Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc.

• Citation: 761 F.3d 314
• Decision Date: 05 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1843.,13–1843.
• Parties: Lisa M. LUPYAN, Appellant v. CORINTHIAN COLLEGES INC., successor in interest to MJB Acquisition Corp., trading and doing business as Wyotech; James Thomas; Arthur Herman; Mark Reynolds.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

761 F.3d 314

Lisa M. LUPYAN, Appellant

v.CORINTHIAN COLLEGES INC., successor in interest to MJB Acquisition Corp., trading and doing business as Wyotech; James Thomas; Arthur Herman; Mark Reynolds.

No. 13–1843.

United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.

Argued Dec. 17, 2013.

Opinion filed: Aug. 5, 2014.

Adam R. Gorzelsky, Esq. (Argued), Susan N. Williams, Esq., Williams Law Offices, Greensburg, PA, for Appellant.

Jeffrey B. Balicki, Esq. (Argued) Feldstein Grinberg Lang & McKee, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellees.

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge and FUENTES, Circuit Judge, SCHILLER ^*, District Judge.

McKEE, Chief Judge.

Lisa Lupyan appeals the summary judgment rendered in favor of her former employer, Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (“CCI”) on her claims of interference with the exercise of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA,” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; and retaliation for her exercise of those rights. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that genuine issues of fact remain as to her FMLA claims. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual & Procedural History

Lupyan was hired as an instructor in CCI's Applied Science Management program in 2004. In December 2007, Lupyan's supervisor, James Thomas, noticed that she seemed depressed and suggested she take a personal leave of absence. Appx. I at 25. On her Request for Leave Form, Lupyan specified that she was taking “personal leave” from December 4, 2007 through December 31, 2007. Appx. I at 26. However, Thomas suggested that she apply for short-term disability coverage instead. Appx. II at 10. Accordingly, Lupyan scheduled an appointment with her doctor and received a “Certification of Health Provider,” a standard Department of Labor (“DOL”) form for providing certification of a mental health condition. Based on this document, CCI's human resources department determined that Lupyan was eligible for leave under the FMLA, rather than personal leave.

On December 19, 2007, Sherri Hixson, CCI's Supervisor of Administration, met with Lupyan and instructed her to initial the box marked “Family Medical Leave” on her Request for Leave Form. Hixson also changed Lupyan's projected date of return to April 1, 2008, based upon the Certification of Health Provider provided by Lupyan. Appx. I at 26. Lupyan contends—and CCI does not dispute—that her rights under the FMLA were never discussed during this meeting. However, later that afternoon CCI allegedly mailed Lupyan a letter advising her that her leave was designated as FMLA leave, and further explaining her rights under that Act (the “Letter”). Lupyan denies ever having received the Letter, and denies having any knowledge that she was on FMLA leave until she attempted to return to work. The issue of whether Lupyan received the Letter is central to this appeal.

On March 13, 2008, Lupyan advised CCI that she had been released by her doctor to return to her teaching position with certain restrictions. On April 1, 2008, Thomas informed Lupyan that she could not come back to work if any restrictions were a condition of her return. Appx. I at 27. Shortly thereafter, Lupyan provided Thomas with a full release from her psychiatrist. This confirmed that she was able to return to work without any restrictions or accommodations. Nonetheless, Lupyan was advised on April 9, 2008 that she was being terminated from her position at CCI due to low student enrollment, and because she had not returned to work within the twelve weeks allotted for FMLA leave. Id. at 27. Lupyan claims this was the first time she had any knowledge that she was on FMLA leave. Appx. II at 9.

Thereafter, Lupyan brought the instant action. She alleges that CCI interfered with her rights under the FMLA by failing to give notice that her leave fell under that Act, and that she was fired in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. The District Court granted CCI's initial motion for summary judgment as to both claims. Thereafter, the District Court sua sponte reversed its ruling on Lupyan's FMLA interference claim. The court recognized that summary judgment was not appropriate because there was a factual dispute regarding whether CCI had informed Lupyan of her FMLA rights. Appx. I at 43–45. CCI responded with an amended summary judgment motion which included affidavits from CCI employees who testified that the Letter was properly mailed to Lupyan. Based on the affidavits, the District Court relied on the evidentiary presumption that arises under the “mailbox rule” and found that Lupyan had received the Letter. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of CCI, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

We have jurisdiction to review a district court's final order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1331.

We exercise plenary review over a district court's order granting summary judgment. Justofin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 517, 521 (3d Cir.2004). We apply the same standard as the district court. We affirm pursuant to Federal Rule 56(c) if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. A factual dispute is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir.2011) (citing Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir.1992)).

A. The Family Medical Leave Act

Congress passed the FMLA in 1993 in an attempt “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1). The FMLA enables “employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons,” Id. § 2601(b)(2). However, Congress recognized the needs of employers by requiring that all such leave be taken “in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers,” Id. § 2601(b)(3). The FMLA entitles eligible employees to take twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-month period for the employee's own “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions” of his or her job. See29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Following this period of leave, an employee has the right to be restored to his or her original position or its equivalent. Id. § 2614(a)(1). When an employee cannot perform an essential function of his or her original position due to the “continuation of a serious health condition,” no right to restoration exists. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c).

The FMLA creates a cause of action for interference with the rights it bestows. Employees can sue for interference with the exercise of FMLA rights under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). They can also sue under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), if an employer retaliates against an employee for exercising her FMLA rights. See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir.2009) (“[F]iring an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute interference with the employee's FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the employee.”).

1. Notice Requirements

The FMLA requires employers to provide employees with both general and individual notice about the FMLA. To meet the general notice requirements, an employer must post a notice of FMLA rights on its premises. See § 2619(a). Because employers have some discretion in the way FMLA policies are implemented, employers must also include information regarding the employer's FMLA policies in a handbook or similar publication. See29 CFR § 825.300.

In addition, regulations issued by the Department of Labor require that an employer give employees individual written notice that an absence falls under the FMLA, and is therefore governed by it. 29 CFR § 825.208; Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir.2004) (“the regulations require employers to provide employees with individualized notice of their FMLA rights and obligations.”). Thus, once an employer is on notice that an employee is taking FMLA-qualifying leave, the employer must: (1) within five business days notify the employee of his or her eligibility to take FMLA leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1); (2) notify the employee in writing whether the leave will be designated as FMLA leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(d)(1); (3) provide written notice detailing the employee's obligations under the FMLA and explaining any consequences for failing to meet those obligations, § 825.300(c)(1); and (4) notify the employee of the specific amount of leave that will be counted against the employee's FMLA leave entitlement, § 825.300(d)(6).

2. Interference Claims

The FMLA's requirement that employers inform employees of their rights under the Act is intended “to ensure that employers allow their employees to make informed decisions about leave.” Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 144 (citing Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 377, 379–80 (D.N.J.2001)). Failure to provide the required notice can constitute an interference claim. Id. at 144–145.

However, an employer's failure to properly notify an employee of her FMLA rights does not necessarily prevent the employee from claiming that her leave is covered by the FMLA. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 82, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002) (no relief under § 2615(a)(1) “unless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation”). Prejudice occurs when the employer's failure to advise the plaintiff of her FMLA rights “rendered h[er] unable to exercise [the right to leave] in a meaningful way, thereby causing injury.” Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 143; see also Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89, 122 S.Ct. 1155.

Here, Lupyan claims that CCI interfered with her FMLA rights by not informing her that her leave was under the FMLA. According to her, she therefore was unaware of the requirement that she had to return to work within twelve weeks or be subject to termination. As noted above, the District Court ultimately entered summary judgment in CCI's favor on this issue based upon its conclusion...