N.W. v. Boone Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date18 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 13–6514.,13–6514.
PartiesN.W., a minor child, by and through his next friend and parents J.W. and J.W., et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. BOONE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants–Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

763 F.3d 611

N.W., a minor child, by and through his next friend and parents J.W. and J.W., et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
BOONE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants–Appellants.

No. 13–6514.

United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Aug. 6, 2014.
Decided and Filed: Aug. 18, 2014.


[763 F.3d 612]


ARGUED:Mary Ann Stewart, Adams, Stepner, Woltermann & Dusing, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellants.
Karen H. Ginn, Chevalier, Ginn & Kruer, P.S.C., Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Mary Ann Stewart, Adams, Stepner, Woltermann & Dusing, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Karen H. Ginn, Chevalier, Ginn & Kruer, P.S.C., Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Appellees. Mary Suzanne Cassidy, O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan & Sergent, Covington, Kentucky, for Amici Curiae.

Before: MOORE and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; STAFFORD, District Judge.
*

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

N.W., by and through his parents, brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482, arguing that the Boone County Board of Education and an assortment of individual defendants (collectively, “the District”) had failed to offer a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to N.W., as required by the IDEA. The district court ruled against N.W., but it nonetheless ordered the District to reimburse N.W.'s parents for the costs incurred as a result of N.W. attending a private school while the litigation played out. The District appeals this portion of the district court's ruling. Because the IDEA bars a district court from ordering reimbursement absent a finding that the school district failed to provide a

[763 F.3d 613]

FAPE, we VACATE this part of the district court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

N.W. is a nine-year-old, autistic child, born in 2004, who has been diagnosed with apraxia.1 In 2007, N.W.'s parents enrolled him in the District's schools when he was three years old. An Admissions and Release Committee (“ARC”) determined that N.W. qualified for special-education services and placed him at St. Rita's School for the Deaf under an individual education program (“IEP”). At St. Rita's, a private school in Cincinnati, N.W. participated in a special program for children with apraxia, which included learning sign language.

In June 2010, N.W.'s parents became dissatisfied with the program at St. Rita's, removed N.W. from the school, and unilaterally placed him at Applied Behavioral Services (“ABS”), another private school in Cincinnati. N.W.'s parents requested that the District reimburse them for the tuition and transportation costs of N.W.'s attendance. The District convened an ARC in October 2010 and generated a new IEP. The District and N.W.'s parents, however, could not agree on placement—the District maintained that it could educate N.W. in its schools; N.W.'s parents wanted N.W. to remain at ABS. Unable to reach an agreement, the parties entered mediation.

Mediation resulted in a settlement agreement. The District agreed to reimburse N.W.'s parents for the tuition and transportation expenses incurred from August 19, 2010 to November 30, 2010. Additionally, the District agreed to pay a portion of N.W.'s tuition and transportation costs through the summer of 2011. N.W.'s parents, in turn, agreed to attend an ARC that would be tasked with creating a plan for N.W. to transition into the District's schools for the 2011–2012 school year. Moreover, “[t]he parties agree[d] and acknowledge[d] that this Agreement constitute[d] a settlement of [the] disputed claim[s].” Appellants App'x at 13 (Settlement Agreement). And “[n]either party ma[de] an admission as to educational placement, negligence, or violation of IDEA or Kentucky law.” Id.

In the Spring of 2011, the District attempted to convene an ARC to develop a transition plan for N.W. N.W.'s parents repeatedly rescheduled. Eventually, the parties met and created a tentative transition plan. N.W.'s parents, however, balked at the plan's implementation and filed a due-process complaint on October 31, 2011. They alleged that the District's proposed plan would fail to provide N.W. a FAPE,2 and N.W.'s parents requested a due-process hearing. In addition, they asked “[t]hat ABS be considered [N.W.'s]

[763 F.3d 614]

‘ stay-put’ placement.” Appellants App'x at 3 (Due Process Compl.).

