769 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 2002), 49S00-0010-CR-616, Henderson v. State

Docket Nº49S00-0010-CR-616.
Citation769 N.E.2d 172
Party NameCorey HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
Case DateJune 06, 2002
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Page 172

769 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. 2002)

Corey HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant,

v.

STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 49S00-0010-CR-616.

Supreme Court of Indiana

June 6, 2002.

Page 173

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 174

Kathleen M. Sweeney, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robin Hodapp-Gillman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Corey Henderson, was involved in an April 1999, Indianapolis drug related armed robbery, and in the ensuing struggle, Jamar Reynolds, an accomplice, was fatally wounded. The defendant was convicted on three counts: 1. felony murder; 1 2. conspiracy to commit robbery as a class A felony; 2 and 3. robbery

Page 175

as a class A felony. 3 The trial court merged the defendant's conviction for class A felony robbery count into the felony murder count, 4 and sentenced the defendant to sixty-five years for felony murder and a concurrent fifty years for class A felony conspiracy to commit robbery. 5 In his direct appeal the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, that his convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit robbery violate the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause, that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing, and that his sentence is manifestly unreasonable.

1. Motion to Suppress

The defendant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion to suppress his statement to police because it was obtained from a coerced search and a warrantless arrest. The defendant was arrested in his home and later, after being given the standard warnings, gave a statement to police at the jail. When the arrest was made, the police did not possess an arrest warrant or a warrant to search the home. The defendant claims that the warrantless entry into his home and his subsequent warrantless arrest violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as an unreasonable search. 6

The Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a residence by police to search for a felony arrestee even when officers have probable cause to make the arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1374-75, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 644 (1980). The State concedes that the police officers' arrest of the defendant amounted to a Payton violation. It asserts, however, that the defendant's subsequent statement to police is not thereby excluded from evidence.

Citing New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644-45, 109 L.Ed.2d 13, 22 (1990), and Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ind.1998), the State argues the exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of a stationhouse statement made by a defendant in legal custody, even if the statement is taken after a Payton violation. The State is correct in this regard. "[W]here the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in

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violation of Payton." Cox, 696 N.E.2d at 859 (quoting Harris, 495 U.S. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 1644-45, 109 L.Ed.2d at 22). For exclusion purposes, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant gave the statement while in lawful custody. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 17-21, 110 S.Ct. at 1642-45, 109 L.Ed.2d at 19-22. "It is well settled that a police officer may arrest a suspect without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony." Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind.1999), Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 536 (Ind.1996); Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 666-67 (Ind.1996). "Probable cause exists when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect had committed a criminal act." Ortiz, 716 N.E.2d at 348 (citing Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 536).

During the police investigation of the death of Reynolds, three witnesses to the shooting described the perpetrator as five feet, four inches tall, weighing 140-150 pounds, with puffy permed hair, and solid gold teeth across the front top of his mouth. The decedent's best friend stated that this description matched a person named Corey, with whom Reynolds and Guilford Forney, a co-perpetrator, 7 had been associating for the past few months. Forney's brother contacted the police and stated he had heard that Corey was in the car at the time of the homicide and confirmed the description given by the witnesses. From this evidence the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant took part in the crimes committed.

Forney's brother stated that Corey lived in a house around the corner on Sunshine Avenue with a family that had a son named Kalief Martin. He described the house where Corey was staying as well as the house across the street from it. After determining the address of the former house, the detective verified that Patty and Otis Martin lived there with their son Kalief. Marion County Sheriff Mike Turner located Patty Martin, who confirmed that Corey Henderson lived in her home. Det. Turner asked Martin to take him to her house. She complied, and when she opened the door, three police officers entered and arrested Henderson.

We hold that regardless of the warrantless police entry into the Martin home where the defendant Corey Henderson was living, the police nevertheless had probable cause to arrest the defendant, and his subsequent statement in police custody was not rendered inadmissible by the warrantless entry.

2. Indiana Double Jeopardy

The defendant contends that his convictions and sentences for felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery as a class A felony violate the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause, Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. He seeks reduction of his conspiracy conviction from a class A to a class B felony.

