Planned Parenthood v. Farmer

• Decision Date: 15 August 2000
• Citation: 165 N.J. 609,762 A.2d 620
• Parties: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY; Planned Parenthood Association of the Mercer Area; American Academy of Pediatrics/New Jersey Chapter; Metropolitan Surgical Associates, Inc., d/b/a Metropolitan Medical Associates; Cherry Hill Women's Surgery Center; Women's Choice Medical Center; Doctors of West New York; South Jersey Women's Center; Gyne Surgical Associates of Middlesex County, P.A.; Women's Surgicare of Howell, P.A.; Gerson Weiss, M.D.; Herbert Holmes, M.D. and George Dainoff, D.O., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John J. FARMER, Jr., Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, in his official capacity, and his successors in office; Christine Grant, Commissioner, Department of Health and Senior Services of the State of New Jersey, in her official capacity, and her successors in office; Hon. Richard S. Williams, Director, Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of New Jersey, in his official capacity, and his successors in office, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

762 A.2d 620

165 N.J. 609

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY; Planned Parenthood Association of the Mercer Area; American Academy of Pediatrics/New Jersey Chapter; Metropolitan Surgical Associates, Inc., d/b/a Metropolitan Medical Associates; Cherry Hill Women's Surgery Center; Women's Choice Medical Center; Doctors of West New York; South Jersey Women's Center; Gyne Surgical Associates of Middlesex County, P.A.; Women's Surgicare of Howell, P.A.; Gerson Weiss, M.D.; Herbert Holmes, M.D. and George Dainoff, D.O., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John J. FARMER, Jr., Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, in his official capacity, and his successors in office; Christine Grant, Commissioner, Department of Health and Senior Services of the State of New Jersey, in her official capacity, and her successors in office; Hon. Richard S. Williams, Director, Administrative Office of the Courts of the State of New Jersey, in his official capacity, and his successors in office, Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued January 19, 2000.

Decided August 15, 2000.

Jennifer Dalven, New York City, a member of the New York bar, argued the cause for appellants (Lenora M. Lapidus, Director, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Lapidus, Ms. Dalven, Catherine Weiss and Julie Sternberg, a member of New York bar, on the brief).

Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Michael Patrick Carroll, Morristown, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Right to Life.

James Katz, Cherry Hill, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae American Medical Women's Association, Inc., the Society for Adolescent Medicine, and Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health (Tomar, Simonoff, Adourian, O'Brien, Kaplan, Jacoby & Graziano, attorneys).

Russell J. Passamano, Morristown, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Life Education and Resource Network— New Jersey, LifeNet, Inc., Abortions Aftermath, League of American Families and New Jersey Family Policy Council.

Ann R. Bartlett, Clinton, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by PORITZ, C.J.

In this appeal plaintiffs challenge a state statute that conditions a minor's right to obtain an abortion on parental notification unless a judicial waiver is obtained, but imposes no corresponding limitation on a minor who seeks "medical and surgical care [otherwise] related to her pregnancy or her child." N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1; §§ 1.2 et seq. The State responds that its substantial interests in "protecting" immature minors, "in fostering the family," and in preserving "the rights of parents to rear their children" justify that differential treatment. N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.2. We decide today that the classification created by the Legislature burdens the "fundamental right of a woman to control her body and destiny," Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 306, 450 A.2d 925 (1982), without adequate justification and cannot be sustained against plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. We acknowledge that the State has a substantial interest in preserving the family and protecting the rights of parents. When weighed against the right of a young woman to make the most personal and intimate decision whether to carry a child to term, however, the insubstantial connection between the notification requirement and the interests expressed by the State is not sufficient to sustain the statute. We emphasize that our decision in no way interferes with parents' protected interests, nor does it prevent pregnant minors or their physicians from notifying parents about a young woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy. Simply, the effect of declaring the notification statute unconstitutional is to maintain the State's neutrality in respect of a minor's childbearing decisions and a parent's interest in those decisions. In effect, the State may not affirmatively tip the scale against the right to choose an abortion absent compelling reasons to do so.

We also emphasize, once again, that our holding is not based on, nor do we "presume to answer the profound questions about the moral, medical, and societal implications of abortion." Id. at 299, 450 A.2d 925. At the end of the day, those questions are left to the individual to decide for herself. A young woman's right to choose, to personal dignity and autonomy, is imbedded in the liberties found in the Constitutions of the United States and of this State. As Justice O'Connor has so eloquently explained: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2807, 120 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1992). Because a minor's right to control her reproductive decisions is among the most fundamental of the rights she possesses, and because the State has failed to demonstrate a real and significant relationship between the statutory classification and the ends asserted, we hold that the statute violates the Constitution of the State of New Jersey.

I

The Parental Notification for Abortion Act was signed into law on June 28, 1999, by its terms to take effect ninety days thereafter. L. 1999, c. 145, §§ 2 to 13 (codified at N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.1 to -1.12). Prior to the effective date, plaintiffs¹ sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction precluding enforcement of the Act. The trial court, proceeding by Order to Show Cause, summarily dismissed plaintiffs' challenge on a determination that they had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. This Court stayed implementation of the Act on September 27, 1999, pending an expedited disposition on the merits in the Chancery Division and direct certification to the Court. See R. 2:12-1. The matter is now before us pursuant to our Order.

A. The Parental Notification for Abortion Act

We have previously adverted to the legislative findings that provide the underlying rationale for the Parental Notification Act. More specifically, the Act states:

The Legislature finds that there exist compelling and important State interests in protecting minors against their own immaturity, in fostering the family structure and preserving it as a viable social unit, and in protecting the rights of parents to rear their children.

The Legislature further finds that minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences of their actions; that the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and of indeterminate duration, particularly when the patient is a minor; that parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best medical judgment concerning their child; and that parents who are aware that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better insure that the minor receives adequate medical attention after her abortion. The Legislature further finds that parental consultation regarding abortion is desirable and in the best interests of the minor.

[N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.2.]

Toward those ends, the Act requires a physician to wait "at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending abortion has been delivered in the manner specified in this act" before performing an abortion on "an unemancipated minor," N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.4(a), such notice to be "delivered personally to the parent by the physician." N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.4(b). Instead of "personal delivery,"

notice may be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at the parent's last known address with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee, which means a postal employee may only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee. At the same time that notice is mailed by certified mail, it shall also be sent by first class mail to the parent at the parent's last known address. The 48 hour period for notice sent under the provisions of this subsection shall begin at noon on the next day on which regular mail delivery takes place following the day on which the mailings are posted.

[N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.4(c).]

The Act explains that a "parent"

means a parent with care and control of the unemancipated minor, unless the parent has no custodial rights; or if there is no parent with care and control, then the foster parent or the guardian of the unemancipated minor; or a person standing in loco parentis to the unemancipated minor,

and a "person standing in loco parentis"

means (1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and fostered, the person's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the minor; (2) that the person and the minor live together in the same household; (3) that the person assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the minor's care, education and development, including contributing towards the minor's support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the person has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the minor a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.

[N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.3.]

Notice is not otherwise required if a parent certifies that he or she has been informed about the pending abortion by setting forth "in a notarized writing that notice was received." N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.5. Notice is also not required if "the attending physician certifies in the unemancipated minor's medical records that the abortion is necessary due to a medical emergency." N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.6. Alternatively, when that finding cannot be made, a minor may seek a judicial waiver of the notification requirement by filing a petition or motion with a judge of the Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.7(a). The minor is entitled to "court appointed cou...