McMaster v. Dewitt

Decision Date03 December 2014
Docket NumberNo. 5282.,5282.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesJoseph D. McMASTER, Appellant, v. John H. DEWITT, M.D. and Carolina Psychiatric Services, P.A., Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2013–000717.

Charles L. Henshaw, Jr., Furr & Henshaw, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Carmelo Barone Sammataro and Robert Gerald Chambers, Jr., Turner Padget Graham & Laney, P.A., both of Columbia, for Respondent Carolina Psychiatric Services, P.A.; James Edward Bradley, John Calvin Bradley, Jr., and Margaret Amelia Hazel, Moore Taylor Law Firm, P.A., all of West Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion

FEW, C.J.

Joseph D. McMaster brought a medical malpractice claim against John H. Dewitt, M.D. and Carolina Psychiatric Services, P.A. based on Dr. Dewitt's alleged negligence in overprescribing McMaster the drug Adderall. The circuit court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the statute of limitations barred McMaster's claim. We affirm.

I. Fact and Procedural History

Dr. Dewitt treated McMaster for Adult Attention Deficit Disorder

and prescribed him Adderall. On May 13, 2008, McMaster was involuntarily committed to Palmetto Health Baptist “in a delusional and paranoid state.” Following his discharge on May 28, Dr. Dewitt stopped prescribing Adderall to McMaster. On June 25, 2008, McMaster was once again admitted to the hospital “in a paranoid and psychotic state.”

On June 16, 2011, McMaster commenced a medical malpractice action against Dr. Dewitt and Carolina Psychiatric. He alleged Dr. Dewitt negligently overprescribed him Adderall, which led to his psychosis

and subsequent hospitalization. The complaint mentioned only his June 2008 hospitalization.

During a deposition, McMaster testified Dr. Dewitt told him in May the cause of his psychosis

. Specifically, McMaster stated, [Dr. Dewitt] called it Adderall induced psychosis when I talked to [him].” When asked what Dr. Dewitt did “wrong,” McMaster stated, [H]e just gave me too much medicine.... I mean, it was just way too much and I didn't know it until it was too late.”

Dr. Dewitt and Carolina Psychiatric moved for summary judgment. They argued McMaster's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because it began to run when McMaster was hospitalized in May 2008. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15–3–545(A) (2005). See id. (stating a medical malpractice claim “must be commenced within three years from the date of the treatment ... giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered”).

Two days before the summary judgment hearing, McMaster filed an affidavit in which he claimed he was not aware of Dr. Dewitt's negligence until June 2008. McMaster explained in his affidavit that when he was hospitalized in May, “Neither [Dr. Dewitt] nor anyone else at that time suggested that Adderall ... had caused me to have paranoid psychosis

... or that the amounts of Adderall ... prescribed to me by Dr. Dewitt had caused me any harm.” Instead, he claimed it was not until he learned of his diagnosis in June that he “began to question whether amphetamines such as Adderall had been overprescribed to [him].” Although he “recalled that Dr. Dewitt's partner, Dr. Larry Nelson, had told [him] in May 2008 that Dewitt had a tendency to overprescribe amphetamines

,”1 he stated, “Dr. Nelson did not tell me that [Dr.] Dewitt had overprescribed amphetamines to me or that Adderall had caused me any injury.”

The circuit granted summary judgment, finding that when McMaster filed his lawsuit in June 2011, it had been “more than three years after he discovered that he was hospitalized due to the Adderall prescribed by Dr. Dewitt.” The court based this finding on McMaster's deposition testimony, in which he stated Dr. Dewitt told him in May he had suffered an Adderall induced psychosis

. The circuit court refused to consider the affidavit submitted by McMaster, finding it “should be disregarded” as a “sham affidavit” under Cothran v. Brown, 357 S.C. 210, 218, 592 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2004).

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff does not commence an action within the applicable statute of limitations. See Kreutner v. David, 320 S.C. 283, 286–87, 465 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995) (affirming “the grant [ing] of summary judgment because the statute of limitations has expired”). In reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the circuit court. Vaughan v. Town of Lyman, 370 S.C. 436, 440, 635 S.E.2d 631, 633 (2006). Under this standard, summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP. “In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Quail Hill, LLC v. Cnty. of Richland, 387 S.C. 223, 235, 692 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2010) (citation omitted). “However, it is not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine.” Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013).

