Young v. State

• Decision Date: 02 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 17113,17113
• Citation: 764 P.2d 129,115 Idaho 52
• Parties: Donald Allen YOUNG III, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 129

764 P.2d 129

115 Idaho 52

Donald Allen YOUNG III, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 17113.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Nov. 2, 1988.

Petition for Review Denied Dec. 30, 1988.

Donald Allen Young III, pro se.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. by Peter C. Erbland and David R. Minert, Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order denying Donald Young's application for post-conviction relief. The application alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged misconduct by officers of the state. We affirm the order denying the application.

Young was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime. On direct appeal he challenged his murder conviction, but we upheld the judgment. State v. Young, 106 Idaho 142, 676 P.2d 56 (Ct.App.1984). Young also filed a motion to reduce a sentence of fixed life imprisonment imposed for the murder. His motion was denied. The order denying the motion was not appealed. Young later filed an application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the application. This appeal followed.

Although Young's brief contains numerous assertions of unfair treatment, we deem the case to comprise two principal issues: whether he lacked effective assistance of counsel at the original trial, and whether the prosecutor or other state officers engaged in prejudicial misconduct. We will discuss these issues in turn.

I

Young argues that his trial counsel represented him ineffectively on an issue of intoxication, as it related to specific intent on the charge of first degree murder. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, the claimant must show that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 714 P.2d 86 (Ct.App.1986). To establish such a deficiency, the claimant has the burden of showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the trial's outcome would have been different. Id. Both the deficiency and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness standard are mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. On appeal, when faced with mixed questions of law and fact, this Court defers to facts found upon substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of law to those facts. E.g., LaGrand Steel Products Co. v. A.S.C. Constructors, Inc., 108 Idaho 817, 702 P.2d 855 (Ct.App.1985).

On the question of deficiency, Young contends that his attorney, an experienced criminal defense lawyer, failed to consult with certain drug and alcohol abuse experts regarding an intoxication defense. Young also claims that his attorney failed to seek out and interview a potential witness who allegedly saw him use amphetamines on the day of the murder. However, the latter claim was disputed by the attorney, who testified at the post-conviction hearing that he recalled no conversation about such a witness. Moreover, the record discloses that after his arrest, Young underwent psychiatric and psychological testing by several doctors. Young's attorney was fully aware of the test results. Several examiners found that Young's behavior on the day in question might have been caused by his alcohol and drug use. But one examiner, a psychiatrist with extensive experience as an expert witness, concluded that Young was attempting to use his alcohol and drug use as an excuse for criminal behavior. If called by Young, or in rebuttal by the state, the psychiatrist apparently was prepared to testify that Young had "the capacity to form the intent to commit first degree murder." The attorney consulted with Young and they decided not to present expert testimony carrying a risk of such a damaging rebuttal. The district judge in the post-conviction proceeding found this to be a permissible strategic decision. We agree.

A similar decision apparently was made with respect to potential testimony by Young's wife. Although she could have testified that Young had been drinking, she was not called as a witness because she might have been asked other questions by the prosecutor about incriminating conversations with her husband.

Despite these strategic decisions, some evidence of intoxication did reach the jury. A police officer testified that Young had a "moderate" odor of alcohol when arrested. The defense also placed in evidence a "Mobat" blood-alcohol kit with a test result of .08%. In sum, we uphold the post-conviction judge's determination that the intoxication issue was handled by defense counsel at trial in a...