Kiser v. Reitz
| Citation | 765 F.3d 601 |
| Decision Date | 27 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–3956.,13–3956. |
| Parties | Russell KISER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Lili REITZ et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ARGUED:Todd W. Newkirk, Frank R. Recker & Associates, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Katherine J. Bockbrader, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Todd W. Newkirk, Frank R. Recker & Associates, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Katherine J. Bockbrader, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Before: MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; NIXON, District Judge. *
Dr. Russell Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. The Ohio State Dental Board (the “Board”), of which the Defendants are members, promulgated regulations that restrict his ability to advertise as a specialist in endodontics while also practicing as a general dentist. Kiser asserts that the regulations are unconstitutional because they chill his exercise of his First Amendment commercial speech rights. On this appeal, we must determine whether Kiser has adequately demonstrated that he has standing to bring his claim under the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014). Because Kiser has alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the Board's advertising regulations will be enforced against him in the future, we conclude that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge to the regulations. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's dismissal of Kiser's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and REMAND for further proceedings.
Dr. Russell Kiser is a licensed dentist practicing in Mansfield, Ohio. R. 2 (Compl. ¶ 19) (Page ID # 9). He is thus subject to the regulation of the Ohio State Dental Board, which is authorized by statute to regulate the dental profession in Ohio by promulgating rules, investigating violations of the rules, and administering discipline. Ohio Rev.Code §§ 4715.02 and 4715.03. One regulation promulgated by the Board relates to dentists' advertising: it provides that if a dentist chooses to advertise as a “specialist” in a recognized field, he may not practice or advertise services outside the scope of that specialty. Ohio Admin. Code §§ 4715–5–04, 4715–13–05. Kiser completed an accredited post-doctoral program in endodontics and he is a Diplomate of the American Board of Endodontics. He accordingly may be recognized as a “specialist” in endodontics pursuant to Ohio Administrative Code § 4715–5–04(B)(3) and (4). R. 2 (Compl. ¶ 20) (Page ID # 10).
Kiser opted to advertise himself as a specialist in endodontics, but he also continued to perform general dentistry services. On August 17, 2009, the Board issued a written warning to Kiser for practicing “outside the scope” of his declared specialty in endodontics, in violation of Ohio Administrative Code § 4715–5–04(B)(2). Id. ¶ 22 (Page ID # 10–11); R. 8–1 (Warning Ltr.) (Page ID # 88–89). In relevant part, the letter stated as follows:
The Ohio State Dental Board (Board) recently concluded an investigation regarding the treatment rendered by you to a particular patient. Based on information received during the course of the investigation, and information that the Board had received previous thereto, concerns have arisen regarding the scope of your practice as an endodontist.
...
[A]s a specialist, one can only advertise services associated with the specialty declared.
...
You have limited your license to the specialty of endodontics. Although you are qualified to perform procedures outside the scope of endodontics, you are NOT permitted to perform procedures that are not part of the specialty training of an ADA [American Dental Association] accredited program in endodontics.
Therefore, if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA's definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist.
R. 8–1 (Warning Ltr.) (Page ID # 88–89). The Board did not take any further action at that time.
In May 2012, Kiser requested that the Board approve proposed signage for his office, which included the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” R. 2 (Compl. ¶ 23) (Page ID # 11). The Board neither approved nor rejected Kiser's proposed signage. Instead, on May 24, 2012, the Board sent Kiser a second letter recommending that he consult legal counsel. Id. Enclosed with the letter were a copy of the regulations at issue and a copy of the first warning letter. Id.
Kiser filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the provisions of the Ohio Administrative Code regulating dentists' advertising unconstitutionally restrict his First Amendment rights by limiting his truthful advertisement of the full range of services for which he is licensed.1 He sought injunctive and declaratory relief. On the Board's motion, the district court dismissed Kiser's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “the Board has not yet enforced the regulations at issue against Dr. Kiser, [and] his claim is not ripe for adjudication.” Kiser v. Reitz, No. 2:12–cv–574, 2013 WL 4080734, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Aug. 13, 2013). The district court explained that Kiser's challenge to the regulations was not ripe because “[i]t is uncertain whether the Dental Board will ever initiate any formal charges against Dr. Kiser, and if it does, there are mechanisms in place at the administrative level for Dr. Kiser to challenge the Board's disciplinary action.” Id. at *4. Kiser timely appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir.2012). When considering a challenge to a complaint based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we “must take the material allegations of the [complaint] as true and construe[ ] [them] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.1994). It is the plaintiff's burden, however, to prove that this court has jurisdiction over his claim, Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir.1986), and that the complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of the Constitution to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The standing doctrine delineates the boundary between justiciable cases and controversies and those disputes that are not appropriately resolved through judicial process. Although “the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” the Supreme Court has recognized that “some of [the standing doctrine's] elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The ripeness doctrine is one of several justiciability doctrines “drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993). The “basic rationale” of ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... and also to protect ... from judicial interference until a[ ] ... decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). In addition, “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the ripeness doctrine traditionally incorporates both constitutional and prudential elements, the Supreme Court has recently suggested that prudential justiciability doctrines are “in some tension with ... the principle that a federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court has cast into some doubt “the continuing vitality” of the long-established prudential aspects of the ripeness doctrine, specifically the aspects that concern hardship to the parties and fitness of the dispute for resolution. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2346–47, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014). Instead, the Court addressed the constitutional component of ripeness in terms of standing. Id. at 2341 n. 5. Accordingly, we will address Kiser's claim, which was dismissed as unripe by the district court, using the constitutional standing framework.2
A plaintiff must demonstrate that he has standing to pursue his claim in federal court...
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