United States v. Katzin

Decision Date01 October 2014
Docket NumberNo. 12–2548.,12–2548.
Citation769 F.3d 163
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant v. Harry KATZIN; Michael Katzin; Mark Louis Katzin, Sr.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. [Argued], Emily McKillip, Esq., Zane D. Memeger, Esq., Thomas M. Zaleski, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant United States of America.

Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [Argued], American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Thomas A. Dreyer, Esq., Chadds Ford, PA, for Appellee Harry Katzin.

William A. DeStefano, Esq., Stevens & Lee, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee Michael Katzin.

Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Esq., Haddon Heights, NJ, for Appellee Mark Louis Katzin, Sr.

Brett G. Sweitzer, Esq., Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for Amicus Appellee Federal Public & Community Defender Organization of the Third Circuit.

Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [Argued], Nathan Wessler, Esq., Benjamin E. Wizner, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union, National Security Project, New York, NY, for Amicus Appellee American Civil Liberties Union.

Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [Argued], American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Sara J. Rose, Esq., Witold J. Walczak, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union, Pittsburgh, PA, for Amicus Appellee American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Pennsylvania.

Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [Argued], American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Hanni M. Fakhoury, Esq., Marcia Hoffman, Esq., San Francisco, CA, for Amicus Appellee Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Catherine N. Crump, Esq. [Argued], American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Peter Goldberger, Esq., Ardmore, PA, for Appellee National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge, with whom RENDELL, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, join.

The instant appeal arises out of the warrantless installation of a Global Positioning System device (a “GPS” or “GPS device”) and subsequent surveillance by agents working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) of a van while investigating multiple pharmacy burglaries. The warrantless surveillance led to evidence of the involvement of brothers Harry, Michael, and Mark Katzin (collectively, Appellees) in the burglaries. Slightly more than a year after the GPS installation and surveillance, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which held that the installation of a GPS device by government agents upon the exterior of a vehicle and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements is a Fourth Amendment “search.” –– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012). As a result, Appellees successfully moved prior to trial to suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the warrantless GPS surveillance, effectively ending the Government's prosecution. We conclude that the evidence is admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and reverse the District Court's grant of Appellees' suppression motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2009 and 2010, the FBI and local police officers were investigating a series of pharmacy burglaries occurring in the greater Philadelphia area, including Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey. The modus operandi was consistent: the perpetrators, who targeted Rite Aid pharmacies, disabled alarm systems by cutting the external telephone lines.

Eventually, Harry Katzin emerged as a suspect. A local electrician, he had recently been arrested for attempting to burglarize a Rite Aid pharmacy, and he and his brothers had criminal histories involving arrests for burglary and theft. Increasingly, investigators received reports of Harry Katzin's involvement in suspicious activities in the vicinity of Rite Aid pharmacies. 1 Their investigation revealed the make and model of Harry Katzin's van, as well as where he primarily parked it, and the agents sought to electronically surveil him. The agents conferred with an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who advised them, in conformity with Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy at the time, that installing a battery-powered GPS device upon Harry Katzin's van on a public street and tracking its movements on public thoroughfares would not require a warrant. Subsequently, on December 13, 2010, without a warrant, officers magnetically attached a battery powered “slap-on” GPS device 2 onto the undercarriage of Harry Katzin's van while it was parked on a public street.

Two days later, at approximately 10:45 p.m. on December 15, 2010, the GPS device indicated that Harry Katzin's van had left Philadelphia and proceeded on public thoroughfares to the immediate vicinity of a Rite Aid in Hamburg, Pennsylvania. According to the GPS device, the van drove around the area before stopping and remaining stationary for over two hours. The agents contacted local police but instructed them to maintain a wide perimeter to avoid alerting the suspects. Consequently, the GPS provided the only evidence of the van's proximity to the Rite Aid. The van left its position at nearly 3:00 a.m. and state troopers followed. Meanwhile, local police confirmed that someone had burglarized the Rite Aid and relayed this information to the troopers, who pulled over the van. Troopers found Harry Katzin at the wheel with Michael and Mark as passengers. From outside the van, troopers observed items consistent with the burglary of a Rite Aid.3 They arrested Appellees and impounded the van. In all, the warrantless GPS surveillance lasted for two days and occurred only on public thoroughfares.

Appellees were indicted and each moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the van. They argued that the warrantless installation and monitoring of the GPS device violated their Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to Jones. The Government argued, inter alia, that even if Jonesnow required a warrant, the evidence should not be suppressed because the agents acted in good faith when installing and monitoring the GPS device.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Appellees' suppression motions. United States v. Katzin, No. 11–226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *11 (E.D.Pa. May 9, 2012). The District Court found that a warrant was required under Jones. Id. at *5–6. Relying on Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), it also rejected the Government's good faith argument, refusing to “extend the good faith exception to encompass the conduct in this case.” Id. at *10. Finally, it concluded that, contrary to the Government's contention, passengers Mark and Michael Katzin had standing to challenge the search of Harry Katzin's van. Id. at *11. The Government appealed.

A panel of this Court unanimously affirmed the District Court's conclusions that the agents' conduct required a warrant and that all three brothers had standing. United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir.2013), vacated by United States v. Katzin, No. 12–2548, 2013 WL 7033666 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2013) (granting rehearing en banc ). However, the panel divided over whether the good faith exception applied and, consequently, whether suppression was appropriate. See id. at 216–41 (Van Antwerpen, J., dissenting). The Government petitioned for, and we granted, rehearing en banc on the singular issue of whether the evidence recovered from Harry Katzin's van should be shielded from suppression pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Katzin,2013 WL 7033666, at *1. We conducted the en banc rehearing on May 28, 2014.

II. DISCUSSION 4

The Fourth Amendment mandates that

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) ([T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness.’). Searches conducted absent a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to certain exceptions. United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2012). To deter Fourth Amendment violations, when the Government seeks to admit evidence collected pursuant to an illegal search or seizure, the judicially created doctrine known as the exclusionary rule at times suppresses that evidence and makes it unavailable at trial. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). However, even when the Government violates the Fourth Amendment, ill-gotten evidence will not be suppressed when the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–26, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (refusing to exclude fruits of unreasonable search because officer acted with objective good faith on later invalidated warrant).

Consequently, we need not determine whether the agents' conduct was an unreasonable search because, even assuming so, we conclude that the good faith exception applies, and that suppression is unwarranted.5 However, we caution that, after Jones, law enforcement should carefully consider that a warrant may be required when engaging in such installation and surveillance. We...

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