Brock v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.

Citation762 F.2d 1349
Decision Date11 June 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-6013,84-6013
Parties119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2808, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,526 William E. BROCK, III, * Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Bette J. Briggs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.

Julius Reich, Reich, Adell, & Crost, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WRIGHT, ALARCON, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant William E. Brock, III, Secretary of Labor for the United States Department of Labor (hereinafter the Secretary) appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his complaint challenging a union election conducted by appellee Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (hereinafter the Guild), and from the district court's sua sponte award of attorneys' fees to the Guild. This appeal requires us to resolve a novel question of statutory construction: whether section 401(c) 1 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (hereinafter LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c), which requires that unions provide adequate safeguards to insure fair union elections, affords the Secretary the power to challenge a union's decision to permit supervisors to participate as candidates in a union election.

I FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 15 and 16, 1983, the Guild (a labor organization subject to the provisions of Title IV of the LMRDA regarding the conduct of union elections) conducted an election of officers. The Guild permitted two individuals who held supervisory or management positions in the entertainment industry to participate as candidates. 2 One was employed as a director/producer/writer for a television series; the other was a director for an episodic television program.

Having exhausted his internal union remedies, Guild member Edmund Morris filed a complaint with the Secretary pursuant to LMRDA Sec. 402(a). The Secretary investigated the complaint and found probable cause to believe that a violation of Title IV of the LMRDA had occurred. Specifically, the Secretary determined that, by allowing supervisors to participate as candidates in the election, the Guild failed to provide the adequate safeguards to insure a fair election required by LMRDA Sec. 401(c).

The Secretary brought an action in district court pursuant to LMRDA Because we conclude that the LMRDA does not authorize the Secretary to set aside a union election based upon the participation of supervisors as candidates for union office, we affirm the district court's judgment solely on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 5 We confine our analysis of this case to the narrow issue whether the Secretary's complaint states a claim under LMRDA Secs. 401(c) and 402(b).

                Secs. 401(c) and 402(b), challenging the election and seeking an order setting it aside and directing a new election under the Secretary's supervision.  The district court granted the Guild's summary judgment motion and dismissed the Secretary's complaint on the following grounds:  (1) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because LMRDA Sec. 402(b) does not confer jurisdiction on the court to hear actions to set aside union elections based upon the alleged participation of supervisors as candidates for union office; 3  (2) the court's jurisdiction was "preempted" because the alleged participation of supervisors as candidates in a union election is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB); 4  and (3) exclusive jurisdiction to determine supervisory status lies with the NLRB.  The court also awarded the Guild its costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412
                

II

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The question on this appeal arises out of the tension between two conflicting policies embodied in Title IV of the LMRDA: the need to afford the Secretary sufficient authority to ensure free and democractic union elections so that union corruption may be avoided, and the policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into union affairs. The Secretary contends that the portion of LMRDA Sec. 401(c) which requires unions to provide "[a]dequate safeguards to insure a fair election" was intended to authorize him to intervene and set aside a union election based upon the participation of supervisors as candidates. We disagree with the Secretary's reading of section 401(c) because such a construction would establish a per se rule of non-eligibility for supervisory candidates. Because "[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted" (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 2015, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978) ), we refuse to extend the statute "beyond the point where Congress ... would stop." 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600, 71 S.Ct. 515, 520, 95 L.Ed. 566 (1951).

In construing a statute in a case of first impression, we look to the traditional signposts of statutory construction: first, the language of the statute itself (see North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312, 103 S.Ct. 1095, 1102, 75 L.Ed.2d 77 (1983); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982) ); second, its legislative history (see Heckler v. Turner, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1144-45, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985) ), and as an aid in interpreting Congress' intent, the interpretation given to it by its administering agency (see Heckler v. Turner, supra 105 S.Ct. at 4214; Winterrowd v. David Freedman & Co., Inc., 724 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir.1984) ).

A. Language of LMRDA Sec. 401(c)

Title IV of the LMRDA (Secs. 401-03) deals generally with the conduct of union elections. See 29 U.S.C. Secs. 481-83. Section 401, entitled "Terms of office and election procedures," establishes minimum procedural standards for the conduct of elections. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 481. Subsection (c) contains a set of rights designed to insure that every candidate for union office is afforded equal access to the voting members. The last sentence of section 401(c) provides:

Adequate safeguards to insure a fair election shall be provided, including the right of any candidate to have an observer at the polls and at the counting of the ballots.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c). LMRDA Sec. 402(b) confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to hear complaints brought by the Secretary which allege violations of LMRDA Sec. 401. It provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The Secretary shall investigate such complaint [of an individual member of a labor organization alleging the violation of a provision of LMRDA Sec. 401] and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election ... under the supervision of the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 482(b).

Neither the language nor the context of the "adequate safeguards" provision supports the broad construction of the statute which the Secretary urges. Section 401(c) makes no reference to candidate eligibility, nor does it draw any distinction between union members based upon their supervisorial Moreover, section 401(e)--which does address candidate eligibility--is similarly devoid of any prohibition against supervisorial candidacy. To the contrary, it confers a blanket grant of eligibility on all union members in good standing:

status. Moreover, the adequate safeguards provision is immediately followed by two examples typifying the procedural safeguards which are required: (1) every candidate has the right to have an observer at the polls, and (2) every candidate has the right to have an observer at the counting of the ballots. LMRDA Sec. 401(c), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 481(c). Had Congress intended the adequate safeguards provision to encompass such substantive protections as restrictions on candidate eligibility, it seems unlikely that it would have included as examples two such purely procedural rights.

[E]very member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)

....

Section 504 of the LMRDA restricts the eligibility of felons and members of the Communist Party. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 504(a). It contains no reference to supervisors. 6

The fact that Congress itself expressly established certain minimal qualifications for candidates for union office in section 504, taken in combination with its broad statement of member eligibility in section 401(e), suggests that Congress intended that unions retain the freedom not to impose additional candidacy qualifications. But cf. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local No. 54, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3187-90, 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984) (NLRA Sec. 7, guaranteeing to employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives "of their own choosing," does not necessarily preempt all state regulations imposing candidacy qualifications which ultimately restrict the rights of employees to select certain individuals as union officers). 7 The conspicuous absence in the LMRDA of any candidacy qualifications based upon...

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