Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | 84-7347 and 84-7476,Nos. 84-7282,s. 84-7282 |
| Citation | 769 F.2d 1503 |
| Parties | 38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1364, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,534, 54 USLW 2167 Barbara J. EATMON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRISTOL STEEL & IRON WORKS, INC., Defendant-Appellant. Barbara J. EATMON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. BRISTOL STEEL & IRON WORKS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Barbara J. EATMON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRISTOL STEEL & IRON WORKS, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
J. Scott Vowell, Richard A. Meelheim, Birmingham, Ala., for Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc.
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for Barbara J. Eatmon, et al.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before RONEY and HILL, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant/defendant Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. ("Bristol") appeals a district court order finding that Bristol breached a conciliation agreement between itself and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor ("OFCC"). The order awarded back pay and attorney's fees to the appellees/plaintiffs, one former female applicant and fourteen former female employees of Bristol Steel. The appellees cross-appeal the district court's denial of their claim for front pay. We affirm the district court's order, except with regard to the denial of front pay and the award of attorney's fees to appellee Vernita Oates. These portions of the order are reversed. The case is remanded for a determination of the front pay claim in a manner consistent with this opinion.
In a 1980 routine compliance review of employment conditions at Bristol, which is a government contractor, the OFCC discovered that Bristol had no restroom facilities for women in its plant. The OFCC also learned that Bristol had refused to hire the fifteen appellees and seven other women who had applied for jobs in May of 1979, but had hired several men. The OFCC advised Bristol that it was in violation of Executive Order 11246, which requires government contractors to be equal opportunity employers. 1 In October 1980, Bristol and the OFCC entered into a conciliation agreement to rectify the situation. That agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "executive order conciliation agreement") provided, in relevant part, that Bristol would pay approximately $4,000.00 in back pay to each of the twenty-two persons identified in the document as members of the "affected class." The fifteen appellees were among the persons expressly named in the document as members of "the affected class." The agreement also had provisions relating to "rightful place" and "front pay," stating that "Bristol Steel Company will provide 'front pay' to compensate the affected class for economic losses that they will continue to suffer between the date of execution of the Conciliation Agreement and the date they (individually) attain their rightful place."
Bristol sent notices to the appellees and the other seven women identified in the executive order conciliation agreement, indicating they should contact the company if they were still interested in employment. The appellees did contact Bristol, and Bristol employed fourteen of them beginning in November and December 1980 and January 1981. One of the appellees, Vernita Oates was not employed because she did not have the necessary physical capabilities. 2
The fourteen appellees who were hired were told about some of the provisions of the executive order conciliation agreement but were never shown a copy of the agreement. Under the agreement, Bristol was obligated to explain fully to the affected class their rights under the agreement, including those of back pay. The plaintiffs were informed that the amount of back pay provided for in the agreement was in the range of $4100, but that Bristol was seeking approval for a reduction in the amounts based on earnings that the women had received during the period of May 1979 until the dates of their employment by Bristol.
In late February 1981, the employed appellees executed releases in which they accepted the benefits provided to them under the executive order conciliation agreement as a waiver and release of claims for employment discrimination relating to the delay in their employment. In this regard, each employed appellee expressly agreed in the release "not to institute a lawsuit or a charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act...." Vernita Oates did not sign a release.
After signing the releases, the employed appellees received checks for the gross amount of $1,311.42 (less appropriate withholdings), which was basically the original back pay amount of about $4000 less the earnings they had received between May 1979 and the date they began working for Bristol. Prior to receipt of those checks, they had not been told that the back pay would be of that amount, or, indeed, of any amount less than $4,000. Appellee Vernita Oates was not given any back pay.
In September of 1981, the work force at Bristol was reduced because of general economic conditions. Bristol based the appellees' seniority dates on their actual dates of employment rather than the dates of their initial applications in May 1979. Thus, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Bristol and the union, appellees were laid off prior to the time that men who had been employed by Bristol during May 1979 until November 1980 were laid off.
All the appellees, except Ms. Oates, filed charges with the OFCC on September 15, 1981 and the EEOC on December 14, 1981. After the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging that Bristol had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the executive order conciliation agreement by, among other things, failing: (1) to provide them with seniority retroactive to the date of their initial 1979 applications; (2) to pay them the back pay amounts provided for in the conciliation agreement; and (3) to pay them front pay. 3
Prior to, and at trial, appellant/defendant Bristol Steel argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had jurisdiction, stating,
I think the jurisdiction of the Court is grounded in the jurisdiction of the Court to enforce agreements between the OFCCP and employer.... I think that is the number one. Number two, Title VII of course allows jurisdiction over certain charges. Ordinarily, those where there has been a charge filed with the EEOC, although the courts have also said that there is an ancillary jurisdiction of the Court to enforce Title VII settlement agreements independently of any assertion of a complaint. Apparently, there is also a question as to whether the Court would have diversity jurisdiction.
Trial Record, vol. 3, at 18.
At trial, the district court held for the appellees on the issue of back pay, but against them on their claims for retroactive seniority and front pay. With respect to back pay, the court determined that the conciliation agreement was unambiguous and thus not subject to a different interpretation through consideration of extrinsic evidence. According to the court, "[t]hat agreement clearly ... called for twenty-two persons listed in ... that agreement to be paid amounts listed in that agreement...." Trial Record, vol. 4, at 66. The court thus did not permit Bristol to introduce evidence showing that Bristol and OFCC had agreed that Bristol would pay only those actually employed and that the amount of back pay would be reduced on the basis of interim earnings. The district court also determined that the releases signed by the appellees had no effect on the back pay provisions of the executive order conciliation agreement. It held that Bristol had breached the back pay provisions of the agreement.
The court determined the appellees were not entitled to retroactive seniority since the conciliation agreement did not mention such a benefit and appellees knew when they signed the releases that their seniority dated only from the time of their actual employment, and not from the denial of their original applications.
The court denied the appellees' claim for front pay, stating that the conciliation agreement was not "sufficiently clear with respect to imposing upon the company any obligation under the labeling of rightful place or front pay for its inability to provide seniority for purposes of layoff going back to date of application." Trial Record, vol. 4, at 70.
The court awarded back pay and attorney's fees to all appellees.
Bristol Steel's appeal and appellees' cross-appeal raise basically the following four issues: 4
1. Whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
2. Whether the district court correctly determined that appellees were entitled to back pay.
3. Whether the district court correctly determined that appellees were not entitled to front pay.
4. Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees to appellees.
Initially, it is necessary to clarify the nature of appellees' claims against Bristol. Their complaint, as amended, states basically two categories of claims. The first is a typical Title VII employment discrimination claim, in which they allege Bristol discriminated against them on the basis of sex when it refused to credit them with retroactive seniority back to the date of their initial applications, and refused to train, recruit, hire and promote female employees. With regard to this claim, appellant Bristol Steel maintains that federal jurisdiction could not be grounded in Title VII, since appellees did not file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of these alleged discriminatory acts, as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). E.g., United Air Lines,...
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