People v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 07 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 90433.,90433.
• Citation: 262 Ill.Dec. 9,764 N.E.2d 1126,199 Ill.2d 1
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie BALDWIN, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

764 N.E.2d 1126

199 Ill.2d 1

262 Ill.Dec. 9

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie BALDWIN, Appellant.

No. 90433.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 7, 2002.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Z. Peter Tokatlian, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee Goldfarb, Veronica X. Calderon, Kathryn A. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

In March 1999, the State charged defendant with four counts of home invasion. 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 1998). Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered a general finding acquitting defendant on all four counts but found him guilty of aggravated unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3.1 (West 1998)) and aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)(1) (West 1998)). Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erroneously convicted him of the uncharged crimes. The trial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment on the aggravated unlawful restraint finding. The trial court imposed no sentence for the aggravated assault finding.

Defendant appealed and the appellate court affirmed. No. 1-99-2312 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. On appeal to this court, defendant argues that his conviction must be vacated because the charging instrument did not sufficiently identify aggravated unlawful restraint as a lesser-included offense of home invasion. We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND

The alleged victim, Donna Roberts, testified that she and defendant lived together intermittently from 1991 through 1999. In January 1999, defendant and Roberts became involved in an altercation that led to defendant's arrest and imprisonment. An order of protection was also issued against defendant.

Roberts claimed sole ownership of the home she formerly shared with defendant. According to Roberts, in March 1999, she and a friend, Willie Jackson, returned to her home after shopping. Upon arriving, Roberts noticed that her burglar alarm had been triggered. She and Jackson entered the house and searched for intruders. Jackson remained in the living room while Roberts checked the basement.

Roberts claimed that she discovered defendant in the basement. According to Roberts, defendant grabbed her while wielding a butcher knife and dragged her up the stairs. He ordered Jackson out of the house and away from "his woman." Jackson left immediately and went to call the police. Roberts claimed that defendant spent several minutes talking to her and dragging her through the house. During this conversation, defendant repeatedly threatened Roberts and asked her why she called the police on him during the January 1999 altercation that led to defendant's incarceration until that day.

Chicago police officers arrived and rang the doorbell. Defendant answered the door and, standing beside Roberts, told the officers that she was all right and that he had not done anything to her.

Officer Victoria Barber testified that defendant tried to close the door while holding Roberts by the arm. Barber put her foot in the way. Barber then separated them by insisting on speaking to defendant outside. After speaking with defendant outside, Barber walked back into the house to interview Roberts. According to Barber, Roberts look scared. Roberts hunched over, kept her head down, and barely spoke. Mindful that the police dispatch indicated that defendant was armed with a knife, Barber searched the vicinity of the front door. She discovered a butcher knife beneath the seat cushion of a chair placed approximately two feet from the front door. She placed defendant in custody.

Defendant also testified. He claimed that he went to the house after his release from jail for the sole purpose of retrieving some clothes to wear. Defendant testified, and Roberts admitted, that Roberts served time in jail for a felony drug conviction. According to defendant, Roberts had quitclaimed the house to him and he resided there while Roberts was incarcerated. He testified that he entered the home with his own key.

He denied pulling a knife on Roberts or threatening her. He indicated he was arrested while seated on the couch. He admitted knowing of the order of protection, but stated that he simply went to the house to get his clothes.

Following a review of the evidence, the trial court acquitted defendant on all four home invasion counts but found him guilty of aggravated unlawful restraint and aggravated assault. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erroneously convicted him of the uncharged crimes. The trial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment on the aggravated unlawful restraint finding. The trial court imposed no sentence for the aggravated assault finding.

Defendant appealed, arguing that neither aggravated unlawful restraint nor aggravated assault are lesser-included offenses to home invasion. In a two-page summary order, the appellate court held that it could not review defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the trial court did not impose sentence. Absent a sentence, a conviction is not a final and appealable judgment. People v. Flores, 128 Ill.2d 66, 95, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989). On that basis, the appellate court partially dismissed defendant's appeal. With respect to the aggravated unlawful restraint finding, the appellate court found that the charging instrument sufficiently alleged the elements of aggravated unlawful restraint to make that charge a lesser-included offense of home invasion.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to this court, defendant argues that his conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint must be vacated because the charging instrument did not sufficiently identify aggravated unlawful restraint as a lesser-included offense of home invasion. He does not challenge the propriety of the trial court's aggravated assault finding. For the reasons that follow, we agree that defendant's conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint must be reversed.

Generally, a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense that was never alleged. People v. Jones, 149 Ill.2d 288, 292, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 595 N.E.2d 1071 (1992). This court, however, has recognized a two-tiered exception to this general rule. First, a defendant can be properly convicted of an uncharged offense when the uncharged offense is identified by the charging instrument as a lesser offense of the one charged. Second, if the charging instrument identifies a lesser-included offense, evidence adduced at trial must rationally support the conviction on the lesser-included offense. See People v. Landwer, 166 Ill.2d 475, 486, 211 Ill.Dec. 465, 655 N.E.2d 848 (1995); Jones, 149 Ill.2d at 292, 298-99, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 595 N.E.2d 1071. The exception has essentially the same application regardless of whether the reviewing court is considering the propriety of a defendant's request for a lesser-included offense jury instruction (e.g., Landwer, 166 Ill.2d 475, 211 Ill.Dec. 465, 655 N.E.2d 848) or the propriety of a trial court's bench trial finding (e.g., Jones, 149 Ill.2d 288, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 595 N.E.2d 1071).

With regard to the first tier, section 2-9(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (West 1998)) defines an included offense in pertinent part as an offense that "[i]s established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged." The statutory definitions do not, however, provide the determinative factors in deciding if a particular offense is an included offense of another. People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 106, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994).

Initially, defendant cites People v. Kuykendall, 108 Ill.App.3d 708, 64 Ill.Dec. 270, 439 N.E.2d 521 (1982), to support his argument that unlawful restraint cannot be a lesser-included offense of home invasion. In Kuykendall, defendant was charged with home invasion but was convicted of unlawful restraint. The appellate court reversed, finding that the only restraint that occurred was incidental to a battery that the defendant inflicted upon the victim. The court held that this incidental restraint necessary to commit the battery was insufficient to support an independent conviction of unlawful restraint. The court further held that unlawful restraint and home invasion have different scienter requirements and therefore unlawful restraint cannot be a lesser-included offense of home invasion. Kuykendall, 108 Ill. App.3d at 710-11, 64 Ill.Dec. 270, 439 N.E.2d 521.

Kuykendall is not instructive. There, the court made its determination ostensibly by examining defendant's conduct as portrayed by the evidence adduced at trial. That case preceded our decision in Novak and our express adoption of the charging instrument approach. Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 112-13, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762. Under this approach, courts must examine allegations contained in the charging instrument; an offense is considered a lesser-included offense if it is described by the charging instrument. Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 107, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762. In making this first-tier determination, courts do not consider facts adduced at trial. See Novak, 163 Ill.2d at 106-08, 205 Ill.Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (adopting approach requiring examination of facts alleged in charging instrument and rejecting approach requiring examination of facts adduced in evidence). The charging instrument approach does not generally require that the lesser offense be a theoretically or practically "necessary" part of the greater offense. Instead,...