Wallace v. Fedex Corp.

Decision Date22 August 2014
Docket Number11–5577.,Nos. 11–5500,s. 11–5500
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
PartiesTina C. WALLACE, Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, Defendant–Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED:Alistair E. Newbern, Vanderbilt Appellate Litigation Clinic, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee. M. Kimberly Hodges, Fedex Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant. ON BRIEF:Alistair E. Newbern, Vanderbilt Appellate Litigation Clinic, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee. M. Kimberly Hodges, David A. Billions, FedEx Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant. Tina C. Wallace, Collierville, Tennessee, pro se.

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; DRAIN, District Judge.*

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

PlaintiffAppellant/Cross–Appellee Tina Wallace worked for DefendantAppellee/Cross–Appellant FedEx Corporation (FedEx) for twenty-one years in a variety of positions. By 2007, she was a senior paralegal. By the summer of 2007, Wallace also had a variety of health problems that required her to take leave from her position. FedEx offered Wallace leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and its representatives verbally asked her to complete a medical-certification form. FedEx, however, never explained the consequences of not returning a completed form. Wallace failed to provide FedEx with the medical certification, and once she was absent for two consecutive days after the form was due, FedEx terminated her employment. Wallace filed suit under the FMLA, alleging that FedEx interfered with her rights under the statute. A magistrate judge dismissed Wallace's request for liquidated damages and front pay, but after a trial, the jury sided with Wallace on the issues of liability and back pay, awarding damages in the amount of $173,000. Both parties filed postjudgment motions, and the magistrate judge denied all of them, except to reduce Wallace's damages award to $90,788.

Wallace appealed the magistrate judge's decisions on liquidated damages, front pay, and remittitur. FedEx cross-appealed, challenging the magistrate judge's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on liability, making several different arguments. On December 14, 2011, a motions panel of this court dismissed Wallace's appeal of the liquidated-damages and front-pay decisions as untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. This decision was clearly erroneous under binding circuit precedent, but we may not revisit it three years later. Therefore, we review only the parties' arguments related to the magistrate judge's March 24, 2011 order. On the merits, we REVERSE the magistrate judge's remittitur decision and ORDER the magistrate judge to enter judgment in favor of Wallace in the amount of $173,000. With regard to FedEx's cross-appeals, we AFFIRM the magistrate judge's denial of judgment as a matter of law on all issues.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts

Wallace started working for FedEx in 1986 as a part-time package handler. She stayed with the company, moving eventually into the legal department in 1993 as an associate paralegal. On June 1, 2007, Wallace transferred as a senior paralegal into the Legal Sales and Alliance Group, which was supervised by Rusty Phillips. Wallace shifted into this group, in part, because of a variety of health problems. Knowing this information, Phillips had a conversation with Wallace prior to her joining his group, highlighting the importance of adhering to the scheduled workday—9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.—to support the sales staff on the West Coast.

During the summer of 2007 as this transfer took place, Wallace was also suffering from temporomandibular joint disorder, known as “TMJ,” which resulted in severe headaches, facial pain, chest pains, “significant weight loss,” and sleeping problems. R. 53 at 130:16–19, 132:17–24 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1587, 1589). Dr. Christine Kasser, Wallace's physician, had prescribed “Synthroid, Adderall, Prozac, Wellbutrin, Lortab, Subutex, Klonopin, and Ambien” to treat this condition. Id. at 133:22–23 (Page ID # 1590). The prescriptions helped some, but Wallace continued to have sleep issues and stomach problems. In late July 2007, Wallace started arriving at work late, which prompted Phillips to email Wallace, stressing the importance of arriving to work on time. See id. at 168:5–24 (Page ID # 1625); Ex. App'x at 56. Wallace apologized for “slacking” and “promise[d] to everyday, try to strive with 100% dedication and determination to get [to work] at or before 9:00.” Ex. App'x at 57.

Wallace's health and attendance problems worsened after Dr. Kasser adjusted Wallace's Lortab prescription on Friday, August 3. R. 53 at 167:15–17 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1624). Lortab is a narcotic, and Wallace and her doctor decided to discontinue its use. Id. at 134:5–14 (Page ID # 1591). This process had rather drastic side effects. Wallace experienced “ringing in [her] ears,” “night sweats,” and “headaches”; she “felt like [she] was in a fog,” and [her] skin was all crawly feeling.” Id. at 134:10–14 (Page ID # 1591). She could not sleep and had diarrhea. Id. As a result, “getting up” in the morning and “getting to work” were difficult. Id. at 134:17–21 (Page ID # 1591). At times, when she arrived at work, she “would sit in the parking lot and cry” or “go in to the building and ... cry.” Id. at 134:20–23 (Page ID # 1591).