He expressly grounds his double jeopardy claim on the actual evidence test announced in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999). Under this test, to establish double jeopardy, the defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense." Id. at 53. The defendant argues that the same injury, the fatal gunshot wound to Reynolds, was used

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"to both prove an essential element of the murder and an essential element of the conspiracy to commit robbery." Brief of Appellant at 15.

This argument does not prevail. Under the actual evidence test, "it is not sufficient merely to show that the same evidence may have been used to prove a single element of two criminal offenses." Redman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 263, 267 (Ind.2001) (emphasis in original). To establish double jeopardy, "it is necessary to show a [reasonable 8] possibility that the same evidentiary facts were used to prove the body of essential elements that comprised each of two or more of the offenses resulting in convictions." Id. (emphasis in original). This Court recently emphasized:

The test is not merely whether the evidentiary facts used to establish one of the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish one of the essential elements of a second challenged offense. In other words, under the Richardson actual evidence test, the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense.

Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind.2002).

In the present case the jury was separately instructed as to the essential elements of each of the challenged criminal offenses. One instruction advised that to convict for felony murder under Count 1, the State must prove: "(1) the defendant; (2) killed; (3) another person; and (4) while committing or attempting to commit robbery, which is to knowingly take property from another person or from the presence of another person by using or threatening the use of force on another person, or by putting another person in fear." Record at 128. As to conspiracy to commit robbery, the elements instruction required the State to prove: "(1) the defendant (2) agreed with another person (3) to commit the crime of robbery, which is to knowingly or intentionally take property from the person or presence of another person by using or threatening the use of force, or by putting any person in fear and (4) one of the conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement." Record at 129-30. This instruction also advised that "[i]f the State further proves an additional element beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime resulted in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant, you should find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery, a class A felony." Record at 130. The instruction also explained that it would be a class B felony if the State proved that it was committed by the defendant while armed with a deadly weapon. Id.

In addition to instructing on the elements, the trial court also read to the jury the charging information as to all three counts. As to the murder count, the information charged that Henderson killed Reynolds while committing...

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  • 985 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind.App. 2013), 54A01-1209-CR-409, Guzman v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • April 15, 2013
    ...of mitigating factors offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002). " A court does not err in failing to find mitigation when a mitigation claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, ......
  • 795 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind.App. 2003), 02A03-0206-CR-183, Foster v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 17, 2003
    ...that sentencing decisions lie within the discretion of the trial court and are governed by I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002); Rodriguez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1169, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) trans. denied. This court will review a trial court's sentencing dec......
  • 777 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind.App. 2002), 55A04-0202-CR-67, Sallee v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • November 8, 2002
    ...determinations are within the trial court's discretion and are governed by Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002). We review a trial court's sentencing decisions only for abuse of discretion, including the court's decisions to increase or decrea......
  • 64 N.E.3d 1263 (Ind.App. 2016), 64A03-1511-CR-2038, Stevenson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 26, 2016
    ...factors offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002). A trial court is neither required to find the presence of mitigating factors, Fugate, 608 N.E.2d at 1374 (citi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
128 cases
  • 985 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind.App. 2013), 54A01-1209-CR-409, Guzman v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • April 15, 2013
    ...of mitigating factors offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002). " A court does not err in failing to find mitigation when a mitigation claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, ......
  • 795 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind.App. 2003), 02A03-0206-CR-183, Foster v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 17, 2003
    ...that sentencing decisions lie within the discretion of the trial court and are governed by I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002); Rodriguez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1169, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) trans. denied. This court will review a trial court's sentencing dec......
  • 777 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind.App. 2002), 55A04-0202-CR-67, Sallee v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • November 8, 2002
    ...determinations are within the trial court's discretion and are governed by Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind.2002). We review a trial court's sentencing decisions only for abuse of discretion, including the court's decisions to increase or decrea......
  • 64 N.E.3d 1263 (Ind.App. 2016), 64A03-1511-CR-2038, Stevenson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 26, 2016
    ...factors offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002). A trial court is neither required to find the presence of mitigating factors, Fugate, 608 N.E.2d at 1374 (citi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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