Berkic v. Crichton
Decision Date | 11 March 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-5733,84-5733 |
Parties | , 1985 Copr.L.Dec. P 25,810, 11 Media L. Rep. 2450 Ted BERKIC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael CRICHTON, Robin Cook, Marvin Moss, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists Entertainment Company, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David Byers, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Marsha E. Diedrich, Silverberg, Rosen, Leon & Behr, Edward A. Ruttenberg, Youngman, Hungate & Leopold, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before SNEED, POOLE, and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff appeals the district court's judgment disposing by various means of
his copyright and Lanham Act claims. We affirm.
In 1968, the plaintiff wrote a 54 page screen treatment that he called Reincarnation, Inc. Hoping to interest a studio in producing a film based on his work, he gave the screen treatment to a literary agent, defendant Marvin Moss, and asked for his help. Moss read Reincarnation and suggested that the plaintiff collaborate with defendant Michael Crichton on a "shared-credit" basis. The plaintiff declined the offer.
In 1978, defendant MGM/UA Entertainment Co. released the movie Coma, written and directed by Crichton, and based on a novel by the same title written by defendant Robin Cook. The novel is still in print and the movie has been and continues to be shown on cable television and is available on videocassettes and videodiscs. The plaintiff alleges that both the movie and the book Coma were largely "adapted, derived, or copied" from his screen treatment Reincarnation.
In December 1980, the plaintiff brought suit in California state court alleging plagiarism, breach of implied-in-fact contract, and several other state causes of action. That complaint was dismissed on a demurrer and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
In March 1983, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in federal district court alleging that Coma infringed his copyright in Reincarnation, and that by failing to credit his contribution to the novel or the movie, the defendants marketed their works under a false designation of origin and thus violated the Lanham Act's prohibition of unfair competition.
On July 1, 1983, the district court dismissed the copyright claim as time-barred to the extent that it was based on actions occurring more than three years before the claim was filed in federal court. The district court then dismissed the Lanham Act claim in its entirety. Although the court's order did not state the reason for the dismissal, the district judge explained at the hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because he could not establish the requisite element of "secondary meaning."
On December 16, 1983, the district court disposed of the remainder of the plaintiff's copyright claim by granting summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that Coma and Reincarnation were substantially similar.
We shall address the substantial similarity issue. Because we affirm the district court's disposition of this issue, we need not reach the other issues raised by the plaintiff on this appeal. 1
To establish a successful copyright claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) his ownership of the copyright; (2) the defendant's access to his work; and (3) "substantial similarity" between the defendant's work and his own. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.1977). For purposes of their summary judgment motion only, the defendants stipulated the plaintiff's ownership of the copyright and their access to his work, but argued that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial similarity between Reincarnation and Coma. On appeal, the district court's judgment granting that motion, and the findings that support it, are subject to our de novo review. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir.1983).
We have broken the test for substantial similarity into two parts. The first part, the "extrinsic test," is used to determine whether two works are substantially similar in their "general ideas." The extrinsic test is objective; it
depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed. Such criteria include the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate.
Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. The extrinsic test compares the individual features of the works; it looks to find specific, articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir.1984).
The second part of the substantial similarity inquiry, the "intrinsic test," is used to determine whether two works are substantially similar in their "forms of expression." The intrinsic test is subjective; it depends solely "on the response of the ordinary reasonable person." Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. To that extent, expert testimony or the comparison of individual features of the works is inappropriate in applying the intrinsic test. Rather, the trier of fact ordinarily decides whether the "total concept and feel" of the two works is substantially similar. In comparing two films, for example, or a film with a written work, the proper question in applying the intrinsic test is whether the ordinary, reasonable audience would recognize the defendant's work as a "dramatization" or "picturization" of the plaintiff's work. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357.
To prevail on a copyright claim, a plaintiff must show substantial similarity of both ideas and expression. Id. at 1356. In this case, the district court found as a matter of law that Coma and Reincarnation were substantially dissimilar, both in idea and in expression. We agree.
It is true that as a general rule, summary judgment is not highly favored on the substantial similarity issue in copyright cases. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355 (); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F.Supp. 774, 777 (C.D.Cal.1981), incorporated by reference, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir.1982) (). But the plaintiff is wrong to suggest that summary judgment can never be properly granted on the substantial similarity issue. Indeed, "no special standard is employed in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of substantial similarity of expression in a copyright case." See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.1983). Krofft emphasized that the question whether there is substantial similarity of ideas between two works "may often be decided as a matter of law." 562 F.2d at 1164. And, since Krofft, we have frequently affirmed summary judgments in favor of copyright defendants on the substantial similarity issue. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1358 ( ); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d at 142 (same); Jason, 526 F.Supp. at 777, incorporated by reference, 698 F.2d at 966 (same). Our independent review of Reincarnation and Coma leads us to the same result today.
At a very high level of generality, the works do show a certain gruesome similarity. Both deal with criminal organizations that murder healthy young people, then remove and sell their vital organs to wealthy people in need of organ transplants. To some extent, both works take their general story from the adventures of a young professional who courageously investigates, and finally exposes, the criminal organization. But this degree of similarity between the basic plots of two works cannot sustain a plaintiff's claim that the works are "substantially similar." No one can own the basic idea for a story. General plot ideas are not protected by copyright law; they remain forever the common property of artistic mankind. See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357 ( ); 3 M. Nimmer on Copyright Sec. 13.03[A] (1984).
The test for "substantial similarity of ideas" compares, not the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements that make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the major characters. The extrinsic test for similarity of ideas looks beyond the vague, abstracted idea of a general plot and instead ...
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