On March 12–13, 2012, the hearing officer convened a hearing at which N.W.'s father and various District representatives testified. The hearing officer issued his decision three months later and found that N.W.'s parents failed to prove that the District's plan would deny N.W. a FAPE. R. 4–1 at 11 (Due–Process Hr'g Dec.) (Page ID # 41). However, the hearing officer also stated that “[t]he present IEP was being used while [N.W.] was attending ABS. [N.W.] continues to be a student at ABS during the pendency of this appeal. Under the situation here where the parties are disputing the transition plan, [N.W.] stays at ABS under ‘stay put[.]’ ” Id. at 14 (Page ID # 44) (citing Casey K. ex rel. Norman K. v. St. Anne Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 302, 400 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.2005)). As a result, the hearing officer ordered the District to reimburse N.W.'s parents for the costs of N.W. attending ABS for 5.5 hours per day during the 2011–2012 school year. Id. at 15 (Page ID # 45).

Both parties turned to the Exceptional Children Appeal Board (“ECAB”). The ECAB affirmed the hearing officer's determination that N.W.'s parents had failed to show that the District would not provide N.W. with a FAPE. R. 16–3 at 4 (ECAB Dec.) (Page ID # 210). However, the ECAB also reversed the hearing officer's stay-put decision, holding that ABS was not N.W.'s “placement” because “no ARC decision or legal decision decided that placement at ABS was proper.” Id. at 20 (Page ID # 226).

In response, N.W.'s parents filed suit in the district court on behalf of their son, contending inter alia that the District's plan would fail to provide a FAPE and “[t]hat the [ECAB] incorrectly overturned the finding of the hearing officer that N.W.'s ‘stay-put’ placement was [ABS].” R. 1 at 8 (Compl. at ¶ 30) (Page ID # 8). The district court, like the hearing officer and the ECAB, found that “N.W. ha[d] not established that the District's offer of placement at New Haven [a District elementary school with an autism-specific classroom] was inappropriate.” R. 20 at 21 (D.Ct.Op.) (Page ID # 270). However, the district court also found that “N.W.'s operative placement under which he was actually receiving instruction at the time the dispute arose was ABS.” Id. at 23 (Page ID # 272). Consequently, the district court ordered the hearing officer's stay-put ruling to be reinstated and the District to reimburse N.W.'s parents for the cost of N.W. attending ABS. The district has appealed to this court; N.W.'s parents have not done so. See R. 22 at 1 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID # 276).

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

“A district court ... reviews IDEA cases under a modified de novo standard, meaning that it may set aside administrative findings in an IDEA case ‘only if the evidence before the court is more likely than not to preclude the administrative decision from being justified based on the agency's presumed educational expertise, a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony, or both.’ ” Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 312–13 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir.2003)). “ ‘Less weight is due to an agency's determinations on matters for which educational expertise is not relevant because a federal court is just as well suited to evaluate the situation.’ ” Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 849 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir.2003)). “More weight, however, is due to an agency's determinations on matters for

[763 F.3d 615]

which educational expertise is relevant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[We], in turn, appl[y] a clearly erroneous standard of review to the district court's findings of fact and a de novo standard of review to its conclusions of law.” Id. at 850 (citing Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir.2001)). “Mixed questions of law and fact, including the question of whether a child was denied a FAPE, are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citation omitted). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we also review de novo. United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir.2012).

B. The IDEA Does Not Permit District Courts to Order Reimbursement Absent a Finding That a School District Failed to Offer a FAPE.

The district court concluded (1) that N.W.'s parents failed to show that the District denied N.W. a FAPE and (2) that N.W.'s parents unilaterally withdrew their child from the District's schools, yet the district court ordered the District to reimburse N.W.'s parents for the tuition and transportation costs incurred by N.W. attending ABS. The District claims that the IDEA prohibits such an order of reimbursement. Given the text and purpose of the IDEA, as well as relevant caselaw, we agree with the District and VACATE the district court's order of reimbursement.

The IDEA states that “[it] does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of a...

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