United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–20243.,13–20243.
• Citation: 767 F.3d 485
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

767 F.3d 485

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.TRANSOCEAN DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 13–20243.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 18, 2014.

Adam Laurence Goldman, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Samuel Glenn Longoria, U.S. Attorney's Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Sean Daniel Jordan, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan L.L.P., Austin, TX, Steven Lynn Roberts, Attorney, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.

Kenneth G. Engerrand, I, Esq., Brown Sims, P.C., David Andrew Kirby, Strong Pipkin Bissell & Ledyard, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc. appeals from the district court's order enforcing administrative subpoenas issued by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board in connection with an investigation following the disaster on the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit in the Gulf of Mexico. Transocean contends that the subpoenas should have been quashed because the Board lacks authority to investigate the incident. We AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

I.

On April 20, 2010, a blowout, explosion, and fire occurred during drilling operations at the Macondo lease site in the Gulf of Mexico. The Macondo well was being drilled by the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit (“MODU”) tasked to the job by Transocean. As a result of the incident, eleven people were tragically killed, a large volume of flammable gas, oil, and other hazardous substances were released into the water and ambient air, and substantial property damage occurred.

Numerous governmental agencies responded to the disaster, including the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (“CSB” or “the Board”). Established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), the CSB serves a public safety mission by investigating accidental releases of hazardous substances into the ambient air and by reporting to the public its findings and recommendations for preventing and minimizing the risk of industrial chemical accidents.

As part of its investigation into the incident at the Macondo well, the CSB issued five administrative subpoenas to Transocean. The subpoenas sought answers to interrogatories and the production of relevant records, including documents generated by Transocean's own internal investigation. Transocean took the position that the CSB lacked authority to investigate the incident, and it therefore failed to comply fully with the CSB's subpoenas.

The United States filed a petition on behalf of the CSB to enforce the administrative subpoenas, while Transocean moved to quash them and to dismiss the petition. Transocean argued that the CSB was not authorized to conduct an investigation because, inter alia, the incident was a marine oil spill over which the CSB lacks jurisdiction, and the incident did not occur on a stationary source.

The district court denied Transocean's motion and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas. The district court held that the CSB was investigating only the release of airborne gases from the blowout and explosion and was not investigating the subsequent oil spill from the well. The court further determined that the CSB would lack authority to investigate an incident involving a marine oil spill only if the NTSB was authorized to investigate. The court held that the NTSB was not authorized to investigate this incident, however, because the incident was located fifty miles off the coast of the United States on the Outer Continental Shelf and did not involve a “vessel of the United States,” and because the incident was not transportation related. The court also concluded that the Deepwater Horizon and its subsea riser comprised a drilling installation that satisfied the statutory requirement of a “stationary source” from which the accidental release of gases the CSB was authorized to investigate. The district court therefore held that the CSB had authority to investigate the incident and to issue the administrative subpoenas. Transocean now appeals.

II.

Administrative subpoenas issued in aid of an investigation will generally be enforced judicially if “(1) the subpoena is within the statutory authority of the agency; (2) the information sought is reasonably relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the demand is not unreasonably broad or burdensome.” See Burlington N. R. Co. v. Office of Inspector Gen., R.R. Ret. Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir.1993) ; see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 255, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) (holding that enforcement of administrative subpoenas requires a showing “that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the [agency's] possession, and that the administrative steps required by [statute] have been followed”). The Government bears the initial burden to show that these criteria have been met, although the burden to make a prima facie case is “minimal.” United States v. Tex. Heart Inst., 755 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir.1985), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc). Once the Government has made a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the party opposing the subpoenas. Id.

In this case, Transocean focuses its arguments on appeal on the authority of the CSB to issue the subpoenas. We review the district court's factual findings underlying its decision on this issue for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Burlington, 983 F.2d at 638, 641.

III.

Transocean contends that the CSB had no authority to issue the administrative subpoenas because the CSB lacked jurisdiction to investigate the incident at the Macondo well. An administrative agency's authority is necessarily derived from the statute it administers and may not be exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress has enacted. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 1297, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) ; see also Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 500–01 (5th Cir.2007). Here, as noted above, the CSB is an independent federal investigative agency established by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. See Pub.L. No. 101–549, Title III, sec. 301, 104 Stat. 2399 (Nov. 15, 1990). The Board is authorized to “investigate (or cause to be investigated), determine and report to the public in writing the facts, conditions, and circumstances and the cause or probable cause of any accidental release resulting in a fatality, serious injury or substantial property damages.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(C)(i). An “accidental release” is “an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary source.” § 7412(r)(2)(A). A “stationary source” is defined as “any buildings, structures, equipment, installations or substance emitting stationary activities (i) which belong to the same industrial group, (ii) which are located on one or more contiguous properties, (iii) which are under the control of the same person (or persons under common control), and (iv) from which an accidental release may occur.” § 7412(r)(2)(C).

A.

Transocean argues first that the CSB lacked jurisdiction to investigate the incident at the Macondo well because the Deepwater Horizon is not a “stationary source” as that term is contemplated by the statute. Transocean reasons that because the word “stationary” in the term “stationary source” is not defined, the word must be construed as commonly understood, which Transocean contends means a fixed and unchanging object rather than something that is moveable. Transocean argues that the Deepwater Horizon was not only moveable but also was a “vessel in navigation.” It reasons, therefore, that the drilling unit could not be a stationary source. We disagree with Transocean's reasoning.

Transocean is correct that similar mobile offshore drilling units and other structures, and even the Deepwater Horizon itself, have been held to be vessels under maritime law. See, e.g., Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 498–99 (5th Cir.2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir.2009) (en banc). For example, in Demette, we noted that “special-purpose moveable drilling rigs, including jack-up rigs, are vessels within the meaning of admiralty law.” Demette, 280 F.3d at 498 n. 18. It is also well-established that “special-purpose structures” may remain vessels under the Jones Act while engaged in drilling operations. See, e.g., Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 776 (5th Cir.1959). And under Supreme Court precedent a “watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation” is considered to be a “vessel” under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act regardless of its purpose or state of transit at a particular moment. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005). Indeed, the Supreme Court held that a watercraft does not “pass in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether it was moving at the time of the accident.” Id. at 495–96, 125 S.Ct. at 1128. Based on the foregoing authority, the district court in the multi-district litigation spawned from the Macondo well incident held that the Deepwater Horizon was a vessel under general maritime law. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “DEEPWATER HORIZON” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 808 F.Supp.2d 943, 950 (E.D.La.2011) ; see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir.2014) (noting the vessel status of the drilling unit).

Nevertheless,...