell v. United States , 336 U.S. 511, 69 S.Ct. 707, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949). See Pallis v. U.S. , 369 Fed.A......
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    ...a duty to pay maintenance and cure to a seaman 'who is injured or fall[s] ill while in service of the ship.'" Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc., 760 F.3d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Whitman v. Miles, 387 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2004)).9 A vessel's duty of maintenance and cure applies unti......
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    ...a shipowner to pay compensation for injuries or illnesses stemming from a preexisting medical condition. Ramirez v. Carolina Dream, Inc. , 760 F.3d 119, 122-23 (1st Cir. 2014). Indeed, "[t]he doctrine is ‘so broad’ that the seaman's ‘negligence or acts short of culpable misconduct ... will ......
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