United States v. Mateen

• Decision Date: 26 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–4481.,12–4481.
• Citation: 764 F.3d 627
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Christopher J. MATEEN, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

764 F.3d 627

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Christopher J. MATEEN, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–4481.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: June 18, 2014.

Decided and Filed: Aug. 26, 2014.

ARGUED:Benjamin C. Glassman, United States Attorney's Office, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Kevin M. Schad, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Benjamin C. Glassman, United States Attorney's Office, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Kevin M. Schad, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS, BATCHELDER, MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, ROGERS, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

The court delivered a PER CURIAM opinion, in which COLE, C.J., and BOGGS, BATCHELDER, MOORE, GIBBONS, ROGERS, SUTTON, COOK, McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, and DONALD, JJ., joined, and CLAY, J. joined in the result. CLAY, J. (pp. 633–36), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The federal statutes prohibiting the sale, distribution, and possession of child pornography include sentencing-enhancement provisions that apply to recidivist offenders who have also been convicted of certain predicate state and federal offenses. Christopher Mateen pleaded guilty to possessing “visual depiction[s] involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). He had previously been convicted of Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05. The district judge determined that the statutory sentencing enhancement was not triggered by Mateen's prior state conviction, and sentenced him to the statutory maximum ten-year term of imprisonment.

At issue in this appeal is the proper construction of the sentencing-enhancement provision, which provides that an individual with a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” will be subject to the enhancement. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). We must decide whether the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only its direct antecedent, “abusive sexual conduct,” or whether it modifies all three listed categories of conduct: “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct.” We conclude that the limiting phrase modifies only “abusive sexual conduct” and, accordingly, only state crimes relating to abusive sexual conduct need involve a minor or ward in order to trigger enhancement under § 2252(b)(2). Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the district court for resentencing and reconsideration of whether Mateen's Gross Sexual Imposition conviction triggers the statutory sentencing enhancement, as properly construed.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2012, an officer with a Franklin County task force targeting internet crimes against children detected an IP address that hosted and shared several images and movies of minors engaging in sexual acts. The officer traced the IP address to the residence of Christopher Mateen. Investigators executed a search warrant at the residence and recovered a computer, which held over 300 images and movies of child pornography. R. 43 (Plea Hr'g Tr. at 20–21) (Page ID # 195–96). Mateen pleaded guilty to knowing possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). R. 18 (Guilty Plea at 1) (Page ID # 31).

Mateen's 2012 conviction was not his first conviction involving sexual misconduct. Several years earlier, he pleaded guilty to Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05, which provides:

(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:

(1) The offender purposely compels the other person, or one of the other persons, to submit by force or threat of force.

(2) For the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the judgment or control of the other person or of one of the other persons by administering any drug, intoxicant, or controlled substance to the other person surreptitiously or by force, threat of force, or deception.

(3) The offender knows that the judgment or control of the other person or of one of the other persons is substantially impaired as a result of the influence of any drug or intoxicant administered to the other person with the other person's consent for the purpose of any kind of medical or dental examination, treatment, or surgery.

(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.

(5) The ability of the other person to resist or consent or the ability of one of the other persons to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age, and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the ability to resist or consent of the other person or of one of the other persons is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition or because of advanced age.

(B) No person shall knowingly touch the genitalia of another, when the touching is not through clothing, the other person is less than twelve years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person, and the touching is done with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

Violation of the Gross Sexual Imposition statute may constitute a felony of either the third or the fourth degree. Id. at § 2907.05(C)(1). Although the state-court judgment of conviction does not specify the subsection on which Mateen's guilty plea rested, it does indicate that Mateen pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree felony. R. 30–1 (Com. Pleas J. Entry at 1) (Page ID # 77). The prosecutor stated at the state-court plea hearing that Mateen's victim was an eight-year-old girl. R. 33–1 (Com. Pleas Plea Colloquy Tr. at 2–4) (Page ID # 89–91).

In the federal plea agreement, the government indicated that it would seek to apply a statutory sentencing enhancement on the basis of Mateen's state Gross Sexual Imposition conviction. R. 12 (Plea Agreement ¶ 2) (Page ID # 18–19). For first-time offenders, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) carries a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). For recidivist offenders, however, a sentencing enhancement applies. In relevant part, the statute provides that an individual with a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward ... shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.” Id. Mateen reserved the right to contest whether his state Gross Sexual Imposition conviction qualified him for the enhancement. R. 12 (Plea Agreement ¶ 2) (Page ID # 19).

The district court concluded that the sentencing enhancement did not apply to Mateen because his prior conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition did not necessarily “involv[e] a minor or ward.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). In construing the sentencing-enhancement provision, the district court determined that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies all three categories of listed conduct: aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, and abusive sexual conduct. R. 36 (D. Ct. Op. at 6) (Page ID # 117). The district court then applied the modified-categorical approach articulated in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), and determined that Mateen's prior conviction for fourth-degree felony Gross Sexual Imposition did not necessarily involve a minor or ward. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID # 117–18). Therefore, the district court held, “[w]ith some reluctance,” that the sentencing enhancement did not apply to Mateen's conduct. R. 39 (Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 21) (Page ID # 154); R. 36 (D. Ct. Op. at 10) (Page ID # 121). The district court sentenced Mateen to ten years of imprisonment, which it believed to be the maximum possible term under the statute. R. 39 (Sentencing Hr'g Tr. at 26–29) (Page ID # 159–62).

On appeal, the government argues that the district court misconstrued the sentencing-enhancement provision.

II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, including its “determinations regarding statutory construction,” United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 602 (6th Cir.2012), and its “conclusion that a prior conviction triggers a mandatory minimum sentence,” United States v. Gardner, 649 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir.2011). The government contends that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct,” and that a prior conviction for a state offense that relates to aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse triggers the sentencing enhancement even if the crime did not involve a minor victim. As always, we begin our exercise in statutory interpretation “by examining the language of the statute itself to determine if its meaning is plain. Plain meaning is examined by looking at the language and design of the statute as a whole.” United States v. Parrett, 530 F.3d 422, 429 (6th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The grammatical structure of the statutory language favors the interpretation advanced by the government. According to “the grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent,’ ... a limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003)....