Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.

Citation764 F.Supp.2d 240
Decision Date10 February 2011
Docket NumberNo. 1:09–cv–00656–JAW.,1:09–cv–00656–JAW.
PartiesAnton K. SAMAAN, Plaintiff,v.ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John P. Flynn, III, Daniel G. Lilley Law Offices, P.A., Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.

James F. Martemucci, L. John Topchik, Germani Martemucci Riggle & Hill, Jeffrey D. Russell, Thomas V. Laprade, Lambert Coffin Haenn, Portland, ME, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., Chief Judge.

The Court denies the Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's earlier denial of their motion for summary judgment.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTSA. Procedural History

On July 2, 2010, David Kaplan, M.D. moved for summary judgment against Anton Samaan, contending that because Mr. Samaan had failed to present competent expert testimony to support his claims against the doctor, Dr. Kaplan was entitled to summary judgment. Def. David Kaplan, M.D.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 24). With his motion for summary judgment, Dr. Kaplan filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the opinions of Mr. Samaan's expert witness. Def. David Kaplan, M.D.'s Mot. in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Ravi Tikoo, M.D. (Docket # 26). Codefendant St. Joseph Hospital joined Dr. Kaplan's motion. Def. St. Joseph Hospital's Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 29). On October 14, 2010, 744 F.Supp.2d 367, 2010 WL 4053672 (D.Me.2010), the Court denied the motion in limine and the motion for summary judgment. Order on Mot. in Limine (Docket # 49); Order Denying Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 50).

On October 19, 2010, Dr. Kaplan moved for reconsideration. Def. David Kaplan, M.D.'s Mot. for Recons. of the Court's Order on his Mot. for Summ. J. or in the Alternative for a Daubert Hr'g on the Admissibility of the Opinions of the Pl.'s Causation Expert (Docket # 53) ( Defs.' Daubert Mot.). Mr. Samaan objected. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n. to Def. Kaplan's Mot. for Recons., or in the Alternative, for Daubert Hr'g (Docket # 65) ( Pl.'s Daubert Opp'n.). On November 15, 2010, the Court denied the motion for reconsideration but granted the motion for a Daubert hearing. Order (Docket # 68) ( Hr'g Order ). Following a December 9, 2010 testimonial hearing, on December 21, 2010, 755 F.Supp.2d 236, 2010 WL 5177740 (D.Me.2010), the Court granted Dr. Kaplan's motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Tikoo. Order on Daubert Hr'g (Docket # 91) (Daubert Order ).

On December 23, 2010, Dr. Kaplan and St. Joseph Hospital moved for reconsideration of the Court's October 14, 2010 Order on summary judgment. Defs. St. Joseph Hosp.'s and David Kaplan, M.D.'s Mot. for Recons. of the Court's Order on Mots. for Summ. J. (Docket # 94) ( Defs.' Mot.). On January 11, 2011, Mr. Samaan objected. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n. to Defs. David Kaplan's and St. Joseph Hosp.'s Mot. for Recons. of the Court's Order on Mots. for Summ. J. (Docket # 99) ( Pl.'s Opp'n.). On January 13, 2011, the Defendants replied. Defs.' Joint Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Recons. of the Court's Order on Their Mot. for Summ. J. (Docket # 101) ( Defs.' Reply ).

B. The Positions of the Parties

1. The Defendants' Position

Referring to the Court Order on the Daubert hearing, the Defendants say that “it is now clear that Plaintiff will not be able to present expert evidence on causation.” Defs.' Mot. at 3. With the exclusion of Dr. Tikoo's testimony, the Defendants say that Mr. Samaan cannot present evidence that there was a departure from a recognized standard of care that more likely than not caused him injury. Id. The Defendants therefore contend they are entitled to summary judgment.

2. Plaintiff's Position

Mr. Samaan objects on a number of grounds. First, he says that Rule 59 does “not provide a procedural avenue for the defendants to appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion, because such an order is interlocutory.” Pl.'s Opp'n. at 2. Mr. Samaan again reminds the Court that he raised this issue when he opposed the Defendants' motion for reconsideration and that he raised the issue again during a November 17, 2010 telephone conference with the Court. Id. He says that when he questioned why a Daubert hearing was being held, the Court “merely replied: ‘Because I want to.’ Id. Mr. Samaan contends that Rule 59 is “expressly designed and intended to provide only for motions made post-trial, and following the entry of judgment.” Id. Because the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order, which cannot be appealed under Rule 59, Mr. Samaan says that the motion is out of order. Id.

Mr. Samaan says that the “second reason that defendants' current motion must be denied is that the claim for professional negligence is not the only claim asserted in the complaint.” Id. at 3. He points out that he has a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 3–4.