On Monday, August 6, Wallace emailed Phillips with the subject line “not sure what to do”:

Rusty, because of my “past/baggage/history, etc.” I have struggled with whether I should or shouldn't let you know something; but because of the same reasons I really feel and think I should, but also shouldn't because of how it will or will not be taken/understood.

Ex. App'x at 15. Phillips responded that he thought “keeping an open, honest line of communication open [was] critical to a successful transition [to Wallace's new position] and offered to find someone with whom Wallace would feel comfortable speaking, if not him. Id.

By Tuesday, August 7, Wallace's Lortab withdrawal symptoms had worsened, and she called in sick. The next day, Wallace emailed Phillips again: “In addition to yesterday, I unfortunately am unable to come in today and the rest of the week.” Ex. App'x at 14. Phillips replied: “You already know you are going to be sick through Friday? No hope of feeling better? Not sure I understand.” Ex. App'x at 58. Three hours later, Phillips sent another email:

Could you please be here at 9:00 a.m. sharp on Monday—we need to spend some time talking about your schedule—I think we are slipping from the 9:00 a.m. start time.... On the work schedule, in my mind, 9:00 means 9:00—not 9:12, 9:17 or 9:25. I believe there is a pattern of missing the start time we agreed upon. While I understand the occasional few minutes—it is a problem when it becomes a pattern.... Please let me know that you have received this e-mail. Thank you and I hope you are feeling better.

Ex. App'x at 14.

Monday came, and Wallace arrived at work ninety minutes late. Phillips emailed: “After setting expectations when you started and after having a couple of discussions regarding your schedule, I am very disturbed that you arrived today at 10:30. We must find time to talk today.” Ex. App'x at 60. Wallace replied several hours later, apologizing. Phillips agreed “to start fresh,” but again stressed the importance of Wallace arriving on time to work. Id.

The next day, August 14, Wallace came to work at 9:30. When she arrived, Wallace tried to give Phillips an explanation, but he told her that they would meet later in the day. Phillips prepared a “written counseling,” a sort of reprimand, and issued it to Wallace. R. 54 at 174:8–9, 174:18–19 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2183); see also Ex. App'x at 61. This written counseling partially documented Wallace's tardiness and the multiple discussions between Phillips and Wallace regarding Wallace's attendance. Ex. App'x at 61. It also acknowledged that continued tardiness would result in “the escalation of the disciplinary process.” Id.

On August 15, Wallace, Phillips, and Cathy Bowsher, a FedEx Human Resources Manager, met to discuss the written counseling. See Ex. App'x at 50. According to Phillips, Wallace apologized again for her tardiness and explained that she had had trouble “getting her child off to school.” R. 54 at 177:23 (Mar. 30 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 2186). She also alerted Phillips and Bowsher to the fact that she was having difficulty, in part, because her doctor had adjusted her medication. At trial, Wallace stated that she did not mention the precise medication being adjusted because she “was not comfortable getting into that much detail.” R. 53 at 136:13–14 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1593). In response, Phillips gave Wallace three options:

First, comply with the attendance policy and complete work assignments in a timely fashion. Second, consider taking a period of time for medical leave until such time as she feels capable of adhering to the attendance policy and completing her work tasks. Lastly, [Wallace could] elect to not comply with the work requirements and suffer the consequences of the progressive discipline process.

Ex. App'x at 50. Wallace did not choose an option at the meeting. R. 53 at 137:6 (Mar. 29 Trial Tr.) (Page ID # 1594).

Immediately following the meeting's conclusion, Wallace went to a pre-scheduled appointment with Dr. Kasser. During this visit, Dr. Kasser recognized that Wallace's “condition appeared to be markedly changed” since the last time the doctor saw her and that Wallace “was anxious, shaking, [and] tremulous.” Id. at 214:10–20 (Page ID # 1671). Dr. Kasser “recommend[ed] that [Wallace] be off work for two weeks due to her medical conditions.” Ex. App'x at 3. The doctor placed this recommendation in writing and then wrote, [s]he...

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