Johnson v. Heckler
| Citation | 769 F.2d 1202 |
| Decision Date | 30 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 85-1254,85-1490,s. 85-1254 |
| Parties | , 10 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 361, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,233 Edna JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant- Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Joseph A. Antolin, John Bouman, Steven Coursey, Shelley Davis, Robert E. Lehrer, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Mark B. Stern, Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.
Before BAUER and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *
In this class action, applicants for and recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits challenge regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Plaintiff-applicants allege that the Secretary's regulations governing the sequential evaluation for determining disability claims violate the Social Security Act and the Constitution by denying benefits at a threshold step even to those claimants who meet their prima facie burden under the Act, and by declining to consider the combined impact of nonsevere impairments in determining whether the threshold step is met. On September 19, 1984, 593 F.Supp. 375, after cross motions for summary judgment, the district court enjoined the Secretary from applying the challenged regulations and ordered her to redetermine class members' eligibility for benefits. On December 17, 1984, 607 F.Supp. 875, the district court denied the Secretary's motion for reconsideration based on the passage of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Amendment), which was signed into law on October 9, 1984. We granted the Secretary's motion for a stay pending appeal and now affirm the district court.
In this case plaintiffs essentially challenge a threshold step, known as "step two," in the Secretary's social security disability evaluation process. Effective February 1979 the Secretary amended the regulations promulgated by her under the Social Security Act to establish a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining eligibility for disability benefits. 43 Fed.Reg. 55349 (1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. Secs. 414.1520 & 416.920). The regulations provide:
(b) If you are working. If you are working and the work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regardless of your medical condition or your age, education, and work experience.
(c) You must have a severe impairment. If you do not have any impairment(s) which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience....
(d) When your impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1. If you have an impairment which meets the duration requirement and is listed in Appendix 1, or we determine that the impairment is equal to one of the listed impairments, we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.
(e) Your impairment must prevent you from doing past relevant work. If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairment, we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.
(f) Your impairment must prevent you from doing any other work. (1) If you cannot do any work you have done in the past because you have a severe impairment, we will consider your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and past work experience to see if you can do other work. If you cannot, we will find you disabled.
The Secretary explained that the denials of claims under the step two severity regulation, 20 C.F.R. Sec. 414.1520(c), were
justified on the basis of medical considerations alone when the degree of a medically determinable impairment is found to be not severe. A non-severe impairment may consist of one or more separate conditions that do not significantly limit the individual's physical or mental capacity to perform basic work related functions.... When there is no significant limitation on the ability to perform these types of basic work related functions, an impairment will not be considered to be severe even though it may prevent the individual from doing work the individual has done in the past.
SSR 82-56. Social Security Rulings (SSR) are binding on all Social Security Administration (SSA) personnel, including state agency adjudicators, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), and the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 422.408. On August 20, 1980, the Secretary promulgated a list setting forth examples of impairments that were automatically to be held non-severe regardless of whether they prevented the claimant's performance of his "past work." See SSR 82-55. 1
The plaintiffs also challenge the Secretary's regulations concerning the combination of non-severe impairments in the determination of disability. On August 20, 1980, the Secretary further amended the disability regulations to provide that at step two of the process, Sec. 414.1520(c), she would "consider the combined effects of unrelated impairments [in determining disability] only if all were severe." 45 Fed.Reg. 55574 (1980) (codified at 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1522).
The named plaintiffs in this case demonstrate the effect of the Secretary's 1979 and 1980 amendments to her regulations and rulings. Named plaintiff Edna Johnson applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on March 24, 1982. At that time Johnson suffered from diabetes, mellitus, lumbago, a duodenal ulcer, Echazski's ring of the esophagus, and anxiety neurosis. Johnson was a nurse's aide who had completed two years of high school. The job of nurse's aide requires "medium" exertional capacities. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles & Selected Characteristics (1981) (DOT). Johnson presented unrebutted evidence that due to her impairments, for which she had been hospitalized five times since 1970, she retained a residual functional capacity to perform only sedentary work and thus did not retain the capacity to perform her past work. After a hearing, an ALJ considered each of her impairments in turn and held that each one, taken separately, was "not severe," pursuant to step two of the regulation. The ALJ did not consider Johnson's inability to perform her past work as sufficient to satisfy the step two threshold test. Consequently, the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council affirmed.
James Montgomery, the second named plaintiff, was afforded disability benefits by the Secretary in November 15, 1976, due to diabetes and heart disease. On January 8, 1982, the Secretary informed Montgomery that he was no longer considered disabled and that his benefits ceased in October, 1981. At the hearing, held after Montgomery appealed the termination of his benefits, Montgomery presented unrebutted evidence that he suffered from hypertension, ischemic heart disease with angina pectoris, diabetes, mild obesity, degenerative osteoarthritis of the spine, and the effects of fractures of the hip, leg, and foot. Prior to the onslaught of his illnesses, Montgomery had worked for 28 years as a butcher, cutter, and boner in a meat packing plant. He has a sixth grade education. Montgomery presented uncontroverted evidence that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform no more than sedentary work due to his combined impairments. Montgomery's past job required "heavy" exertional capacity, although a butcher's job could also be classified as "medium." Therefore, Montgomery did not retain the residual functional capacity to perform his past work.
The ALJ reversed the reconsideration decision to terminate benefits, finding Montgomery still disabled. On its own motion, the Appeals Council reversed the ALJ's decision and reinstated the previous termination. The Council held that each of Montgomery's impairments considered singly were non-severe and did not consider the combined effects of the impairments or Montgomery's inability to perform his past work.
On August 11, 1983, Johnson and Montgomery filed an amended class complaint challenging the step two regulation on statutory and constitutional grounds and seeking a redetermination of the denial of benefits. The class was certified on December 7, 1983, and defined as:
[a]ll persons in Illinois who are filing or have filed applications for disability benefits under Title II and/or Title XVI of the Social Security Act, and whose benefits are being or have been denied pursuant to the policies set forth in 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1520(c), 404.1522, 416.920(c) and 416.922 (1982), and Social Security Rulings cum. ed. 82-55 (1982); and all recipients of such benefits who are making or have made claims for continued benefits ... and whose benefits are being or have been terminated pursuant to the same policies.
Johnson v. Heckler, 100 F.R.D. 70, 72 (N.D.Ill.1983).
On September 19, 1984, the district court held that the step two regulation and rulings violated the Act and required the Secretary to consider the "combined effect" of non-severe impairments. On December 17, 1984, the district court denied the Secretary's motion to alter or amend its earlier order based on the passage of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984. Pub.L. 98-460.
On March 5, 1985, pursuant to the 1984 Act, the Secretary amended 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(c) & 416.920(a) to direct her adjudicators to consider the combined effect of all of an individual's impairments in determining the existence of a...
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