While South Carolina courts have not established the standard for reviewing the circuit court's decision to exclude a sham affidavit, federal appellate courts use an abuse of discretion standard.2 See Cothran, 357 S.C. at 218, 592 S.E.2d at 633 (“find[ing] persuasive the reasoning of federal case law in adopting the rule that a circuit court may exclude a sham affidavit). We adopt this standard and accordingly, must determine whether the circuit court acted within its discretion in refusing to consider McMaster's affidavit.

III. Statute of Limitations

McMaster argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for two reasons: (1) a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding when he was put on notice that Dr. Dewitt acted negligently in prescribing him Adderall; and (2) the affidavit he submitted two days before the summary judgment hearing was improperly excluded as a “sham.” We find the circuit court properly granted summary judgment.

A. Notice Under the Discovery Rule

Subsection 15–3–545(A) provides that a plaintiff must bring a medical malpractice claim “within three years from the date of the treatment ... giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered.” We apply the discovery rule to determine when an action accrues. Dunbar v. Carlson, 341 S.C. 261, 266, 533 S.E.2d 913, 915–16 (Ct.App.2000). Under the discovery rule, the statute begins to run when “the facts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.” Knox v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 362 S.C. 566, 570, 608 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ct.App.2005) ; see also Dunbar, 341 S.C. at 266, 533 S.E.2d at 916.

Here, the evidence demonstrates McMaster suffered an injury in May 2008, the circumstances of which put him on notice to inquire into whether this injury gave rise to a claim against Dr. Dewitt. Dr. Dewitt prescribed McMaster Adderall to treat his attention deficit disorder

, and in his deposition, McMaster testified three times he was aware in May that he was hospitalized for Adderall induced psychosis. The following is an excerpt from this deposition:

Q: [Y]ou knew that then, when you went in [to the hospital] that [Adderall] was the problem or when you got out?
A: No. I didn't know it when I went in [the hospital]. I didn't know that was the problem when I went in.
Q: But you knew it when you got out? When you talked to your boss?
A: When I talked to—talked to the doctors on the floor.
Q: Okay.
A: I mean, [Dr.] John [Dewitt] called it Adderall induced psychosis

when I talked to [him].

Q: And that was in May of 2008?
A: Correct.

When asked what Dr. Dewitt did “wrong,” McMaster stated, [H]e just gave me too much medicine.... I mean, it was just way too much and I didn't know it until it was too late.” The following exchange then took place:

Q: And that would've been when you went into the hospital in May—
A: Yeah.
Q: —of 2008?
A: Right.

....

Q: And you were discharged at the end of May 2008 from the hospital?
A: May 2008. The first time, yeah.
Q: All right. And when you were discharged, did you know what was wrong with you?
A: From what I was told, it was Adderall induced psychosis

.

This testimony indicates McMaster was aware in May he suffered an Adderall induced psychosis

due to the medicine prescribed by Dr. Dewitt. As we will discuss, the record contains no admissible, material facts to the contrary. Thus, we find the circuit court properly granted summary judgment because the statute of limitations began to run in May 2008.

McMaster argues a question of material fact exists as to when his cause of action accrued because the discharge summary from his May hospitalization stated he was diagnosed with “[p]aranoid psychosis

of unclear etiology,” but the discharge summary from June contained the diagnosis: “Medication or drug induced psychosis.” He contends that because the May discharge summary did not mention medication as the cause of his psychosis, there is a question of fact as to whether he was put on notice of a claim against Dr. Dewitt.

We find any conflict between the discharge summaries immaterial in light of McMaster's deposition testimony. Specifically, McMaster testified Dr. Dewitt told him in May he had “Adderall induced psychosis

.” McMaster certainly knew Dr. Dewitt was the one who prescribed him Adderall. This information, regardless of the diagnoses in the discharge summaries, “would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice ... that some claim against [Dr. Dewitt] might exist.” Knox, 362 S.C. at 570,...

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