Clay v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 99-D-1006-N.,CIV. A. 99-D-1006-N. |
| Citation | 77 F.Supp.2d 1220 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
| Parties | Mary R. CLAY, Plaintiff, v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP., et al., Defendants. |
Jere L. Beasley, Richard D. Morrison, R. Graham Esdale, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
J. Fairley McDonald, III, Peter S. Fruin, Montgomery, AL, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., W. Randall Bassett, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court are Plaintiff Mary Clay's ("Plaintiff") Motion To Remand and Brief In Support Of Motion To Remand ("Pl.'s Br."), filed October 5, 1999. On October 20, 1999, Defendants Philip Morris, Inc. ("Philip Morris") and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (individually and as successor by merger to The American Tobacco Co.) ("Brown & Williamson") filed their Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Remand, which the court construes as a Response ("Resp."). On October 26, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Response To Defendants' Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Remand, which the court construes as a Reply. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Plaintiff's Motion To Remand is due to be granted.
Removal of a case from state to federal court is proper if the case could have been brought originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statutes must be strictly construed, see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941), and all doubts must be resolved in favor of remand to state court. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108 (3rd Cir.1990)); Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.1983); see also Stone v. Williams, 792 F.Supp. 749 (M.D.Ala. 1992). Further, it is well-settled that the defendant, as the party removing this action to federal court, has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996).
A district court has original jurisdiction over all cases between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants. See Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S. 185, 187, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 108 L.Ed.2d 157 (1990).
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, a defendant's "right to removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a residential defendant having no real connection to the controversy." Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921). The Eleventh Circuit has articulated that joinder may be deemed fraudulent in three situations:
The first is when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse) defendant.... The second is when there is outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts.... [A third situation arises] where a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there is no joint, several or alternative liability and where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the claim against the nondiverse defendant.
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.1998) (citations omitted).
The defendant bears the burden of proving fraudulent joinder. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989)). The burden on the defendant is a "heavy one" that requires the court to evaluate the parties' factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and the court must resolve all uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff. See id.; Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440 (citing Bobby Jones Garden Apts., Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir.1968)).1 If there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder is proper and remand the case to the state court. See Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440 (citing Parks v. New York Times, Co., 308 F.2d 474, 477-78 (5th Cir.1962)). In addressing fraudulent joinder, the court may consider both affidavits and deposition excerpts. See Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1561.
Plaintiff contends that she began smoking cigarettes when she was fifteen years old, and that she smoked at least a pack a day until 1999. (Compl.¶ 21.) Plaintiff claims that she became addicted to nicotine at an early age and "was unaware at the time that she was becoming addicted to the nicotine in the cigarettes." (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff primarily smoked cigarettes manufactured by Defendants. (Id. ¶ 23.) In 1999, Plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer. (Id. ¶ 24.) Her deteriorating health caused her to quit smoking and quit her job and forced her to undergo various medical treatments. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "designed, manufactured, distributed, marketed and sold" cigarettes which were unreasonably dangerous when used for their intended purpose. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff further contends that Defendants knew, or reasonably should have known, that cigarettes were likely to lead to lung cancer and other diseases, and that use of cigarettes would lead to addiction. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had "significantly greater knowledge of the composition of cigarettes," their addictive nature, and the health hazards they posed, yet Defendants continued to sell cigarettes without warning the public about the hazards associated with cigarettes. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)
Defendants Brown & Williamson and Philip Morris are large manufacturers of tobacco products who do business in Alabama by agent. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants Brunos, Inc., Food World, Inc., Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. and United Stop N Shop, Inc. are Alabama retailers that sell cigarettes. (Id. ¶¶ 4-8.) Plaintiff alleges that individual Defendant Jim Wilcox ("Wilcox") is an Alabama resident and a former employee of Philip Morris. (Id. ¶ 9.) Lastly, Plaintiff contends that individual Defendant John Castaneda ("Castaneda") is an Alabama resident and a former employee of Brown & Williamson. (Id.¶ 10.)
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a four-count Complaint against Defendants in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama, in August 1999, claiming violations of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) (count I), negligence (count II), wantonness (count III), and conspiracy (count IV). Defendants Philip Morris and Brown & Williamson3 filed a Notice Of Removal ("Notice") to this court on September 8, 1999, on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is undisputed that the Parties meet the amount in controversy requirement of § 1332. Defendants claim that the diversity of citizenship requirement of § 1332 does not prevent removal because the only non-diverse defendants were fraudulently joined by Plaintiff. (Notice ¶ 12.) In her Motion To Remand, Plaintiff argues that the Alabama Defendants "are not fraudulently joined" and that the case is due to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Lowndes County. (Pl.'s Br. at 2.) For the reasons stated herein, the court agrees with Plaintiff that this cause is due to be remanded.
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the AEMLD (Compl. at Count One), whereas Defendants claim that the individual4 and non-diverse retail Defendants were fraudulently joined because "[P]laintiff has no possible claim against the retailer and individual defendants under AEMLD." (Notice ¶ 21.) When determining whether a resident defendant is fraudulently joined, "federal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law." de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380-1381 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538). Thus, the court must determine whether Plaintiff's claims under the AEMLD against Castaneda and the non-diverse retail Defendants are arguable under Alabama law.
The Alabama Supreme Court first announced the judicially created AEMLD in Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976). To establish a claim under the AEMLD a plaintiff must prove:
(1) he suffered injury of damages to himself or his property by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) Showing these elements, the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from, or entered into any contractual relation with, the seller.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which support an AEMLD cause of action against Castaneda. (Resp. at 8.) First, Defendants note that Castaneda has never had any personal contact with Plaintiff. (Id.) Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff presents no evidence that Castaneda...
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