Finally, he claims that summary judgment is inappropriate because the record “contains admissions by both defendant St. Joseph Hospital and the defendants' joint expert witness, Dr. McKenna, which satisfy the Plaintiff's burden of proof for establishing the proximate cause element of the professional negligence claim.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Mr. Samaan protests that [t]he court did not acknowledge or address those facts in the orders denying the motions for summary judgment and the first motion for reconsideration.” Id. Mr. Samaan instructs that “admissions by a party-opponent are an exception to the prohibition on hearsay testimony and are admissible.” Id. at 4–5 (citing Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(2)). To this end, he points to the testimony of Dr. Maryann Walsh, the physician at St. Joseph who admitted Mr. Samaan, and a letter from Dr. Elsayed Hussein, Mr. Samaan's treating physician, who opined that Mr. Samaan should have received t-PA, and if he had, the permanent left-sided paralysis would have been avoided. Id. at 5–6. Finally, Mr. Samaan asserts that Defendants' joint expert witness, Dr. Paul Nyquist, “agreed with the ECASS–III recommendation for the extension of the 3 hour administration window, and did so because patients generally received a benefit from the administration of t-PA.” Id. at 6–7. He goes on to say that Dr. Nyquist testified that “the statistics demonstrate patients receiving t-PA have a ten or eleven times greater chance of receiving a clinical benefit than experiencing a negative side-effect.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). Mr. Samaan points to an article in which Dr. Nyquist wrote that the NINDS Study confirmed the efficacy of this thrombolytic therapy when started within 3 hours of the stroke symptom onset.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in pleading).

Mr. Samaan notes that the Defendants seek reconsideration of two proper orders which denied their motions for summary judgment.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). He complains that “the court's decision to proceed with a Daubert hearing of Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Tikoo, effectively switched the burden of proof with respect to the sought-after summary judgment from the Defendants and onto the Plaintiff.” Id. at 9. He demands that the burden return to the Defendants in their motion for reconsideration. Id. Finally, he says that the Defendants' reliance on Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158 ¶¶ 17–22, 784 A.2d 18, “misses the mark” because if there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant—such as existed here—the plaintiff may proceed with a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as an independent tort. Id. at 13. To make out a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, all that is necessary, according to Mr. Samaan, is his own testimony of his severe emotional distress. Id. at 14. Mr. Samaan asserts that the Defendants have failed to present statements of material fact on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim “as required by the Rules”. Id. (emphasis in original).

3. Defendants' Reply

The Defendants reply that the Court has the inherent authority to entertain a motion for reconsideration. Defs.' Reply at 1. They observe that the Court also has the inherent authority to hold a Daubert hearing as part of its gate-keeping function. Id. The Defendants further reply that a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress “is not a claim that can stand alone without a finding of negligence against the defendants.” They argue that a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may only stand when there exists bystander liability or a special relationship between the actor and the person emotionally harmed. Id. at 2–3. They contend that neither exists here. Id.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Motion to Reconsider

Mr. Samaan has vigorously insisted that a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion for summary judgment is procedurally flawed because it amounts to an attempted appeal of an interlocutory order. The Court has traced the source for this incomprehensible argument to the Defendants' miscitation of the proper rule for their motions for reconsideration. As authority for their motions for reconsideration, the Defendants cited Rule 59. Def.'s Daubert Mot. at 1; Defs.' Mot. at 1. Noting that Rule 59 addresses a motion for new trial or a motion to alter or amend judgment, Mr. Samaan has seized on Defendants' citation error and claimed that their motions for reconsideration were somehow impermissible attempts to appeal an interlocutory order. Pl.'s Daubert Opp'n. at 3; Pl.'s Opp'n. at 2.

Mr. Samaan's argument badly conflates an interlocutory appeal with a motion for reconsideration. The Local Rules provide for the filing of a motion for reconsideration:

A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of the court, meaning a motion other than one governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or 60, shall demonstrate that the order was based on a manifest error of fact or law and shall be filed within 14 days from the date of the order unless the party seeking a reconsideration shows cause for not filing within that time....

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    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • 13 Octubre 2011
  • Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 9 Enero 2012
    ...238, 239–40 (D.Me.2011), the district court denied the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp. ( Samaan VI ), 764 F.Supp.2d 240, 249 (D.Me.2011). The court predicated this ruling on a tentative finding that the descriptions of the new experts' expected te......
  • Martínez-Morales v. Victaulic Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 5 Junio 2013
    ...40), it is unnecessary to hold a Daubert hearing. United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 115 (1st Cir. 2009); cf. Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that it is "routine" and within the trial court's discretion to hold a Daubert hearing "[w]hen a serious......
  • Martínez-Morales v. Victaulic Co.
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    • 6 Junio 2013
    ...it is unnecessary to hold a Daubert hearing. United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 115 (1st Cir. 2009); cf Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 240, 246 (D. Me. 2011) (noting that it is "routine" and within the trial court's discretion to hold a Daubert hearing "[w]hen a serious issue......
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