United States v. Fields

• Decision Date: 02 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–70025.,13–70025.
• Citation: 761 F.3d 443
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee. v. Sherman Lamont FIELDS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

761 F.3d 443

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee.

v.Sherman Lamont FIELDS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 13–70025.

United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.

July 30, 2014.

As Revised Sept. 2, 2014.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, San Antonio, TX, Jennifer Sheffield Freel (argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Jeffrey E. Ellis, Esq. (argued), Portland, OR, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner–Appellant Sherman Lamont Fields was convicted of murder in a jury trial in federal district court and sentenced to death. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Fields unsuccessfully sought habeas relief in the district court on numerous grounds, and now seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court's denial of habeas relief. We hold that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court's conclusions and accordingly DENY Fields's request for a certificate of appealability.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Escape and Murder of Suncerey Coleman

Sherman Lamont Fields was arrested in September 2001 for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he was held in federal custody in a detention center in Waco, Texas. In November 2001, while Fields was in custody, he bribed a correctional officer, offering him $5,000 for a key to the detention center's fire escape. He used the key to escape on November 6.

That evening, Fields met with a friend, Edward Outley, who provided Fields with a car and a handgun. Fields then visited his ex-girlfriend, Suncerey Coleman, at Hillcrest Hospital in Waco, where she was caring for her newborn child. Fields was angry at Coleman for having seen other men while he was incarcerated. Fields convinced Coleman to leave the hospital with him that evening, and drove her to Downsville, Texas, outside Waco. Fields and Coleman had sexual intercourse,¹ and then he killed her by shooting her twice in the head. Fields hid Coleman's body in underbrush near the road. Coleman's body was found two weeks later, on November 21.

Using a handgun, Fields later carjacked an employee of Hillcrest Hospital, Tammy Edwards, while she was exiting her car. Edwards managed to escape, and Fields drove away in her car.

Police arrested Fields on November 24, 2001. In May 2003, the government

charged Fields by a seven-count indictment with (1) conspiring to escape from federal custody, (2) escaping from federal custody, (3) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to escape, resulting in intentional murder, (4) carjacking, (5) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to carjacking, (6) felon in possession of a firearm, [and] (7) using and carrying a Ruger .22 caliber firearm during and in relation to escape.

Fields, 483 F.3d at 324. The government sought the death penalty on the murder charge.

B. Fields's Trial

1. Guilt/Innocence Phase

Fields's trial took place in January and February of 2004. Fields represented himself pro se, with his appointed counsel acting as standby counsel. Fields pleaded not guilty to each charge. His defense was that he did not kill Coleman, but that his second girlfriend, Shalaykea Scroggins, did so with Outley. He contended that Scroggins was in “a passionately jealous rage” and shot Coleman in the back of the head, and that Outley, who was Scroggins's sister's boyfriend, shot Coleman a second time. The jury rejected Fields's defense and found him guilty on all counts.

2. Punishment Phase

Fields agreed to be represented by his appointed counsel during the punishment phase of the trial. After hearing the evidence, the jury recommended the death penalty. The district court sentenced Fields to death. The district court also sentenced Fields to 715 months of imprisonment on the noncapital counts.

C. Post–Conviction Proceedings

1. Direct Appeal

On direct appeal, we rejected Fields's claims of sentencing error and trial error, and affirmed his convictions and sentences. Fields, 483 F.3d at 323. ²

2. Federal Habeas Petition

Fields filed several motions seeking to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging a total of forty-nine claims. The district court denied relief on all claims in its September 25, 2012 order, and found, sua sponte, that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should not issue. Fields filed a motion to vacate or amend the district court's order denying his § 2255 motion, among other post-judgment motions, all of which the district court denied.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This court may not consider an appeal from the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for relief unless either the district court or this court issues a COA.” United States v. Hall, 455 F.3d 508, 513 (5th Cir.2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)); see also United States v. Bourgeois, 537 Fed.Appx. 604, 610–11 (5th Cir.2013) (unpublished). To obtain a COA, Fields must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). The Supreme Court has explained that “a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail.” Id. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029.

In determining whether to grant a COA, “the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the petitioner's] claims.” Id. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029. This inquiry consists of “an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029. “[I]n a death penalty case any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved in the petitioner's favor.” Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir.2005) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Fields seeks a COA on the following claims: that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because of his trial counsels' failure to: conduct a competent penalty phase investigation, conduct an adequate investigation related to the charged crime, and challenge expert testimony about Fields's future dangerousness; (2) he was incompetent to waive counsel; (3) his practice cross-examination of a government witness violated his constitutional rights; (4) the government violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and correct false testimony at trial; (5) Fields is actually innocent; (6) the district court's Allen charge was coercive; (7) security procedures during the trial, including the district court's requirement that Fields wear a stun belt, were prejudicial; (8) cumulative error requires that his convictions be set aside; and (9) the district court erred by failing to grant discovery or hold an evidentiary hearing. We address each claim in turn.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Fields raises several separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). His three principal contentions are that he received ineffective assistance because of trial counsels' failure to: conduct a competent penalty phase investigation, conduct an adequate investigation related to the charged crime, and challenge expert testimony about Fields's future dangerousness. For the reasons that follow, we deny a COA as to each of Fields's IAC claims.

1. Penalty Phase Investigation

In his § 2255 petition, Fields asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to conduct a competent penalty phase investigation. He included with his petition “critical mitigation evidence” that was readily available to his counsel, but which he claimed his counsel never presented to the jury. The district court reviewed this evidence and rejected Fields's IAC claim, finding the evidence contained in his § 2255 petition duplicative of that adduced at trial.

Fields now devotes nearly seventy pages of briefing to this issue, contending that reasonable jurists would debate the district court's rejection of his IAC claim because he has established that his counsels' performance was deficient and prejudiced him. Specifically, he contends that: (1) the district court “applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating his IAC claim”; (2) “trial counsel performed a sub-standard investigation and therefore presented inadequate mitigation evidence at trial”; (3) his “§ 2255 Motion presented voluminous mitigation evidence further demonstrating the ineffectiveness of counsel[s'] investigation”; and (4) “this new evidence establishes the prejudice caused by trial counsel[s'] incompetence and the reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel been effective.” Fields's arguments center on the specific mitigation evidence that he claims his trial counsel should have uncovered and presented during the penalty phase of the trial. This includes evidence of the terrible poverty, neglect, abuse, and trauma that he faced while growing up, his potential brain damage, his history of incarceration, and his mental illness and family history of mental illness.

We have reviewed the evidence provided by Fields, and for the reasons that follow, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court's holding. Accordingly, we deny Fields's claim for a COA.³

To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must show that (1) his “counsel's representation ‘fell...