State v. Allen

• Decision Date: 16 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. A14A0297.,A14A0297.
• Citation: 762 S.E.2d 111,328 Ga.App. 411
• Parties: The STATE v. ALLEN, et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

328 Ga.App. 411

762 S.E.2d 111

The STATE

v.ALLEN, et al.

No. A14A0297.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 16, 2014.

James Luther Wright III, Jordan Kerry Van Matre, for Appellant.

William C. Puckett Jr., Christina Michelle Kempter, Holly Wilkinson Veal, for Appellee.

PHIPPS, Chief Judge.

After police discovered marijuana in a car that was stopped for lane infractions, Patrick Scott and Dorian Allen, the driver and passenger, respectively, were indicted for the possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.¹ Scott and Allen moved to suppress the drug evidence as the fruit of an illegal seizure. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing, then granted their motion. The state appeals. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

The sole witness at the suppression hearing was the patrol officer who initiated the traffic stop. On direct examination, he testified to the following. On September 13, 2012, while stationed in the median of an interstate to monitor traffic, the officer observed a 2012 Nissan Altima vehicle cross from the center lane of travel into “the fast lane.” As the Altima passed the officer's stationary position, the officer saw the driver “pointing his finger all in the passenger's face.” Concerned that the driver was distracted, the officer decided to catch up with the Altima. As he did so, the officer saw the Altima “make the same lane infractions again”; the officer also saw that the driver was “still reaching over with his fingers, pointing in the passenger's face.” The officer initiated the traffic stop.

The officer walked to the Altima and informed the two occupants, appellees Scott and Allen, that they were stopped because of lane infractions. The officer asked them whether they were having an argument. Scott answered no, and stated that he was just talking to Allen. The officer advised Scott that he would be writing him a courtesy warning for the lane infractions. The officer obtained from Scott his driver's license and obtained from Allen a South Carolina identification card.

The officer perceived that Scott and Allen were nervous. Because of the lane infractions, the officer wanted to “see how [Scott] was on his feet” to “make sure he wasn't intoxicated.” The officer asked Scott to exit the vehicle; Scott got out of the vehicle and walked to the location designated by the officer. The officer conducted a pat-down search of Scott; after finding no weapon, the officer “engaged in general conversation with [Scott]” while he wrote the courtesy warning.

But after writing the warning, the officer did not thereupon hand it (along with the identifications) to Scott, who was standing beside him. Instead, as the officer testified,

[O]nce I completed the warning I had dispatch check both of their driver's license[s]. Mr. Allen's was through South Carolina and Mr. Scott's was through Georgia. While waiting on returns from GCIC to come back, waiting on dispatch I had asked Mr. Scott for consent to search his vehicle. Mr. Scott wouldn't deny nor consent to a search.

The officer testified that Scott replied only that “you already got me stopped,” and “[s]o at that time I had Mr. Allen exit the vehicle also and once Mr. Allen exited the vehicle I had them both stand at the front of my patrol car and I retrieved my K–9 partner Kazan out of the rear of my vehicle.” When the officer walked the drug dog around the Altima, the dog showed a positive odor response. The officer put Kazan back into the patrol car, then began searching the Altima. While searching the interior of the vehicle, the officer received the requested GCIC information from dispatch; when the officer's search reached the trunk of the car, he discovered the marijuana.

An audio-video recording of the traffic stop was played at the suppression hearing.

On cross-examination, the officer provided additional details. He testified that, when talking to Scott and Allen as they sat in the Altima, he had looked at the vehicle's interior, but had seen neither marijuana nor any drug paraphernalia; and he had not detected the odor of marijuana. The officer stated that, when Scott complied with his directive to step outside the Altima, Scott continued to appear nervous, but showed “no signs of being intoxicated or impaired.” The officer had concluded, “[Scott] wasn't intoxicated.” Additionally, the officer agreed that “the courtesy warning was completed at that time as we see in the video ... when [he] contact[ed] dispatch”; that “[a]fter [he] completed the warning” he “ran the license[s] at that point”; and that the “written warning was completed prior to [his] running the GCIC to dispatch.”

On motion to suppress the evidence, Scott and Allen argued that the drug evidence was discovered only after the officer had unlawfully expanded the traffic stop. In its order ruling thereon, the court recited that it had considered, inter alia, both the officer's testimony and the recording. The court set forth the state's position that the extended detention was authorized by the officer's need to run a computer check, then found, however, that “the officer did not begin this inquiry until ... at the point when the officer had finished writing a warning citation for the traffic offense.” The court also determined that it was the drug dog's response that provided probable cause to search the vehicle, but ruled that at the time the drug dog had so responded, Scott and Allen were being unlawfully detained—i.e., detained without any articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Citing Weems v. State,² the trial court granted the suppression motion. In three related claims of error, the state challenges this suppression ruling.³

In Miller v. State,⁴ the Supreme Court of Georgia reiterated three fundamental principles that must be followed when conducting appellate review of a ruling upon a motion to suppress:

First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support [them]. Second, the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment.⁵

Further, the Court instructed, “To properly follow the first principle, [an appellate court] must focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order, as the trial court sits as the trier of fact.” ⁶

Here, the trial court explicitly included in its order this pertinent finding: “the officer did not begin this inquiry [the computer check at issue] until ... the point when the officer had finished writing a warning citation for the traffic offense.” This finding must be accepted, as there was evidence adduced at the hearing that supported it.⁷ For instance, as detailed above, the officer unequivocally testified so.⁸ Moreover, the audio-video recording of the traffic stop supports the officer's account. Construed most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and grant of the suppression motion,⁹ the evidence showed that, before initiating the computer check, the officer had concluded the tasks related to the investigation of the lane infractions, including a determination that the driver Scott was not intoxicated. The officer, therefore, lacked articulable suspicion of any drug (or other) crime, as the officer's perception that Scott and Allen were nervous “did not support a finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion that would have justified prolonging the detention.” ¹⁰

As a general rule, an investigatory stop is not unreasonably prolonged by the time necessary to run a computer check. ¹¹ But it does not necessarily follow that an officer may initiate a computer check after completing the investigation into the basis for the traffic stop.¹² Further, a police officer may check “for outstanding warrants or criminal histories on the occupants of a vehicleat a valid traffic stop” based upon concerns for officer safety “as long as under the circumstances they do not unreasonably prolong the stop.” ¹³ But “[o]nce the tasks related to the investigation of the traffic violation and processing of the traffic citation have been accomplished, an officer cannot continue to detain an individual without articulable suspicion.” ¹⁴

A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time to complete that mission. The officer's purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention.¹⁵

Accordingly, the evidence here showed that the officer—having accomplished the tasks related to his investigation into lane infractions ¹⁶ and having no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity aside from the traffic violation—unreasonably prolonged the duration of the traffic stop when he initiated the computer check.¹⁷

The foregoing, governing principles were recently reinforced by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. State,¹⁸ which recited:

In some cases, a detention is prolonged beyond the conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place, and in those cases, the courts generally have concluded that such a prolongation—even a short one— is unreasonable, unless, of course, good cause has appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to pursue a different investigation.¹⁹

Construing the evidence in the instant case most favorably to the upholding of the trial court's findings and...